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Chapter 1 
1. Background and Introduction 
1.1 Background to the Study 
 
Following the end of Apartheid in May 1994, South Africa ventured out into the 
international system with a renewed purpose. As a free nation, South Africa began to 
normalise relations with those countries and institutions which had so fervently isolated it 
during Apartheid. Since then, South Africa has begun to grow and adapt to dealing with the 
realities of the international system in the post-Cold War period. As a result, in the brief 
period, “...since its democratisation in 1994, South Africa has successfully established itself 
as not only an African but also a Southern leader in many international fora such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations (UN).”1 
 
However following the end of Apartheid none of this could have been possible, had it not 
managed to successfully navigate through the often precarious transitional phase, which left 
the nation with the tremendous tasks of both carving out the new political dispensation and 
creating a workable foreign policy.  South Africa was simultaneously deeply affected by a 
number of emerging domestic realities, such as the ever present and highly pressing 
economic and developmental needs of its populace. On top of all this, it has had to make 
progress towards resolving all of these issues in a short period of time, whilst having to 
begin the task of balancing its new global and regional obligations and ambitions.   
One key way in which South Africa has managed to forge ahead into the ever shifting 
international arena is through a process of forging ever closer bilateral relationships with 
many of the worlds more influential nations or multinational organisations, be they from 
the emerging south, or the established north. As such South Africa enjoys formal bilateral 
                                                          
1
 Shrivastava, M. “South Africa in the Contemporary International Economy: India's Competitor or Ally?”, in 
South Asian Survey, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2008, p. 123. 
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relations with approximately 182 states2, and a plethora of multilateral institutions such as 
the United Nations (UN).  
Therefore the notion of forming a strategic partnership is a natural extension of the 
common practise of utilising bilateral relationships as the foremost departure point for 
nearly all diplomatic engagements. Specifically in the South African Governments 
Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) Strategic Plan 2010-2013, 
the department commits itself to realising its strategic focus, one aim of which it 
emphasises is3:   
Through bilateral and multilateral interactions [to] protect and promote South African 
National interests and values.  
 
South Africa however has only established ‘strategic partnerships’ with a handful of states. 
One of the most important strategic partnerships of all is the one South Africa enjoys with 
India. Since the very earliest days following the end of Apartheid, both nations have 
committed to pursuing bilateral relations with one another. Indeed India was one of the first 
countries to re-establish links with the new South Africa, when the former South African 
Foreign Minister Pik Botha successfully restored formal diplomatic and consular relations 
with India in November 19934, during his visit there.  
 
However before progressing any further it is important to define the concept of a ‘strategic 
partnership’. The idea is said to have been borrowed from the business world. It emerged in 
the early 1990’s and grew to be a popular method for generating growth and increasing 
profitability by enabling firms to, “...find and maintain competitive advantage”5. As such, 
Mohr and Spekman tell us that6: 
 
                                                          
2
 Department of International Relations And Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/bilateral/index.htm, February 2011. 
3
 Department of International Relations And Cooperation, Strategic Plan 2010-2013, 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/department/strategic%20plan%202010-2013/strategic%20plan%202010-2013.pdf, 
February 2011, p. 5. 
4
 Author Unknown, India-South Africa Relations, The High Commission of India to South Africa, 
http://www.indiainsouthafrica.com/fact-file/india-south-africa-relations.html. 
5 Mohr, J. & Spekman, R.: “Characteristics of Partnership Success: Partnership Attributes, Communication 
Behavior, and Conflict Resolution Techniques”, in Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Feb., 1994), 
p.  135.  
6
 Loc cit. 
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...partnerships are defined as purposive strategic relationships between independent firms 
who share compatible goals, strive for mutual benefit, and acknowledge a high level of 
mutual interdependence. They join efforts to achieve goals that each firm, acting alone, 
could not attain easily. The formation of these alliances and partnerships is motivated 
primarily to gain competitive advantage in the marketplace.   
 
Macdonald and Chrisp, further explain the concept of a ‘strategic partnership’ in business7: 
The logic of partnership is plain. All organisations have strengths, but no organisation has all 
the strengths required to do everything. For some tasks, the organisation must acquire new 
strengths, through either organic development or the acquisition of external assets. The 
latter course is likely to be much faster than organic development. 
 
They go on to note that8: 
Successful partnership working is built on organisations moving together to address 
common goals; on developing in their staff the skills necessary to work in an entirely new 
way - across boundaries, in multi disciplinary teams, and in a culture in which learning and 
good practice are shared. 
 
It follows logically that many of these notions can be applied to the field of International 
Relations, and the bilateral relationships between various states or multilateral 
organisations in the international system. Essentially it allows one to understand that the 
primary purpose of a ‘strategic partnership’ is to allow countries to achieve greater gains 
through collaborative action by allowing them to leverage their individual expertise or 
comparative advantages, in order to achieve a certain goal. Clearly it was only a matter of 
time before the most powerful nations in the international arena embraced these ideas and 
began to speak of their deeper partnerships with their allies as being ‘strategic’ in nature.  
 
It is this type of thinking that has led South Africa and India to the position in which they find 
themselves today. The ‘strategic partnership’ therefore is as a result of the significant 
potential for cooperation that has existed between them, which they have subsequently 
recognised and chosen to act on. As Alves notes9:  
 
                                                          
7
 Macdonald, S. & Chrisp, T. “Acknowledging the Purpose of Partnership”, in Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 
59, No. 4 (Jul., 2005), pp. 307-308. 
8
 Ibid., p. 308. 
9
 Alves, P. “India and South Africa: Shifting Priorities”, in South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 
14, Iss. 2, Winter/Spring, 2007, p. 87. 
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India and South Africa share a long history marked by common experiences and interests. 
South Africa is now home to the largest Indian population born outside India and the two 
countries are very similar in many respects, not least in language, ethnic diversity, politics, 
and law. This all contributes to a natural affinity between them, and constitutes a strong 
foundation for stronger bilateral ties in an ever more complex international environment. 
The commercial relationship has blossomed in recent years, with India possibly holding the 
most potential of all of South Africa's emerging 'southern partners'.  
 
 
The notion therefore that a partnership between the two was almost inevitable becomes 
increasingly apparent when one considers both the obvious similarities between the two 
and the fluid nature of the current international system, alongside the resultant important 
role both partners play within it.  
Again, South Africa and India are primary examples of powers which are hoping to raise 
their profiles as middle powers through their bilateral, strategic partnership. It is this 
apparent desire to raise their individual profiles within the contexts of both the 
international system and their own regions, which undoubtedly is driving the partnership 
forward.  This idea was given voice as far back as 1996, when in a visit to India the then 
deputy president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, stated10: 
Our common hope of success will depend on our ability to act together. We are reassured 
that we can count on India as our strategic partner in this historic endeavour which seeks to 
give birth to a new world, of just and lasting peace, of prosperity of all peoples and equality 
among nations.”  
 
Ultimately, the official basis of this ‘strategic’ partnership between the two nations comes 
from two declarations that they have both signed. These are the original ‘The Red Fort 
Declaration on a Strategic Partnership between South Africa and India’11, which in 1997 
established the strategic partnership, and the ‘Tshwane Declaration on Reaffirming the 
Strategic Partnership between South Africa and India’12. Both of these documents will be 
given greater attention at a later stage. 
                                                          
10
 Singh, J. “Introduction” in Singh, J.: South Africa-India Strategic Partnership into the 21st Century, Institute 
for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, July 1997, p. 7. 
11
 The High Commission of India to South Africa, India-South Africa Relations, , 
http://www.indiainsouthafrica.com/HCISAShowStatement?id=7. 
12
 The High Commission of India to South Africa, India-South Africa Relations, , 
http://www.indiainsouthafrica.com/HCISAShowStatement?id=8. 
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However in order to truly understand the strategic partnership, and its future direction, one 
also has to look at some of the deeper factors which have contributed towards making it a 
reality.  Above and beyond the obvious factors, such as commercial potential, and 
numerous similarities between both partners, there exist deep historical ties between the 
two. Therefore a brief historical understanding of the relationship throughout the Apartheid 
era is one that has to be explored, in order to begin to understand the essence of the 
partnership. 
The connection between the two countries begins during the period between 1860 and 
1894 when significant numbers of indentured Indian labour was brought over to South 
Africa from India13. Many of these workers were then either forced to remain in South Africa 
or chose to stay, sowing the seeds of South Africa’s approximately one million strong Indian 
population14. 
Alves provides a concise account of the political developments from that point on15: 
The most famous Indian, Mohandas Gandhi, was not a migrant labourer but arrived in 
Durban in 1893 to participate in a lawsuit in the then Transvaal. He founded the Natal Indian 
Congress in 1894 after failing to prevent a bill denying Indians the vote. It is widely accepted 
that his experience of discriminatory rule in South Africa strongly influenced his thinking and 
actions when he returned to India. The African National Congress (ANC), founded in 1912 as 
the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), modelled much of its resistance 
activities on Gandhi's approach. The SANNC became the ANC in 1923; the resemblance of 
the new name to that of the Indian National Congress (INC), formed in 1885, is no 
coincidence. Examples abound of Indians' interactions with South Africa's resistance leaders. 
It is thus unsurprising that Indians have filled many senior positions in the ANC, both in exile 
and in South Africa. Since 1994, Indians have continued to fill prominent posts in the ANC-
led government. The Indian government itself complemented and supported the work of 
Indians in South Africa. In 1947 a newly independent India was the first to impose sanctions 
on the apartheid government. It was also among the first non-African countries to recognise 
the ANC; it allowed the ANC to establish a mission in Delhi and in fact granted the ANC full 
diplomatic status in 1967." India under Nehru was also a founding member of the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM), which consistently condemned the apartheid government and 
was the first country to raise awareness of apartheid in the UN. 
 
India’s ties with South Africa are therefore some of the oldest in the world, and undoubtedly 
the oldest of any nation that is now able to be considered as an ‘emerging power’16.  The 
                                                          
13
 Dharampal : “ South African Indians, India and 'New' South Africa”, in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 
27, No. 43/44 (Oct. 24-31, 1992), p. 2357. 
14
  Alves, P., Op Cit, p. 88. 
15
 Loc cit. 
16
 Ibid., p. 89. 
8 
 
end result of this incredibly strong bond with South Africa led to the prioritisation of 
restoring diplomatic links following the end of Apartheid. As previously mentioned, South 
Africa, “...established its mission in New Delhi in November 1993; the Indian High 
Commission in Pretoria opened in May 1994 after South Africa joined the Commonwealth 
although the consulate in Johannesburg had been open since 1993.”17 
 
Alves outlines further progress from then onward18: 
 
By 1995, South Africa and India had established a joint ministerial commission (JMC); by 
1997 the parties were ready to commit to a full strategic partnership. The JMC, which had 
met six times by 2005, has produced a slew of co-operation agreements, memorandums of 
understanding and declarations on issues ranging from a double taxation avoidance treaty 
and an extradition treaty to the establishment of programmes for co-operation in 
information technology, energy, air transport and so on. There are now about 26 bilateral 
agreements and MoUs in total. 
 
Now that a sufficiently comprehensive background to the strategic partnership has been 
provided, the fundamental research question the dissertation will answer can be 
formulated. This will be:  
 What are the long-term prospects for the ‘strategic partnership’ between India and South 
Africa? 
 
The sub-questions which will be made use of in the report are:  
1. What constitutes a strategic partnership in International Relations? 
2. What makes this partnership a strategic one, within the context of other strategic 
partnerships in International Relations? 
3. What are the priorities of this ‘strategic’ partnership? 
4. Is there a special ‘normative’ element to this partnership? 
5. How important is it to either party in relative terms? 
6. Who stands to benefit from it the most, or is it even sided? 
7. How do the respective foreign policies of India and South Africa drive the partnership? 
8. Are there any areas of obvious future tension within the partnership? 
9. Where is the partnership heading? 
                                                          
17
 Loc cit. 
18
 Loc cit. 
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10. Has the partnership reached an apex in terms of its achievable benefits, or is there more to 
come? 
 
1.2 Rationale of the Study 
The rationale for the dissertation is simple. India and South Africa are fundamentally 
important players within the broader south-south context. Both partners continue to offer one 
another valuable political support and mutual assistance within the international arena. According to 
a statement made by the South African government on 31 May 2010, in the run up to President 
Zuma’s state visit to India19 : 
Internationally, South Africa and India share several common interests, including the reform 
of the United Nations (UN) and Bretton Woods systems, cooperation in the India-Brazil-
South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum, the G20 and on Climate Change. South Africa and India 
also share positions on international threats to security, including terrorism, religious 
extremism, trafficking in drugs, small arms and human beings and infectious diseases such as 
the HIV and AIDS pandemic. 
 
As such, the ‘strategic partnership’ behind South Arica and India’s bilateral engagement has 
the potential to become one of the most influential bilateral relationships of the new 
millennium.  Rob Davies for instance has claimed that the importance of the engagement 
stems from, “...seismic shifts in the global economic architecture with India and South Africa 
leading the change”20. Whilst the Anand Sharma, the Indian Minister of State External 
Affairs, was quoted as saying, “This century will be our century, of India and South Africa 
and Asia and Africa”21.  
The rationale therefore is derived from understanding the potential benefits and 
shortcomings of the strategic partnership. The example South Africa and India set is 
significant in that it demonstrates to many of the Souths’s leading powers what is 
achievable through close bilateral cooperation. This in turn will enable other nations within 
                                                          
19
 Department of International Relations and Cooperation, President Zuma to Undertake State Visit to India, 
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2010/10053115351001.htm, 31 May 2010. 
20
 Voll, K., India and South Africa: South-South Cooperation and Reform of the International Governance 
System, Foundation for European Progressive Studies, http://www.feps-
europe.eu/fileadmin/downloads/globalprogressive/1006_India_SouthAfrica_SouthCoop_KV.pdf, June 2010, 
p.4. 
21
 Loc cit. 
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the developing south to either learn from or emulate the example which is being set by 
India and South Africa as they work together to advance not only themselves, but the 
developing south as a whole. 
Yet the potential to realise greatness though strategic partnerships, does not begin and end 
here. By way of example, one can refer to the long standing ‘strategic consensuses’ between 
the United States and Israel, in order to see the potential rewards close cooperation 
through such a partnership can bring. It was this understanding between the two, from the 
very creation of Israel, that the United States government was committed to the existence 
and territorial integrity of Israel, while Israel would maintain the regional political status 
quo, which has had such a profound impact on the Middle East22. For decades now this 
special relationship has virtually defined the character of the Middle East, affecting the lives 
of millions of individuals. This sets quite a hefty precedent in terms of what is achievable 
and how to go about doing so. More than that however this example demonstrates the 
value and importance of understanding the dynamics and limitations of strategic 
partnerships, such as the one South Africa and India now enjoy. 
South Africa and India’s partnership has essentially evolved from changes in the 
international system. At the international level, improved multilateral and bilateral relations 
between the emerging Southern elite states have prompted a dramatic shift in the global 
balance of power. The end of the Cold War has opened up significant space and generated 
numerous possibilities for non-dominant countries in the international system to redefine 
their role within this system23. “In this process, different political initiatives have stressed 
the importance of a certain group of non-dominant countries- which have reasonable 
bargaining power – not only in global political and economic restructuring, but also in the 
various regional subsystems in which they are located”24. 
South Africa and India are primary examples of just such powers, which are hoping to raise 
their profiles as middle powers through their bilateral, strategic partnership. It is this desire 
                                                          
22
 Gulshan, D., “U.S.-Israel Strategic Consensus” in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 18, No. 51, Dec. 17, 
1983, p. 2156. 
23
 Sennes, R. “Brazil, India and South Africa: Convergences and Divergence in Intermediate Countries’ 
International Strategies”, in Vaz, A. (eds.): Intermediate States, Regional Leadership and Security: India, Brazil 
and South Africa, Universidade de Brasilia, Brasilia, p. 49 
24
 Loc cit. 
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to raise their individual profiles within the contexts of both the international system and 
their own regions. This is best illustrated by Alves when he points out that for South Africa, 
India possibly holds “...the most potential of all of South Africa's emerging 'southern 
partners'”25.  
Therefore it becomes imperative that a deeper understanding of the partnership is gained, 
not only in terms of its potential to impact upon the international system, but because of 
the effect it may have on either partner. Because strategic partnerships represent such a 
powerful diplomatic tool, they need to be interrogated. Doing so will provide insight into a 
whole host of issues, not least of which is the fact that very little has been written about the 
dynamics of strategic partnerships. In most cases governments continue to promote these 
partnerships, but are unable to effectively define the term, “strategic partnership” let alone 
leverage them to achieve greater mutual benefit.   
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
Process tracing will constitute the primary methodological approach to the ‘strategic 
partnership’. This is as methodological approach which is, “...well suited to testing theories 
in a world marked by multiple interaction effects, where it is difficult to explain outcomes in 
terms of two or three independent variables”26. This is because as George and Bennett put 
it, process tracing, “...is an indispensable tool for theory testing and theory development not 
only because it generates numerous observations within a case, but because these 
observations must be linked in particular ways to constitute an explanation of the case”27. 
This has proven to be the best method of assessing the ‘strategic partnership’ between 
South Africa and India. They also recognise that process tracing forms a prominent 
component of Social Constructivism theories28, which is  what the report has employed in 
order to analyse the ‘strategic partnership’. 
                                                          
25
 Alves, P. Op Cit., p. 87. 
26
 George, A. & Bennett, A.: Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, MIT Press, London, 
2005, p. 206. 
27
 Ibid., p. 207. 
28
 Ibid, p. 206. 
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The research will utilise a substantial variety of secondary sources. Authors such as Alves, 
Shrivastava, Voll, and Singh formed an integral part of the analytical framework. The sources 
themselves will come from a variety of books and journals, key documents, policy papers, 
and newspaper articles. Close consultation will also be made with several prominent South 
African academics, such as Dr Stephen Gelb, a former director of the Centre for Indian 
Studies, Dr. Nomfundo Ngwenya, a South African foreign policy expert based at the South 
African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), as well as Elisabeth Sidiropoulos and former 
South African Naval Capitan, Frank van Rooyen, both of whom are highly knowledgeable 
and experienced SAIIA staff. This will help greatly in securing multiple sources of input, and 
increase the robustness of the report. 
The University of the Witwatersrand’s extensive libraries have been instrumental in securing 
the necessary secondary sources. Further the researcher’s employment at the South African 
Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), has further facilitated the significant usage of 
primary evidence, through consultation with leading South African academics, who are 
employed by the institute, or whose work is housed in the institute’s library.  
As the author is focusing on his home country, deeper insights into South African aspects of 
the report have emerged. Field research in India would have rounded the report, however 
due to budget and time constraints this will not be possible.  
 
1.4 Literature Review 
 
There are three main topics which the existing research covers, all of which feed into the 
scope of the research report: These are: South Africa and India’s bilateral relationship, the 
foreign policies of South Africa and India and the need to engage with the term ‘strategic 
partnership’.  
As the origins of the term ‘strategic partnership’ have already been dealt, the next task in 
situating the strategic partnership within the context of the literature is reviewing the 
foreign policy directives of either partner.  Beginning with India’s foreign policy one 
13 
 
observes certain key trends. These are eloquently outlined by Cohen, in his book, “India, 
Emerging Power”29. 
The enduring national debate in any major democracy revolves around the balance between 
considerations of realpolitik and its idealist inclinations. The former are necessary because 
the world is imperfect, since even other democracies may pursue policies which threaten it-
just as alliances with distasteful or dissimilar states may be necessary. Yet democracies have 
an urge to proselytize, and many, including India, assume that foreign policy should be an 
extension of cherished domestic values. India has for many years projected an image of 
indecision as it has oscillated between grand proclamations of idealism and actions that 
appear to be motivated by the narrowest of realpolitik considerations. It has treated some of 
its neighbours as vassals, while declaring its support for the equality of all states; it has 
bowed low before totalitarian regimes, while professing an eternal commitment to 
democracy. In recent years, there seems to be a new effort to resolve the realism-idealism 
conundrum and to determine priorities in Indian foreign policy. 
 
Sahni notes that there are eight key drivers of contemporary Indian foreign policy. These 
are30: 
India's quest for strategic autonomy; its aspiration to status transformation; its desire to play 
a role in shaping the global system; its need to access technology and bypass technology 
denial regimes; its hunger for energy; its regional imperatives; its search for a continental 
role; and its diaspora policy. There are also five crucial factors that are, significantly, not 
acting as drivers of India's foreign policy today —democracy, culture, geography, markets 
and norms. 
 
South Africa’s foreign policy on the other hand, is slightly different in its construction, but is 
eerily similar in the way in which it too struggles to strike a delicate balance between Realist 
concerns and the Liberal principals which are enshrined in its constitution31:  
The bifurcated character of the country’s foreign policy is shown by its ability to play a 
leadership role and persuade other states to subscribe to its vision on the one hand, and its 
tendency to be persuaded by pragmatic factors to act as only one among the many in 
regional engagements on the other. The latter trait demonstrates a reluctance to lead.  
 
                                                          
29
 Cohen, S.: India: Emerging Power, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 307-308. 
30
 Sahni, V. “India's foreign policy: Key drivers”, in The South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 14, 
Iss. 2, Winter/Spring 2007, p. 21. 
31
 Habib, A. & Selinyane, N. “South Africa’s Foreign Policy and a Realistic Vision of an African Century”, in 
Sidiropoulos, E. (ed.): Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future: South Africa’s Foreign Policy 1994-2004, The South 
African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 2004, p. 55. 
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The actual factors which go into formulating South African Foreign Policy are outlined in the 
2008 updated Green Paper on Foreign policy, which draw heavily on the original principals 
that were first laid out between 1994 and 1995. Minister Alfred Nzo has spelt out South 
Africa's foreign policy principles in the following terms (Heads of Mission Conference, 
September 1995, Pretoria):  
The underlying principles which serve as guidelines in the conduct of our foreign relations 
include32:  
 a commitment to the promotion of human rights;  
 a commitment to the promotion of democracy;  
 a commitment to justice and international law in the conduct of relations between 
nations;  
 a commitment to international peace and to internationally agreed-upon mechanisms 
for the resolution of conflicts;  
 a commitment to the interests of Africa in World Affairs; and  
 a commitment to economic development through regional and international 
cooperation in an interdependent world."  
 
In his address to the Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committee of Parliament on 14 March 1995, 
Minister Alfred Nzo made the following observations about South Africa's foreign policy 
objectives and priorities33:  
 "In terms of foreign policy, Africa is clearly to be a priority in the years ahead."  
 "The promotion of economic development of the Southern African region is of 
paramount importance as the economies of the countries in the region are intertwined 
to such an extent that, for South Africa to believe that it could enter a prosperous future 
in isolation without taking neighbouring countries with her, would be unrealistic and 
hazardous."  
 "South Africa will also strive to engage the industrial world in development in Southern 
Africa with the objective of enhancing the fullest possible development of its human and 
natural resources by combining foreign capital with our own expertise."  
 "South Africa exchanges the equivalent of 64 per cent of its GNP with the outside world 
... (and) ... it follows from our broad national interests and governmental policy that the 
emphasis with all European countries, should fall upon economic, technological and 
scientific cooperation."  
 
                                                          
32
 Department of Foreign Affairs, South African Foreign Policy, 
http://www.info.gov.za/greenpapers/1996/foraf1.htm#3, 22 April 2008. 
33
 Loc cit. 
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Therefore there are indeed similarities and significant overlaps in the aims of both India and 
South Africa’s respective foreign policies. However India’s global ambition and South Africa’s 
African centric view, demonstrate that there are indeed areas in which they differ. The 
effect of these differences in foreign policy will need to be explored and understood within 
the context of the ‘strategic partnership’. 
In order to understand these differences, and to contextualise the partnership, one needs to 
be aware of the basic characteristics of the partnership so far, before moving on to the 
contemporary debates surrounding the partnership. The partnership therefore is 
characterised by cooperation in the areas of global trade reform, UN Security Council 
reform, economic growth, defence, scientific progress, technological advancements, culture 
and climate change. All of which have been outlined in the Tshwane Declaration, which 
carried on from the earlier Red Fort declaration. 
“While both India and South Africa present useful examples of the complex nature of a 
democratic state in economically, culturally and ethnically diverse societies, there are 
significant differences in their political economies that make them logical economic 
partners, political allies, as well as competitors in the international system”34. 
To date co-operation has been achieved in a number of areas. These have been primarily 
centre around economic issues. Boosting bilateral trade has been particularly successful, as 
evidenced by the previously mentioned fivefold increase in bilateral trade since 2003. 
Defence is another example of an area in which strong gains have been made.   
An MoU on defence equipment was signed in 1996, with the India-South African Joint 
Defence Commission following two years later. Since then there has been substantial trade 
in hardware and good progress has been made in maritime security co-operation35.  
 
The maritime aspect has been fruitful as evidenced by the successful conclusion of the 2008 
IBSAMAR I joint naval exercises36.  
                                                          
34
 Shrivastava, M. “South Africa in the Contemporary International Economy: India's Competitor or Ally?”, in 
South Asian Survey, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2008, p. 132. 
35
 Alves, P. Op Cit., p. 91. 
36
 Dutta, A. “Role of India's Defence Cooperation Initiatives in Meeting the Foreign Policy Goals” in The 
Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3,  July 2009, p. 36. 
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Yet there is evidence of emergent tensions or areas which could prove to be problematic in 
the coming years, within the ‘strategic partnership’ as a whole. The most important of which 
is that there is a growing feeling that India may place less emphasis on its relations with 
South Africa, as it continues onwards to claim its place as a new global super power. As its 
influence grows, India will shift its emphasis, and start to focus on its relations with the USA, 
China, Pakistan, Russia and a rapidly advancing East Asia37.  
As such, South Africa’s relations with these countries and the East Asian region may have 
significant consequences for South Africa and the continued prospects of the ‘strategic 
partnership’. The point at which India may begin to shift its priorities away from South Africa 
to these other partners, is naturally unknown, however it needs to be watched carefully by 
South African policy makers. 
To date there appears to be very little available literature on the topic of South Africa and 
India’s bilateral relations, or the implications thus far of their ‘strategic partnership’.  Much 
of the literature on South African Foreign policy is out of date, and has not reflected the 
change in the political environment within the country, following the replacement of 
President Mbeki, by President Zuma. The literature on Indian Foreign Policy is often security 
centric, and fails to address the bilateral and multilateral engagements she enjoys with 
other countries. South Africa is also largely ignored by Indian analysts, who opt to focus on 
the partners who will become central in India’s rise to super power status.  
There however are a wide array of official documents and sources of information regarding 
the subject, however this is often couched in political terms and is relatively vague in most 
instances. These limitations however are not insurmountable. Through close consultation of 
an optimal mix of primary and secondary sources, and effective dialogue with numerous 
academics and government officials from both the Indian diplomatic mission to South 
Africa, and the South African government, this will be overcome. 
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1.5 Theoretical Background and Existing Theory  
 
International Relations theory attempts to provide a conceptual framework which enables 
one to analyse the interactions between and among states, within the international system.  
 
1.5.1 Constructivism 
 
One of the top theories which could describe the strategic partnership between South Africa 
and India is Constructivism. Constructivism is the branch of International Relations theory, 
which stresses the socially constructed nature of modern international relations. It can be 
used in this situation due to its somewhat balanced nature, as it has its origins in Realism, 
but outwardly it commonly identifies with Liberal viewpoints. 
 As such the theory was developed by the notable constructivist theorist Alexander Wendt, 
who challenged conventional realist and liberal thinking which he believed was inherently 
flawed in their base assumptions. Wendt for instance attempted to show key realist 
concepts such as power politics were a product of social interaction, and as such were 
socially constructed and not simply a natural phenomenon. He maintained that concepts 
such as power politics are capable of being transformed by human actions, in that power 
politics can be shaped by ideas and individuals to be more or less important depending on 
who was interacting and at what level.  
The debate between realists and liberals has remerged as an axis of contention in 
international relations theory. Revolving in the past around competing theories of human 
nature, the debate is more concerned today with “structure” (anarchy and the distribution 
of power) versus “process” (interaction and learning) and institutions38.  
 
Barkin informs us that39: 
Constructivists see the facts of international politics as not reflective of an objective, 
material reality but an intersubjective, or social, reality. In other words, what actors do in 
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international relations, the interests they hold, and the structures within which they operate 
are defined by social norms and ideas rather than by objective or material conditions.  
 
It would therefore be able to take these implicit assumptions of Constructivism, and apply 
them to the strategic partnership between South Africa and India. It is entirely plausible to 
argue that the entire relationship is founded not on real world concerns such as mutual 
economic development, or power projection, as Liberal or Realist proponents might, but 
instead that the relationship stems almost entirely from the close relationship between the 
ANC and India during the anti-Apartheid years. It is identity politics taken to a whole new 
level, basing an entire strategic partnership on a shared history and common values. This is 
altogether not that farfetched, when one considers that ultimately, “...constructivism makes 
explicit an assumed but unexplored step in situationally strategic liberal arguments which 
accounts for the maintenance of cooperation.”40   
Hopf elaborates even further when he applies constructivist theory to his analysis of the 
notion that in international relations actors and structures are mutually constituted. He 
asks:41 
How much do structures constrain and enable the actions of actors, and how much can 
actors deviate from the constraints of structure? In world politics, a structure is a set of 
relatively unchangeable constraints on the behavior of states. Although these constraints 
can take the form of systems of material dis/incentives, such as a balance of power or a 
market, as important from a constructivist perspective is how an action does or does not 
reproduce both the actor and the structure. 
 
The relevance of this to the case of South Africa and India’s strategic partnership is 
important. It fundamentally seeks to deal with the nature of the partnership, and the actors 
within it. Hopf goes on to outline additional elements of Constructivism which demonstrate 
why it is the best theoretical approach to adopt in this context:42 
Meaningful behavior, or action, is possible only within an intersubjective social context. 
Actors develop their relations with, and understandings of, others through the media of 
norms and practices. In the absence of norms, exercises of power, or actions, would be 
devoid of meaning. Constitutive norms define an identity by specifying the actions that will 
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cause Others to recognize that identity and respond to it appropriately.  Since structure is 
meaningless without some intersubjective set of norms and practices, anarchy, mainstream 
international relations theory's most crucial structural component, is meaningless. Neither 
anarchy, that is, the absence of any authority above the state, nor the distribution of 
capabilities, can "socialize" states to the desiderata of the international system's structure 
absent some set of meaningful norms and practices. 
 
These ideas and the use of Constructivism as a theoretical tool to explain the nature of 
South Africa and India’s strategic partnership will be dealt with in greater detail, at a later 
stage.  
 
Chapter 2 
 
2. The Individuals within the Strategic Partnership: Understanding 
Contemporary India and South Africa 
 
As was mentioned in the introduction to the study, the broad purpose of this dissertation is 
to get to grips with the nature and possible future direction of India and South Africa’s 
strategic partnership. In order to do this, chapter 1 provided the historical background to 
the formation of the strategic partnership.  Chapter 2 will therefore examine each of the 
partners as individuals, as understanding the individuals who compose the partnership is 
the key to understanding the partnership itself. This is in itself an essential task, as a failure 
to understand the nature of the individual, and the dynamics which have shaped their 
current global and domestic realities will ultimately leave one unable to accurately fathom 
the overall character and future direction of the strategic partnership.  
The process will be undertaken through an examination of each partner’s domestic power 
attributes, and by reviewing their global standing. In so doing, the chapter will focus on the 
most salient features that have come to define contemporary India and South Africa. The 
process will primarily focus on the period from the early 1990’s right through to the present 
day. It is also necessary to make mention of the fact that in dealing with both individual 
partners attention will be paid to their respective shortcomings, as it is only through their 
relative shortcomings that one is able to properly understand their individual identities. To 
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do so, the chapter will now begin the process of exploring South Africa’s economic, 
domestic and international dimension. 
As such, the chapter will serve as an important introductory component to the following 
one, which will move on to examine the actual strategic partnership. Its purpose therefore 
will be to continue the process of laying the foundation for an in depth examination of 
South Africa and India’s strategic partnership.  
2.1 Situating South Africa 
 
South Africa is a nation of many contradictions, and contrasts. They are expressed though 
her diversity and continued struggle to reinvent herself over the years. Although the country 
is nowhere near as powerful as contemporary India, it is able to hold its own in nearly every 
international and continental arena in which it engages. South Africa also holds undeniable 
potential, as Africa’s foremost economy, and the continent’s most successful state.  
To gain a broad overview of contemporary South Africa, please refer to Appendix 1, which 
covers all of South Africa’s key developmental indicators and general characteristics.   
2.1.1 South Africa’s Economy 
 
One of the most important aspects of post-Apartheid South Africa has been its economic 
performance. This is a key feature in the manner in which South Africa not only see itself, 
but is seen by others. The country’s economic challenges are often at the forefront of both 
government policy making and the wider public discourse.  
As such it comes as no surprise that South Africa’s global economic reintegration and 
domestic economic performance following the end of Apartheid has been one of the most 
difficult challenges the country as a whole has had to face. To this day, poor economic 
performance and a whole host associated problems within the economy, continue to plague 
the aspirations of the South African government. In many ways therefore, the country’s 
economic performance and the domestic factors which continue to impede further growth, 
act as the perfect barometer for South Africa’s overall performance.  
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Macro- Economic policy has as a result become the chosen method of dealing with many of 
the shortcomings within the economy, while equally serving to overcome the legacy of 
Apartheid. As such, Macro-Economic policy needs to be closely examined in order to 
understand the reality that contemporary South Africa has had to face. 
In light of this, it is important to note that South African economic policy has continued to 
evolve since it first emerged under the direction of government from 1994 onwards, right 
up till the present day. So far it has been fundamentally characterised by strong market and 
growth orientated ideals, while thankfully never losing sight of the core need to redress the 
many injustices of the past. However to properly understand South Africa’s economy, one 
needs to go back to the beginning, in order to appreciate the exact nature of the challenge 
the post-Apartheid government was confronted with. 
As such the new government had, “...inherited an economy characterised by high levels of 
public debt, high inflation and poverty rates, as well as little social security protection for 
the most vulnerable.”43 The problems that faced South Africa’s economy on the eve of the 
elections were nothing short of immense. Freund and Padayachee provide a solid overview 
of this particularly bleak picture44: 
Economic growth had slowed markedly since the early 1970s, reversing the robust growth 
that characterised the performance of the economy in the 1960s, when the country's 
growth rate on average was surpassed only by that of Japan. During the severe recession of 
March 1989-May 1993 the contributions of both the primary and secondary sectors to 
growth fell in real terms; only the tertiary sector experienced a positive, albeit marginal, 
growth. Although manufacturing remained the principal contributor to GDP, the nature of 
South African manufacturing still remained closely linked to the mining and energy sectors, 
which were the foundations of South Africa's modernisation since the second half of the 
19th century. Net investment had been declining since 1981. Domestic investment as a 
proportion of GDP declined from 27 per cent to 15 per cent over the decade 1983-93. 
Domestic savings fell from an average of 23.5 percent of GDP in the 1980s to 17 per cent in 
1993. By the early 1990s as much as 40-45 per cent of the economically active population 
was found outside the formal sector. Labour absorption into the formal sector from the mid-
1970s to 1994 plummeted from 60 per cent to under 40 percent. 
 
In addition, South Africa struggled to deal with the effects of immense levels of international 
competitive trade and economic pressure it now was forced to face, a vulnerability to 
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external shocks, a high unemployment rate, a low level of human capital development, the 
scourge of HIV/AIDS, and an unacceptably high rate of crime (including corruption and 
fraud)45.  
As a result South Africa had to adopted new economic policies which would have to be 
designed to deal with this whole host of problems. This in itself was no easy task, as in exile 
the ANC had spent very little time planning for South Africa’s post-Apartheid economic 
reconstruction46. This meant the ANC was unable to offer any more complex economic 
outlook than what had been broadly laid out in the 1955 Freedom Charter47. This left them 
with few realistic options, as the Freedom Charter had largely spoken of Nationalisation as 
the starting point for the beginning of the reconstruction process48.  Freund and Padaychee 
continue49: 
However as the ANC began to interact with a wider set of establishment interest groups and 
institutions, both global and local, it came to see these sorts of attractive populist economic 
pronouncements as damaging to its image. A process of setting out an alternative macro-
economic vision was set in place, with the assistance of the Canadian development agency, 
the International Development and Research Centre. That initiative led to the formation of 
the Macro-Economic Research Group (MERG), a network of South African researchers linked 
to a central administrative and co-ordinating structure based at Witwatersrand University in 
Johannesburg. A number of progressive British, Canadian, American and Australian 
economists, who had been closely associated with the anti-apartheid movement in their 
respective countries, assisted in the formulation of the new macro-economic policy.   
 
What followed was South Africa’s first post-Apartheid macro-economic policy, which would 
come to be known as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The RDP first 
emerged as a concept by the ANC in its 1994 Policy Framework document. From here it was 
taken up in the Government of National Unity’s RDP White Paper -Discussion Document50. 
In his opening address to a Joint Sitting of Parliament, on the 24 May 199451, President Nelson 
Mandela described the motivations behind the RDP52:  
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My Government's commitment to create a people-centred society of liberty binds us to the 
pursuit of the goals of freedom from want, freedom from hunger, freedom from deprivation, 
freedom from ignorance, freedom from suppression and freedom from fear. These 
freedoms are fundamental to the guarantee of human dignity. They will therefore constitute 
part of the centrepiece of what this Government will seek to achieve, the focal point on 
which our attention will be continuously focused. The things we have said constitute the 
true meaning, the justification and the purpose of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme, without which it would lose all legitimacy." 
 
The RDP itself therefore was a macroeconomic framework which emphasised the alleviation 
of poverty, and the reconstruction of the economy53. To do this it sought to deal with five of 
the most important issues in the South African economy. These were: meeting basic needs; 
upgrading human resources; strengthening the economy; democratising the state and 
society; reorganising the state and public sector54. The RDP treated social and economic 
problems as being largely interrelated. This became an important characteristic of South 
Africa’s domestic environment, as nearly all of South Africa’s domestic challenges were 
interwoven with the efforts to revitalise and develop a new economy for the country. 
Even though the RDP viewed economic and social problems as being synonymous, it did 
rank them in terms of importance. Meeting basic needs was described as being, “...the first 
priority”55, this would be closely followed by “...the development of human resources 
through education and training”56. Corder explains that57: 
In the first year of operation "22 Lead Programmes were identified, planned and budgeted 
to kickstart the delivery" of the RDP. These covered a broad range of activities, for example: 
land reform, redistribution and restitution; health care, in particular the provision that "no 
child under 6 years of age and no pregnant women may be turned away from a hospital or 
clinic"; electricity; primary school nutrition, under which "5,4 million children are being fed a 
basic snack every morning" and the provision of rural water. 
 
 All of this would be financed by what was known as the RDP Fund, which was established in 
terms of the RDP Fund Act of 199458. The fund unfortunately was unable to raise the required capital 
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to sustain the RDP ambitious goals, particularly since the massive amounts of financing from both 
public and private sources failed to materialise59.  
Ultimately the RDP enjoyed somewhat of a limited success. It did achieve quite a lot in terms 
of working towards its goals, but it was largely labelled as being overambitious and as a 
result saw many groups in South African society becoming disillusioned with the 
programme. The RDP overemphasised the role of the state within the broader 
developmental framework, and at the same time failed to set specific targets or deadlines 
by which its goals were to be achieved. The end result of which was that the RDP office was 
closed in March 1996, and the RDP fund ended up being reincorporated into the ministry of 
finance60. 
 Following on from this the RDP was to be replaced by the next evolution in South African 
Macroeconomic policy. The new macro-economic policy was to become known as the 
Growth Empowerment and Redistribution. GEAR was presented to the South African 
parliament in 1996, by the then minister of finance, Trevor Manuel61.  
The main aims of GEAR were to improve South Africa’s Macroeconomic discipline by 
reducing the budget deficit, which would be achieved by reducing the government’s debt 
and interest burden62. GEAR also sought to promote foreign investment in South Africa, 
through various measures, including a reduction in tariffs63. The final major component of 
GEAR revolved around the idea of freeing up markets in the country, through efforts such as 
privatising inefficient state owned enterprises and allowing market forces to set price levels, 
rather than relying on state intervention to do so64.  
The end result of these changes in macro-economic policy was that South Africa had been 
able to re-establish itself with the international economic arena. South Africa embraced 
neoliberal economic orthodoxy and has enjoyed steady advances in terms of her economic 
progress. However GEAR failed to deliver on all of its aims. Carmody’s view of the results of 
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South Africa’s post-Apartheid economic policy performance is revealing when he states 
that: 
...with the end of apartheid, it was meant to be well placed to act as an 'engine of growth' 
for surrounding countries. However, despite the elimination of international sanctions, since 
1996 when neo-liberal economic reforms were introduced more than a half a million jobs 
have been lost, in contrast to the 600,000 that were meant to be created. Total private non-
agricultural employment fell almost 6 per cent from 1997-1998 alone, and employment 
declines have continued unabated since then. In the first nine months of 2000, as the gold 
price declined, over 9 per cent of gold miners lost their jobs, with each worker supporting 
approximately ten people financially. This deepening jobs crisis could be read as a working 
through of the previous economic crisis, and an adjustment to globalisation, which will bring 
renewed growth and job creation in its wake: the position espoused by ministers in the 
South African government. Alternatively, the interaction between internal economic 
conditions, external competition and capital flows may presage deepening economic 
dualism and marginalisation. Which of these outcomes results depends importantly on the 
actions and strategies of the major companies that dominate the South African economy, 
and on state policies that frame the context in which these strategies are adopted. 
 
In contrast to any of the later views with regard to India’s economic miracle, we see South 
Africa is lagging behind in terms of economic dynamism and as a result stands as a lesser 
next to India’s successes within the same time frame, although this is somewhat 
understandable due to the obvious differences between the two partners. 
 This brings us to the state of the South African economy today. In February 2006 the South 
African government formally adopted a new macro-economic policy, known as the 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA)65. Its chief challanges still 
remain, long after it was first unveiled in 2006. These are outlined by the IMF in the IMF 
Survey Magazine Economic Health check for South Africa66: 
South Africa’s strong overall economic performance is tarnished by the difficulty 
encountered in reducing its high unemployment level. The recession worsened the country’s 
unemployment picture considerably, with close to 1 million jobs lost since end-2008. As of 
June 2010, unemployment stood at some 25 percent. This contributes to the high degree of 
income inequality. 
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Overall AsgiSA has seen the country’s economy enjoy modest success. South Africa 
managed to achieve an average economic growth rate of 5 % between 2004 and 200767. The 
South Africa Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) however offers up far more upbeat 
assessment of the state of the economy, in its report entitled: “2010, Geared for Growth”68. 
In it, the DTI lists certain economic highlights for the South African economy, which include: 
 Government debt, as a percentage of GDP, declined from 44.4% in 2000, to 22.4% in 2009. 
 Private sector investment has grown at an average of 5.4% a year over the past decade. 
 There has been increasing investment interest in South Africa as a base for accessing Africa’s 
potential as an almost untapped source of raw materials. In 2008, over US$14 billion 
worth of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) entered South Africa, more than double the 
previous year’s recorded investment flows. 
 In 2008, the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index ranked South Africa 45th 
out of 134 global nations. 
 South Africa generates two-thirds of Africa’s electricity and accounts for almost 25% of the 
continent’s GDP. 
 
This therefore means that South Africa now possesses a modern and competitive economy, 
which is both sophisticated and self reliant. Although nowhere near India’s current 
performance, South Africa, “...is one of the most sophisticated and promising emerging 
markets in the world”69. Its unique combination of highly developed economic 
infrastructure, and a burgeoning emerging market economy, has resulted in “...an 
entrepreneurial and dynamic investment environment with many global competitive 
advantages and opportunities”70. 
 
2.1.2 South Africa’s Domestic Reality 
 
Although most of South Africa’s domestic challenges can be related back to its economic 
performance, or rather the social dimensions of that performance, there are still numerous 
additional factors which are independent of that sphere. This section will provide a brief 
overview of the domestic environment within South Africa, focusing primarily on the top 
challenges that the country is currently facing. That said, however it is important to note up 
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front that the overall domestic situation within the country is one of relative stability. South 
Africa suffers from no significant internal divisions or threats, such as terrorism or separatist 
movements and does not contest any of the borders it shares with neighbouring states.  
The first challenge which South Africa is unfortunately most famous for is the issue of crime. 
Domestically South Africa suffers excessively high levels of crime and corruption; so much so 
that it has often been labelled ‘the crime capital of the world’. This is widely recognised to 
be one of the most important domestic issues facing the country today. In 1998, the 
Institute for Security Studies set out to answer the question of whether or not South Africa 
was the crime capital of the world, they concluded that71: 
Based on Interpol figures South Africa has high but manageable levels of property crime but 
an extraordinary high level of violent crime. It is South Africa’s high level of violent crime 
which sets the country apart from other crime ridden societies. This finding is supported by 
CIAC data indicating that since 1994 recorded violent crime has been escalating at a faster 
rate than any other crime category. It is primarily violent crime which fuels people’s fear of 
crime. 
 
Their research did not end there. In their 2010 report entitled “The state of Crime in South 
Africa” they reveal that a,”... longitudinal analysis of total national crime recorded annually 
shows that overall crime levels peaked in 2002/03, after which there was a gradual decline 
until 2007/08 when crime started to rise once again”72. Crime continues to plague South 
Africa, and is often cited as one of the primary reasons for low foreign investor confidence 
in South Africa73. 
South Africa is also facing significant problems with regards to the issue of migration and 
refugees. In 2010, one quarter of all asylum requests made in the world, were made in 
South Africa74. This means that South Africa is now ranked by the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees, as the most favoured country for asylum seekers in the world75. 
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The Forced Migration Studies Programme (FMSP) at the University of the Witwatersrand is a 
leading institution dedicated to studying issues surrounding migration within South Africa. 
In a 2010 they released a report entitled, “Population movements in and to South Africa”. It 
provides an accurate overview of the extent of the challenge South Africa is facing76:  
 Recognized refugees: cumulative since 1994: 47 596 (at end 2009); 
 Recognized asylum seekers: new applicants in 2009: 223,324. Of these, 4,567 were 
approved, 46,055 were rejected and 172,702 were added to the backlog of unprocessed 
cases; 
 Economic migrants issued with individual work permits (not including corporate permits): 
32,344 in 2007/8 (more recent data not available); 
 People deported: 312,733 in 2007/8. More recent data is not publically available, although 
overall deportation numbers are likely to have diminished significantly after the moratorium 
on deportation of Zimbabweans was introduced in April 2009.  
 
Migrants and refugees also pose a significant potential challenge to the South Africa 
government not only due to their sheer numbers, but also due to local attitudes towards 
them. Violence against foreign nationals has become an ongoing feature of post-Apartheid 
South Africa77. “While the most intense period of attacks took place in May 2008, similar 
patterns of violence began long before and have yet to stop”78. The results of the most 
recent outbreaks of violence were that79: 
 
From 11 to 26 May 2008, foreign nationals and ethnic minorities were attacked in at least 
138 sites across South Africa. This resulted in 62 reported deaths. At least a third of those 
killed (21) were South African citizens from ethnic minorities. In addition to the murders, 
over a hundred thousand people were displaced and millions of Rand of property were 
damaged or stolen. 
 
HIV and AIDS are the next most significant challenge South Africa faces. The UNAIDS 
programme in 2008 reported that there are an estimated 5.4 million South Africans who are 
living with HIV/AIDS80. This represents a large portion of the overall population, and will 
continue to place a significant socio-economic burden on the South African government, 
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and society at large.  The nature of the burden is revealed by Booysen, Geldenhuys and 
Marinkov to be81: 
 A decline in total labour supply and in the total population due to HIV/AIDS-related mortality 
amongst the economically active population, which affects both the demand and supply side 
of the economy. 
 A decline in labour and total factor productivity resulting from HIV/AIDS-related morbidity. 
 Direct and indirect costs and productivity losses to the private sector due to HIV/AIDS-
related morbidity and mortality amongst employees: Firms will experience higher 
expenditure due to increased health care costs, burial fees and training costs and payment 
of other employee benefits, as well as absenteeism and a higher labour turnover, which will 
increase the cost of employment. In addition, demand for certain goods and service and 
therefore sales revenue and turnover may increase or decline due to changes in household 
expenditure patterns. These impacts of the epidemic translate into increased production 
costs, increased prices (i.e. higher PPI, and perhaps even higher interest rates), and a decline 
in aggregate demand, savings and investment. 
 Household expenditure: The care of and loss of HIV infected family members translate into 
losses of household income as well as higher medical and funeral expenses, which results in 
changes in expenditure patterns and in turn in private savings and in investment. 
 Government expenditure: HIV/AIDS will impact primarily on the health sector due to a 
higher demand for health services and the high costs of HIV/AIDS treatment. In addition, the 
public sector will like business in the private sector face higher costs of employment and 
lower productivity as a result of HIV/AIDS, which in turn will result in lower savings due to 
greater deficits. 
   
However, in spite of this, South Africa has many comprehensive policies and programmes in 
place to deal with the pandemic. As a result these policies comprehensively cover the 
management, treatment, care and support of AIDS. The South African government is 
therefore taking action do deal with the pandemic. Its treatment programmes have82:  
...enrolled approximately 370,000 people by September 2007 with ARV treatment in the 
public sector and an estimated 120,000 people in the private sector. Although still 
significantly lower than the treatment need, it is currently the largest AIDS treatment 
programme in the world. 
 
On a more positive note, South Africa is increasingly becoming a stable democracy, despite 
the many domestic challenges it is facing. It was not long ago, particularly in the first free 
election the country held in 1994, where politically motivated violence had been 
widespread. In April 1994 as the first democratic election approached, anti-election 
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elements within the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and on the extreme right of the South 
African political spectrum generated an upsurge in political violence83. “In the four week 
period 16 March to 15 April, 429 people were killed”84. However there were only seven 
people who were recorded as being killed in political violence during the election days85. 
This then led to what has been termed as the South African political miracle, as the 
expected violence never materialised. 
Ever since then, electoral process and democratic rigor has been firmly established in South 
Africa. From the current perspective, as far back as the April 2004 national elections, the 
electoral process was completely calm. In April 2004, “...the electoral process had become 
so routine that many described the campaign and voting day as boring and reporters 
searching for controversial stories had little to cover”86. In fact, “...the electoral process was 
perceived to be on track to such an extent that the European Union, United Nations, 
Commonwealth, and Carter Centre all declined to send delegations to monitor and observe 
the 2004 election”87. Ultimately in 2004 it was voter apathy and not voter intimidation that 
had become a major concern for political leaders and analysts”88. Clearly therefore South 
Africa has become a stable democracy, free from the curse of electoral violence and political 
instability that continues to plague many of her regional African neighbours. 
South Africa’s domestic position therefore is multifaceted. South Africa possesses a great 
number of strengths and advantageous qualities, but at the same time is indeed dealing 
with a growing number of potentially serious challenges.  The country has however made 
significant progress towards dealing with these challenges, as seen by the example of its 
extensive AIDS programmes. The future prospects for South Africa therefore continue to 
look bright, as was aptly demonstrated when South Africa successfully hosted the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup Soccer Tournament 
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2.1.3 South Africa’s International Presence 
 
Moving now onto one of the most important aspects of South Africa’s position within the 
strategic partnership; the countries international presence. Within the international arena, 
we see that South Africa has emerged into the post-Apartheid period with a great deal of 
enthusiasm. South Africa has made significant strides to normalise relations with a whole 
host of countries, particularly those within the Southern African region. Simon provides a 
brief overview of South Africa’s re-emergence onto the international stage89:  
Following regular assertions by President Nelson Mandela to that effect, the ANC-led 
government committed itself to fostering friendly and mutually beneficial relations-both 
bilateral and multilateral-with other African states, and to open and honest dealing. Virtually 
all major global and continental organizations, including the UN and its specialist agencies, 
the World Bank, Commonwealth, Non-Aligned Movement and Organization of African Unity, 
were joined or rejoined within a very short period of time following the ANC's I994 election 
victory. 
 
The new government therefore strove to undertake a foreign policy position which was 
orientated towards the global South, as a direct extension of its broader African agenda90. 
Its execution91: 
...has involved a complex balancing act aimed at advancing developmental goals embedded 
in an independent foreign policy. The country’s foreign policy elite has sought to weigh 
national imperatives with regional and continental goals and dynamics, factoring in South-
South cooperation considerations while navigating North-South tensions and opportunities. 
This has entailed exploring a workable partnership between Africa and the industrialized 
North in particular, North and South in general. One of the major challenges facing South 
Africa has been balancing issues of principle and morality with unavoidable considerations of 
realpolitik. The Mandela government strove to position the country as a “good” world 
citizen conducting a principle-driven foreign policy. This was underscored by commitments 
to human rights and international law as a “guide” to the relations between nations while 
promoting Africa’s interests; at the same time, linking internal development to growing 
regional and international cooperation.  
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As it stands today, South Africa is clearly an important player within the wider international 
system. The reshaping of South Africa’s foreign policy by the ANC government since the end 
of Apartheid has played an important part in achieving this success, as it is directly linked to 
the manner in which the country both portrays itself in the international system and is 
simultaneously perceived by other actors within that system. As such South Africa, 
particularly in the early years, established itself as a moral and highly principled actor under 
the presidency of Nelson Mandela.   
 
Unfortunately some of the earliest tests of this Afro-centric and highly principled approach 
to foreign policy produced rather embarrassing results. The two examples which spring to 
mind are when President Mandela made his proposal at the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government meeting in New Zealand that Nigeria's military regime should be isolated for 
the execution of the prominent Ogoni activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995; and his attempts to 
broker a peace deal between Mobutu and Kabila to end the war in the Congo in I99792. 
“These interventions either failed or backfired, raising further questions over the thrust, 
orientation and programmatic content of South Africa's foreign policy”93.   
 
However these initial setbacks did not dampen South Africa’s resolve. Following on from 
Mandela, Thabo Mbeki began to consolidate South Africa’s international position. He did so 
by shifting the ANC government’s foreign policy from one of aspirational moralism to 
operational pragmatism, leading to a greater sense of orthodoxy and conservatism in its 
conduct94. South Africa also began to commit itself greatly under Mbeki’s leadership 
towards embracing multilateralism. 
 
Around 1996, Mbeki began to outline his approach on an idea he managed to popularised, 
which became known as the ‘African Renaissance’95. In simple terms, the essence of this 
notion of an ‘African Renaissance’ was a tool which South Africa would use to maximise its 
foreign policy options in Africa96.  The ultimate expression of this philosophy was 
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undoubtedly found in Mbeki’s efforts to establish his New Economic Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD), which was to fall under the aegis of the African Union (AU) as its 
economic and social development programme. De Waal describes NEPAD as being97: 
 
...both a 'big idea' and an umbrella for best practices. It is an opening for major resource 
flows, both aid- and trade-related, and an attempt to reenvision development partnership 
on the basis of good governance within Africa. 
  
Biswas comments on NEPAD98: 
 
While the AU is Africa's aspirational outfit in the present globalisation setup, its pragmatic 
counterpart, New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a plan for African 
development. Through NEPAD, African leaders have made a commitment to the African 
people and the world to work together in rebuilding the continent. It is a pledge to promote 
peace and stability, democracy, sound economic management, people-centric development 
and to hold each other accountable in terms of the agreement outlined in the programme. 
 
However South African foreign policy is not blind to the broader international arena, due to 
its distinctly African orientation. Its commitment to multilateralism has seen South Africa 
become a key player in several international organisations. So much so, that many feel 
South Africa has made an impact in this field that, even at an early stage, it has managed to 
reach far beyond its, “...perceived level of capacity, influence and experience”99. 
 
Having noted this, there is an alternative view which should be considered. This view may 
also be closer to reality than the overly idealistic image the South African government, and 
the Mbeki presidency in particular, attempted to cultivate. What this view of South Africa 
entails is that rather than ascending to the natural position of ‘African champion’, South 
Africa has instead risen to become a ‘reluctant hegemon’100.  Mokoena elaborates on this 
position further101: 
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The country’s economic dominance has pushed it into a leadership role in African politics, 
yet the willingness to fulfil this role is not clear, especially since many African elites perceive 
South Africa as a self-interested ‘neo-imperialist’ actor. This is in part due to the obvious 
differences between South Africa and most (sub-Saharan) African countries, which often 
means that South Africa’s national interests, however broadly defined, are not always 
aligned with those of other African countries.  
 
This said, it is undeniable that South Africa has managed to engage in a wide variety of 
regional and international arenas, dealing with a multitude of issues. Therefore her foreign 
policy strikes a careful balance between a strong commitment to Africa and the need to 
behave as a responsible developing nation. 
 
Within the international arena, one of the most important issues South Africa has engaged 
with which demonstrate a measure of versatility within its foreign policy, has been the 
process of reforming the UN Security Council and the Bretton Woods institutions. In 2003, 
the Secretary General of The United Nations, Kofi Annan, raised the issue of Security Council 
reform in an address to the General Assembly102. Shortly after this, President Mbeki 
addressed the assembly and voiced his support for the idea of reforming the Security 
Council. The Secretary General subsequently greatly honoured South Africa by nominating 
the country to serve on his task team which was to advise him on the matter103.  
Subsequent to this South Africa has occupied a non-permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council twice, once during 2007-2008, and again from 2011-2012104. 
 
South Africa also played a distinguishing role in setting up and hosting the first negotiating 
session of what was to become known as the Kimberly Process105. The first meeting was 
convened in May 2000 in Kimberly. What it aimed to do, by including governments, NGO’s 
and the international diamond industry, was to set out and develop an internationally 
accepted and recognised procedure for certifying that all diamonds reaching the 
international market had not come from illegal diamond mining operations, or had not been 
smuggled out of legal mines106. This was a bold attempt to reduce the scourge of so called 
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conflict diamonds, which had fuelled conflicts in countries like Angola, Liberia, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone107. The efforts met with great success, so 
much so that by 2003, 50 countries and interests in the international diamond industry had 
signed up to the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme108.  
  
South Africa has further enhanced its international profile by becoming a regular participant 
and member of numerous organisations orientated to the interests of the global south. 
These include, the India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) dialogue forum, the G77, the Non 
Aligned Movement (NAM), The African Union (AU), The Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), and most recently the Brazil, Russia, India, China group of large 
developing economies, now known as the BRICS.     
 
Additionally the country has played host to numerous important international conferences 
over the years. The first mega conference the country hosted was in June 1996, which was 
the ninth meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 
IX)109. After the successful hosting of this prestigious event, many others soon followed. 
These included: the conference on the Information Society and Development (ISAD) in 1996; 
the 12th summit of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) in Durban (September 1998); the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, which gave rise to the Fancourt declaration 
on development (November 1999); the UNAIDS conference in 2000; The Wold Conference 
on Racism (WCAR) in Durban (August to September 2001); the founding Summit of the 
African Union (June-July 2002); followed shortly thereafter by the largest and most 
successful of the all, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in September 
2002110.  
 
Last but not least South Africa has managed to play a strong leadership role in many of the 
world’s financial institutions, chief among which is the World Trade Organisation (WTO), of 
which South Africa has been a member since January 1995111, and the International 
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Monetary Fund (IMF). South Africa has played such an important role in these organisations 
for many years, that as, “... testimony to its status as one of the leading emerging 
economies of the world, South Africa was invited along with Brazil, China, India and Mexico 
to participate at the G-8 Gleneagles Summit in 2005112” 
 
In conclusion then South Africa has made incredible progress in terms of its economy, its 
domestic situation and it ever increasing international presence. It has become somewhat of 
a force to reckon with in the brief period since its reacceptance into the international 
environment. Therefore credit to the country which even in the face of a wide variety of 
challenges, has managed to elevate itself to such a prominent position. It is no wonder India 
has established a strategic partnership with South Africa, because what it lacks in substance, 
it more than makes up for in potential.   
 
2.2 Situating India 
 
India is rather a contradictory power; it is developing at a phenomenal rate, yet is still bound 
by tradition and constrained by almost overwhelming domestic pressures. India however 
has, in many ways just like South Africa, undergone a series of rapid and monumental 
changes since the early 1990’s. An attempt will now be made to situate India within the 
same economic, domestic and international spheres. 
To gain a broad overview of contemporary India, please refer to Appendix 2, which covers 
all of India’s key developmental indicators and general characteristics.   
 
2.2.1 India’s Economy 
 
Interestingly, India’s currently phenomenal economic performance began with a series of 
domestic economic reforms, at roughly the same time as a free South Africa was starting to 
carve out its new growth path with the RDP.  In 1991 India began what can be termed as an 
‘economic awakening’. This was a rather a late start for India, as in comparison to most 
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developing nations at the time, India had chosen to follow an inward orientated industrial 
development policy, as opposed to an outward orientated one113. The final push that drove 
India into a new economic age came in the combined of the end of the Cold War, and a 
domestic balance of payments crisis.114. 
This ‘awakening’ therefore officially began to occur in 1991 when the 1974 Foreign 
Exchange and Regulation Act (FERA), was finally overturned115. According to Nagaraj116: 
Such a restrictive policy is believed to have retarded domestic technical capability (as 
reflected in the poor quality of Indian goods); it also meant a loss of export opportunity of 
labour-intensive manufactures - in contrast to many successful east Asian economies. 
Moreover, such a policy is said to have encouraged 'rent seeking' by domestic partners on 
imported technology - with little efforts to improve product quality, undertake innovation, 
and seek export markets. 
 
This rather unsatisfactory situation was largely due to the fact that India was relatively 
closed off to foreign investment and joint-venture partnerships. Nagaraj continues117: 
Compared to most industrialising economies, India followed a fairly restrictive foreign 
private investment policy until 1991 - relying more on bilateral and multilateral loans with 
long maturities. Inward foreign direct investment (FDI) was perceived essentially as a means 
of acquiring industrial technology that was unavailable through licensing agreements and 
capital goods import. Technology imports were preferred to financial and technical 
collaborations. Even for technology licensing agreements, there were restrictions on the 
rates of royalty payment and technical fees. Development banks largely met the external 
financial needs for importing capital equipment. However, foreign investment was 
permitted in designated industries, subject to varying conditions on setting up joint ventures 
with domestic partners, local content clauses, export obligations, promotion of local R and D 
and so on - broadly similar to those followed in many rapidly industrialising Asian 
economies.    
 
India as a result has managed to boast incredible economic growth, with an average growth 
rate of more than 7 percent per annum since 1994118. India’s real GDP growth rate is 
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expected to be between 8 and 9 percent during 2011119. This incredible performance has 
been leveraged on the back of India’s moves to open its economy to international 
investment and global competitive forces, and to foster a market friendly approach to 
business120. It has also managed to rid itself of many inefficient state run enterprises, since 
the early 1990’s121. It is this adoption of neo-liberal macroeconomic policies by the Indian 
government which has been credited with its continued success. Varshney provides a 
succinct overview of the evolution of India’s economy to date122: 
In some areas of economic policy, progress has been dramatic; in others, little or no progress 
has been made. India's investment regime has undergone the most extensive reform. The 
industrial licensing system has been almost completely abolished. Firms are free to make 
decisions about investment, pricing, and technology. Only three industries-rail transport, 
military aircraft and ships, and atomic energy generation-are now reserved for the public 
sector (instead of 18 in the past), and these, too, are beginning to welcome collaboration 
with private industry on some activities. The rules governing foreign investment have been 
substantially liberalized. Complete foreign private ownership in a large number of industries, 
and majority private ownership in most industries, is allowed, excluding airlines, insurance 
companies, and the major retail trade. And since 1992, foreign institutions have been 
allowed to buy and sell stocks in Indian firms. Indian companies, in turn, are now free to 
issue equity in foreign markets. A great deal of progress has also been made in reforming 
India's trade and exchange-rate regimes. India now has a flexible exchange rate system. The 
average tariff on imports has come down from over 1oo percent to just under 25 percent 
today, and all quota restrictions on trade have been lifted. 
 
One of the great success stories to come out of this process has been India’s ability to create 
massive software and services based industries, both of which have been almost entirely 
financed from domestic sources123. These industries now have a solid foothold in many of 
the world’s most advanced economies, such as the United States. The Indian software 
industry was expected to be worth around US$ 50 billion in 2008, reaching US$ 100 billion 
not long afterwards124.  
A chief reason why the software industry and the economy as a whole is performing so well 
is because it has benefitted greatly from India’s post-independence policy of state 
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subsidised education125. As a result, India now possesses significant highly trained, English-
speaking educated elite, which make up the backbone of its economy126. India’s success 
with education means that at current rates, India will soon become the world’s largest 
English speaking country127.  India has also achieved another significant milestone through 
its economic performance, which is the establishment of a middle class. This middle class, 
usually defined by the ability to buy a private car, numbers somewhere in the region of 300 
million people; making it larger than the entire population of the United States128. Along 
with this significant achievement, India demonstrates its ferocious commercial energy when 
one considers the fact that every month, five million new mobile phone subscribers are 
signed up129. Interestingly, Varshney makes the additional observation along these lines, 
that130: 
Corporate dynamism, rarely associated with India in the past, is fast changing the business 
map of the country, and India, in turn, is rapidly becoming an important factor in the global 
strategies of the world's leading international firms. 
 
However this is not to say India’s growth is going to remain this way. There are in fact 
numerous impediments to her continued economic success, chief amongst which is the 
dismal state of India’s largely crumbling infrastructure. This is a primary reason why India is 
witnessing less foreign investment than its nearest Asian rival, China, and why unlike China, 
India has been unable to leverage its manufacturing sector131. Walker provides this 
description of India’s infrastructural plight132:  
Its ports, railroads, highways, electricity supplies, and grid systems are aged and ramshackle, 
and traffic jams and power outages are routine, reinforcing each other when the traffic 
lights blink out. Critical segments of the economy- such as the container transport system, 
which allows easy shipping of freight by land, sea, and air - have been state monopolies, 
subject to the usual debilitating problems of the breed. Arriving foreigners receive a startling 
introduction to the bustle and backwardness of India before they ever reach a hotel. 
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Varshney goes on to mention additional factors that continue to limit progress, in five key 
areas. They are, “...fiscal policy, privatization, small-scale industry, agriculture, and labor 
law”133. Large scale agricultural subsidies which are heavily defended by India’s poor 
farmers are often blamed for significant deficits, yet they are almost impossible to remove 
due to socio-political pressure134. A lack of reform in terms of India’s labour law is also a 
serious problem for India’s continued economic success, “...meaning that no company 
operating in India employing more than loo workers can fire any without government 
permission-and permission is almost never granted”135. 
Arguably the largest constraint to India’s continued economic growth is its relative lack of 
energy security. Sharma and Mahajan take stock of the situation136:  
In order to sustain a growth rate of 8% up to 2031-32 and to meet the basic energy needs of 
its citizens, India must increase its primary energy supply by three to four times 2003-04 
levels and its electricity generation capacity/supply by five to six times. At present, India 
imports almost 70% of its oil and this dependency is slated to increase significantly, given 
India’s deficiency in indigenous sources of energy, particularly oil. 
 
Clearly therefore this presents a monumental challenge to a country like India, especially in 
the face of growing global demand and the combined effects of the fact that many energy 
producing nations are already struggling to keep up with demand. This issue therefore may 
cripple India’s future development just as surely as nuclear war with Pakistan would. 
Lastly, India has to deal with the one more inescapable reality; population growth. This in 
itself is perhaps less worrisome than the knock on effects it will have for the entire Indian 
economy. This knock on effect is more of a cumulative process, whereby it ratchets up 
demand for resources, jobs, social services and living space. Lavoy details the effects of 
India’s expanding population on the countries people and environment:  
Urbanization, industrialization, and skyrocketing energy consumption are damaging air 
quality and causing deforestation, soil erosion, water pollution, land degradation, and strain 
on the municipal services of all major cities. New Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, and Kolkata rank 
among the world’s largest and most polluted cities because of heavy industrial pollution and 
the rapidly rising number of vehicles on the roads. Of the three million premature deaths 
                                                          
133
 Varshney, A. Op Cit., p.  97. 
134
 Loc cit. 
135
 Loc cit. 
136
 Sharma, D. & Mahajan, D.  “Energising Ties: The Politics of Oil”, in The South African Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 14, Iss. 2, Winter/Spring 2007, p. 40.  
41 
 
1that occur worldwide each year because of air pollution, the highest number is reported in 
India. Water shortages also continue to be a major problem and the government is actively 
building dams in the Kashmir region to store water and help with increasing energy needs137.  
 
It is therefore a fair assumption that India’s economic growth, although nothing short of 
incredible, is not guaranteed to last. India also has a long way to go in order to improve the 
chances that economic performance will continue, which is even before one considers all of 
the countries additional domestic challenges that are not included in those above.  
 
2.2.2 India’s Domestic Reality  
 
India is eternally characterised as being an incredibly diverse state, and it is this fact that 
continues to influence the nature of modern India’s society.  India therefore is often 
described as being a confusing mix of many of the world’s great religions, languages, 
cultures and ethnic identities.  Another essential element in terms of understanding India’s 
domestic environment is that one has to remain conscious of the fact that India is a unique 
product of the blending of the very old, and the very new138. It is also the world’s largest 
democracy, which in itself poses some sizeable and unique challenges139. India’s domestic 
reality is therefore highly complicated, and poses its own set of unique challenges.  
The domestic character of contemporary India began to change with a greater degree of 
consistency for the early 1980’s.  “One by one, the images of a stable, orderly, peaceful and 
progressive India have given way to a series of interacting social, political and economic 
revolutions”140. These ‘revolutions’ as Cohen refers to them are not violent or ‘bloody 
revolutions’, but as he terms them, ‘bleeding revolutions’141. 
Cohen elaborates about the changing nature of Indian society and domestic realities142:  
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These revolutions include the bursting forth of hitherto quiescent groups, usually from low 
castes, with demands for ethnic and linguistic autonomy, a changed centre-stage 
relationship, a transformed Indian disaspora, and a direct challenge to India’s secular order. 
 
These changes very quickly become very difficult to track, or are so subtle that the vast 
majority of Indians and foreigners either fail to perceive them or are unable to comprehend 
their significance. This is why the paper will only cover the most important of these 
‘revolutions’. The paper has already in the previous section dealt with one of the most 
important ‘revolutions’ in the form of India’s economic awakening and the subsequent 
shifts in macro-economic policy. The next important change comes in the social sphere, 
through a change within one of India’s oldest social institutions, the caste system.  
One has to understand the caste system above any other Indian social phenomena. This is 
because although there are other aspects of Indian society which are possibly relevant to 
India’s rise as a global power, none are as important as the caste system. As such it is 
important to realise early on that the caste system in India, is essentially a social construct. 
The Sanskrit term for caste is jati, and as such there are many different jati’s in India143. 
Some are spread throughout India, and others are simply small local entities.  However the 
reasons behind the extremely hierarchical nature of the caste system in India are still hotly 
debated among scholars.  
Cohen explains that castes144: 
...may have evolved from functional or occupational specialization, acquiring their current 
form from the four major varna recorded in the early Hindu scriptures (ca. 500 B.C.): 
Brahmins, the teachers and priests of society; Kshatriyas, the warrior-rulers; Vaishyas, 
merchants and businessmen; and, at the bottom, Shudra, or farmers.  
 
Caste is usually associated with Hindu traditions, but this is not to say that it has not been 
influenced by the many religions found throughout India145. Essentially the caste system has 
its roots in the practise of endogamy, which refers to the largest possible group a family will 
seek a marriage partner for their child146. 
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The reason however that this practise is so important within India is that caste is 
determined by birth and is a largely rigid hierarchical structure. It is essentially the 
exceptional rigidity of the caste system that worries modern observers, as the lower castes 
are often seen to be oppressed and exploited by the higher castes.  As Mencher notes, 
“...from the point of view of people at the lowest end of the scale, caste has functioned (and 
continues to function) as a very effective system of economic exploitation”147, and that 
“...one of the functions of the system has been to prevent the formation of social classes 
with any commonality of interest or unity of purpose”148. It is this notion that the caste 
system encourages discrimination and oppresses low born individuals that makes caste such 
a central component in contemporary Indian society.  The theorist Charles Drekmeier 
summarised the role of caste in Indian society when he remarked that caste was, ‘The Great 
Wall of India’149.  
We can therefore use the changes in one of India’s oldest and most important social 
constructs as a lens through which to view India’s broader social revolution. This is because 
India’s wider ‘social revolution’ has begun to pit, “...middle and low castes and India’s many 
tribes against one another and against once-dominant high castes in a sometimes violent 
struggle for power”150.  Caste therefore is at the very heart of Indian society and as such one 
has to refer to it before one can accurately gauge almost any domestic phenomena in India.   
This is particularly important in terms of the manner in which contemporary India constructs 
its own unique identity, but also because caste is a key part of the processes which are 
changing Indian society. However, as caste is a socio-political issue it often ends up giving 
rise to more immediate and tangible problems. Some of these problems are very closely 
related to caste, and others a somewhat distanced from it, particularly in contemporary 
India where overt discrimination on grounds of caste is illegal. The paper will now briefly 
explore the two issues which tend to stand out the most. These issues are poverty, which is 
a core issue, and the closely linked problem of collective violence. 
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The first of these challenges, poverty, is perhaps modern India’s greatest concern. For 
instance if one views the figures in appendix 2, one will quickly see that the percentage of 
the population affected by multidimensional poverty in India, at 16.1% in 2010151, far 
exceeds the South African figure in appendix 1 of 3.9%152.  Poverty in India therefore is often 
viewed as one of its greatest domestic challenges and continues to hold back the nation’s 
development.  It is interestingly also another unfortunate by-product of the caste system.  
According to Shah and Mehta153: 
Lack of access to resources or assetlessness is a unifying characteristic of poverty in all its 
manifestations. The poor lack ownership of or access to assets such as land, water, forest, 
dwelling units, credit, literacy, longevity, voice and capital-both physical and social. Those 
who are severely below the poverty line are largely involved in subsistence type activities for 
which they get exploitatively poor returns despite suffering extreme physical hardship and 
undertaking grave risks so as to earn a meagre income. Since earnings are below even the 
margins of existence, expenditure and survival needs exceed income.  
 
Poverty therefore traps India’s citizens in a cycle of suffering from which they are unable to 
escape. The Indian government as a result has utilised a mixture of strategies to deal with 
the issue right from the time of independence, up until today. However by the 
government’s own admission, many of these programmes have failed to produce the 
anticipated results. 
According to The Chronic Poverty Research Centre, in the year 2000, “India’s anti-poverty 
programmes in total amount to some 6-7 per cent of total Government of India budgetary 
expenditure or 1 per cent of GDP”154. As a result155: 
Poverty rates have declined and there have been notable successes – e.g. the building of a 
social contract around famine prevention. Despite this, there remains a chasm between 
official policies on the one hand, and the experience of the poor on the other. 
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In addition156: 
Policy on poverty has tended to become part of a political economy that proliferates ‘doles’, 
which often exist more to allow political power bases to be consolidated than to help the 
poor. Thus, while there has been poverty reduction, anti-poverty budget increases have not 
made the contribution that was hoped for; and the targeting of anti-poverty programmes is 
poorly handled, producing both errors of inclusion and exclusion. 
 
The net result of this is that the burden of poverty will continue to plague India for many 
years to come. It is because of this that a significant amount of the Indian government’s 
efforts will have to continue to focus on this issue, with the possibility that it will result in 
the neglect of other key social and political arenas. The focus on poverty will also inevitably 
produce a need to spend ever increasing amounts of social and physical capital in order to 
address this issue. This will therefore continue to entrench India’s notorious centralised and 
sluggish bureaucratic machinery, inadvertently causing a large portion of the Indian civil 
service to continue to implement wasteful and ineffective poverty reduction programmes. 
The issue of poverty will therefore continue to burden India long into the future, and as a 
result is one of the primary domestic issues that characterises contemporary India. 
Closely linked to both the issue of poverty and caste, is that of collective violence. It is 
unfortunately ironic then that the country which produced Mahatma Gandhi, the father of 
non-violence, is so often plagued by death and destruction as a result of severe bouts of 
collective violence157. Many scholars would argue that collective violence, and occasionally 
terrorism is symptomatic of a failure to deal with poverty and caste based grievances. 
However a growing body of evidence is beginning to suggest that most of the collective 
violence encountered in India is a product of class divisions rather than being religiously or 
ideologically motivated158. This distinction aside, the fact remains that collective violence 
and terrorism pose a continued threat to the internal stability and the cohesion of Indian 
society. Both phenomena are rooted in the earliest days of independence, as Bryjak 
explains159:  
India became an independent nation in the midst of one of modern history's most savage 
and gruesome struggles. Along with India's freedom in August 1947 came the creation of the 
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state of Pakistan, a geographically divided nation most of whose population came from the 
Punjab region of the Indian subcontinent. With this partition approximately 7 to 8 million 
Hindus and Sikhs found themselves residents of a new country that was pre-dominantly 
Muslim. An estimated equal number of Muslims were now part of a state that was 
overwhelmingly Hindu. In a desperate attempt to become citizens of societies comprised 
primarily of members of their own religion, millions of people embarked on one of the 
greatest migrations in history. During this chaotic mass exodus of people, centuries-old 
hostilities between Hindus and Sikhs on one side and Muslims on the other erupted into a 
bloodbath of major proportions. As Khushwant Singh notes, "By the summer of 1947, when 
the creation of the new state of Pakistan was formally announced, ten million people-
Muslims and Hindus and Sikhs-were in flight. By the time the monsoon broke, almost a 
million of them were dead, and all of northern India was in arms, in terror and in hiding." 
 
Partition therefore undeniably marked the beginning of contemporary India, but it also 
marked the beginning of a period which would see acts of collective violence and terrorism 
becoming ever more commonplace.  In order to understand the phenomenon of ‘collective 
violence’, Bryjak separates it into three typologies. These are; the violence of remonstrance; 
the violence of confrontation; and the violence of frustration160. According to Bryjak, each 
typology has its own unique characteristics161: 
The violence of remonstrance culminates from the efforts of a group of demonstrators to 
bring attention to a particular point of view, usually in the form of a set of perceived or 
experienced grievances.  
 
While162: 
Unlike the violence of remonstrance where a group's feelings of injustice and anger are 
directed toward an authority figure, the violence of confrontation results from the conflict 
between two groups of private citizens over an issue.  These factions are usually informal, 
comprised primarily of friends, relatives, neighbors, and/or members of the same caste, 
religious, linguistic, or regional group. 
 
Finally163: 
...collective violence results from frustration and occurs when people perceive themselves to 
be in a situation they find unendurable. In some cases the police are the catalyst for this 
form of violence.  Some impersonal event usually sets in motion the people's anger and 
frustration. Once the crowd begins engaging in aggressive action, it becomes opportunistic 
and may lash out randomly, in some cases destroying everything in its path. 
 
                                                          
160
 Ibid., p. 37. 
161
 Ibid., p. 38. 
162
 Ibid., p. 39. 
163
 Ibid., p. 44. 
47 
 
Concrete examples of collective violence in the three categories are not hard to find. One of 
the most brutal acts of communal violence that fits the ‘frustration’ typology occurred 
following the assassination of Indira Gandhi by her two Sikh bodyguards on October 31, 
1984164. Bryjak elaborates165:  
The  Hindus'  rage  at  the  death  of  their "mother"  exploded  in  an all-out  attack on  Sikhs 
in many parts of  Delhi. Sikhs  were  savagely  beaten,  shot,  and  in  many  cases  burned  to  
death. Within a week of Gandhi's death, two thousand people (mostly Sikhs) were killed in 
the capital city, and another five hundred died as a result of riots in five neighboring states. 
The army (which was not called in until the second day of rioting) did not gain control of the 
situation in Delhi until Mrs. Gandhi had been cremated on November 3, three days after her 
death. 
 
Cohen also highlights an additional aspect of violence in India when he describes various 
separatist movements who have often used violence and terror attacks to force New Delhi’s 
hand in order to leave the Union166. He mentions that there have been numerous such 
separatist movements which have attempted to gain independence at regular intervals, 
such as: the Tamils in the 1950’s, the Nagas in the 1960’s, the Mizos in the 1960’s and 
1970’s, the Sikhs in the 1980’s and the Kashmiris in the 1990’s167.  
However the most worrying form of violence by far, has to be domestic terrorism. An 
overview of domestic terrorism is provided by Mohapatra168: 
India has faced terrorist movements in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, bordering Pakistan, 
and part insurgent-part terrorist movements in the northeast, bordering Myanmar and 
Bangladesh; in Bihar, bordering Nepal; and in certain interior states like Andhra Pradesh, 
Madhya Pradesh and Orissa.  
 
Examples of specific domestic terrorist attacks are also not hard to find, such as the one that 
occurred on 1 October 2001 when “...at least thirty-one people were killed and seventy-five 
injured when ‘Islamic militants, allegedly Pakistanis with close Al- Qaeda links, launched a 
suicide attack on the Kashmir state assembly in Srinagar’”169. Arguably one of the most 
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devastating attacks in recent memory took place in November 2008, when 10 armed 
gunmen stormed two luxury hotels, a busy train station and a Jewish centre in Mumbai170. 
This brazen attack resulted in the death of 166 people, and would go on to be become 
known as the Mumbai terror attacks171. Incidences such as these serve to emphasise that 
terrorism is an incredibly serious threat to domestic stability in India, and is an ever present 
danger with which the Indian government will have to contend with for quite some time to 
come. 
Moving along now to one of India’s attributes which is somewhat difficult to classify as 
being entirely domestic, because it greatly influences the international dimensions of the 
state. This attribute is that of defence. It will be included here under the domestic section 
because although it is highly influential in the international arena, it is firmly seated in the 
domestic. It is also worthwhile noting that it in addition straddles the line between being a 
positive and negative characteristic of India. Most realists would argue whole heartedly that 
it is entirely beneficial, where as many neo-liberals would argue quite the opposite by going 
against it as it burdens the state with unnecessary debt and obligations, in an age where 
economic diplomacy supposedly reign supreme. The correct answer inevitably will lie 
somewhere in between.  
What is undeniable though is that India in the 21st Century is a military power of quite some 
consequence.  Back in 2005 India hosted some of America’s top aviators in a combat 
simulation exercise known as Cope India. Walker comments on the results of this 
encounter172:  
When the U.S. air force sent its proud f-15 fighter pilots against the Indian Air Force in the 
Cope India war games two years ago, it received a shock. The American pilots found 
themselves technologically out matched by nimbler warplanes; tactically outsmarted by the 
Indian mix of high, low, and converging attack waves;  and outfought by the Indians, whose 
highly trained  pilots average more than 180 flying hours a year- roughly the same as their 
US. and Israeli counterparts and slightly more than those of NATO allies such as  France and 
Germany. U.S. General Hal Hornburg said that the results of the exercise, against Indian 
pilots flying Russian-built Sukhoi Su-30 and French Mirage 2000 fighters, were "a wake-up 
call." According to testimony in a House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee hearing, the 
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U.S. F-15s were defeated more than 90 percent of the time in direct combat exercises 
against the Indians. 
 
This of course is less likely to be the case today, now that the U.S. Air Force is capable of 
deploying a total of 137 F-22 Raptors, whose stealth fighter characteristics would decisively 
overcome India’s Air Force173. However that is not the point here, the point is that as 
recently as 2005, in one area of defence capability that America expends significant 
amounts of money, and effort the Indian Air Force was able to overwhelmingly defeat it. 
This is simply scratching the surface of India’s capabilities, as it ranks globally as being the 
world’s fourth most capable military, once nuclear weapons have been excluded174.  The 
nuclear issue will form an important part of India’s international position, and as such will 
be discussed in greater depth in the following section on India’s international dimensions. 
Having said this it is perhaps somewhat ironic then that India, which as we saw earlier, 
produced Mahatma Gandhi whose life work was ultimately characterised by his 
commitment to non-violence, has managed to find itself mired in several conflicts since 
independence175. It is even more sadly ironic then that India which achieved this 
independence without using violent methods, and has since then often committed itself to 
the peaceful resolution of conflicts, has succumbed to these numerous conflicts, often with 
its neighbours176. 
This tally includes four wars with Pakistan, one with China, numerous border skirmishes 
with each of them, as well as several military interventions in its smaller neighbouring 
states177. India has also managed to project its military power outside of its own region, 
either through its own efforts or in conjunction with other states178. This includes several 
UN peacekeeping operations, many of which incidentally have been in Africa, such as their 
mission to the Congo and Sierra Leone179. Actually India has participated in every UN 
peacekeeping mission in Africa, and continues to support the UN’s peace keeping efforts on 
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the continent180.  Moreover, its contributions are not simply symbolic or rhetorical, but 
rather are increasingly hands on in nature181.  Indian troops have as a result engaged in 
some of the most dangerous and challenging missions the UN has ever undertaken and it is 
because of this that India has suffered more casualties in the service of the UN than any 
other member nation182.  
India therefore has quite a lot stacked up against it, but at the same time through the 
economic growth we witnessed in the previous section and its military capability that we 
have just explored, it is a nation destined to emerge as a global power. This is because even 
though India faces potentially overwhelming domestic challenges, it does not mean that 
they are insurmountable. Evidence for this is all around, As Shrivastava reminds us183: 
The Indian nation is a product of the biggest mass movement in human history and a 
century-long revolution that cut across class, caste, religious communities and gender. This 
mass character of the Indian national movement makes it distinct from a cadre-based 
revolutionary movement and accounts for the ingrained legitimacy and resilience of the 
Indian nation-state. Furthermore, the multi-class revolution ensured a deep permeation of 
the ideals of anti-imperialism, commitment to secular democracy and egalitarianism in 
Indian society to such an extent that even six decades after Independence, governments 
consistently face strong resistance against any move to distance policy from these principles. 
 
Therefore it is through the combination of all of these domestic challenges that we begin to 
picture what contemporary India is facing. We need to be aware of these issues because to 
do so, is to be aware of the likely forces that will shape the country’s future, and the nature 
of its society. Ultimately then when considering both nation’s domestic environments, it is 
important to note that just as South Africa is unable to escape its domestic realities when 
constructing both its national identity and its foreign policy position, India is likewise unable 
to distance itself from its domestic realities when constructing its own national identity and 
foreign policy. It is because of this that the domestic dimensions to both countries are so 
important in the process of understanding both their perception of self but also their 
priorities and behaviour within the strategic partnership. We also need to remind ourselves 
that by understanding the primary challenges they face, we can then begin to understand 
the nations themselves.  
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However it is worthwhile noting that India in particular, is noted for the link between 
domestic issues and foreign policy formation. This is because one of contemporary India’s 
enduring challenges has been to construct an essentially conservative foreign policy while 
managing the domestic changes that have been mentioned above184. This process began 
with Nehru when he managed to, “...persuade the world that India ‘counted for something’ 
and used foreign policy to bolster national pride and self confidence”185. The process was 
continued by Indira Gandhi when she firmly established the link between foreign policy and 
domestic politics by intervening in the domestic politics of several neighbouring states186 . 
This culminated in her successfully dismembering of the original state of Pakistan187. The 
process however did not stop there; it continues to this day in the era of collation 
governments, where domestic and foreign policies remain tightly interwoven188.  
 
2.2.3 India’s International Presence 
 
There is no denying that ever since 1991 when India first undertook economic reforms; it 
began a process that has since catapulted it into the international arena as a leading actor 
both within its own right, but also within most major multilateral forums. “Today, every 
global power—including the United States and China—treats India with the respect and 
consideration befitting a country that has posted an average economic growth rate of more 
than 7% since 1994 and that plays an active role in shaping a wide range of political, 
economic, and military issues both in its immediate neighborhood and also, increasingly, 
well beyond its borders”189.  
 
Interestingly in his 2006 article, entitled, India in 2006: A New Emphasis on Engagement,   
Lavoy had this to say about India’s international prowess190: 
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What was distinctive about India in 2006 was not just the progress that it made in achieving 
its power potential—after all, India has been developing its economic and military 
capabilities for years—but rather India’s willingness to act as great powers do in applying the 
very military and diplomatic tools that the superpowers flaunted during the Cold War and 
the European powers employed before that. To use a colloquial phrase, India has long 
“talked the talk” of a big power, but it has now started “walking the walk” as well. 
 
He elaborates ever further when he reveals191: 
The socialist and nonaligned India of previous decades spurned commercial connections 
with the world economy and avoided international commitments that could entangle it in 
the global balance of power. In contrast, today’s India embraces globalization, foreign 
engagement, and international power politics as mechanisms for improving its national 
welfare and political might. 
 
He later goes on to observe that experts, “...recently stopped asking if India will become a 
great power and began to wonder what kind of great power it will become”192. 
 
This enthusiasm for India’s new found highly respectable position in the international 
system is derived from a number of issues. Some such as its nuclear capabilities might be 
said to produce a sense of intimidation, rather than admiration, while other still such as its 
economic performance are downright incredible and cannot be denied.  This section 
therefore will deal with three critical components of India’s newfound international 
prowess, which are: Its nuclear weapon status, the strategic partnership agreement it has 
with the United States and the dominant position it occupies within the South East Asian 
region. 
 
Beginning with the nuclear issue we quickly are confronted with the fact that although it is a 
contentious issue, nuclear weapons often are the ultimate signifier of scientific and 
industrial prowess. This is because nuclear weapons technology, and the industrial capacity 
to produce such devices, is rather expensive and difficult to obtain193. Many of the world’s 
great powers were only able to acquire them through their deep scientific and industrial 
skills base. For example, the most difficult part of producing a nuclear weapon is acquiring 
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the necessary fissile material, which involves the refining of radioactive ore such as 
Uranium, which is in itself a highly complex process194. The weapon design component can 
be relatively simple in comparison, but still requires a great deal of skill if a safe and 
effective weapon is desired195. This is why a number of states with vast resources and 
expertise, such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, have struggled unsuccessfully to produce nuclear 
weapons196.  
 
The fact then that India managed to produce and successfully test a nuclear weapon both in 
the Rajasthan desert on May 18, 1974197, and again in 1998198, is in itself a glowing 
commendation of India’s scientific and industrial capacity, regardless of any opinion one 
might have as to the morality or usefulness of having done so.   
 
Having done so before India re-demonstrated its nuclear capabilities to the world on May 11 
and 13 1998, after which it declared that these tests were in-fact part of a weaponisation 
programme199. This marked somewhat of a sharp alteration in India’s avowedly anti-nuclear 
stance, which up until then had included extensive efforts to encourage global disarmament 
and ban all nuclear testing, as established by a broad national consensus200. This is another 
irony India was all too aware of. This is because India had been the first to introduce the 
proposals which led to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), as far back as 1954201. This is still something many people are not aware of.    
 
However, following these tests India failed to realign its earlier policy stance on nuclear 
weapons. It had fought to achieve a global ban on nuclear weapons right from the beginning 
and continued to do so after becoming a nuclear weapons state itself. This is demonstrated 
                                                          
194
 Loc cit. 
195
 Ibid., p. 139. 
196
 Ibid., p. 138. 
197
 Praagh, D., “India’s Bomb”, in Asian Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 6 (Jul. - Aug., 1974), p. 357. 
198
 Cohen, S. Op Cit., p. 157. 
199
 Jayaprakash , N., “Nuclear Disarmament and India”, in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 35, No. 7 (Feb. 
12-18, 2000), p 531. 
200
 Loc cit. 
201
 Ibid., p. 525. 
54 
 
by a statement made at the UN General Assembly in 1999 by the then Indian Ambassador 
and permanent representative to the UN, Savitri Kunadi, in which he said202: 
...there is no dilution of India's commitment to the goal of global nuclear disarmament. India 
believes that its security would be enhanced in a nuclear weapon free-world and thus 
continues to press for negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention that will prohibit 
forever the development, production, stockpiling use and threat of use of nuclear weapons 
and provide for the elimination of all existing weapons under international verification  
 
From this point on India began to espouse what has become known as a ‘No-First-Use’ 
pledge. This pledge is the203: 
...very first step by nuclear weapon states towards the goal of global nuclear disarmament 
has to begin with a no-use (of nuclear weapons) pledge against non-nuclear weapon states 
and a no-first-use (of nuclear weapons) pledge against other nuclear weapon powers. A no-
first-use pledge, at the very least, is just a hypothetical guarantee - merely an expression of 
good faith. It does not involve verification, dismantling or freezing of nuclear weapons 
stockpile. But it still is the key element in advancing the cause of nuclear disarmament 
because it significantly con-tributes to de-freezing all rigid and inflexible mental attitudes 
regarding the issue. It also helps a great deal in adopting a saner approach towards the 
problem. All previous governments in India have staunchly supported this proposal. 
 
In a statement before the lower house of the Indian parliament on August4, 1998, prime 
minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee further elaborated India’s approach to it ‘No-First-Use’ 
commitment when he  said204:  
We have stated that we will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. We are also willing to 
strengthen this by entering into bilateral agreements on no-first use or multilateral 
negotiations on a global no-first-use. Having stated that we shall not be the first to use 
nuclear weapons, there remains no basis for their use against countries which do not have 
nuclear weapons. 
 
This somewhat contradictory position is an important one, and as such will form part of the 
analytical component of the next two chapters as it is a potential source of tensions 
between South Africa and India. This is because South Africa is the only nation in history to 
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voluntarily disarm and is deeply committed to advancing the cause of a nuclear weapons 
free world.  
For now though it is sufficient that one is aware of the nuclear capabilities of India, and the 
fact that this allows them significant military and diplomatic prowess, both within their 
region and further afield. This goes to the importance of India globally and emphasises that 
the claims that India is now ‘walking the walk’, are in fact true. 
Turning now to the Indo-US strategic partnership we begin to realise even more why India 
can be considered as a global player with significant potential. This is because it is finally 
able to interact with the world’s sole surviving super power, from whom it was for many 
years, effectively estranged.  
The beginnings of a thaw between New Delhi and Washington came on the back of U.S. 
President Bill Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000205. This was the first time an American 
head of state had visited India in nearly 22 years206.  
 
Things however did not warm between the two powers immediately, as in a speech made 
by Clinton before India’s parliament he had tactfully managed to reveal Washington’s 
primary concerns about India, which were: Kashmir, Nuclear Proliferation and India’s 
relationship with Pakistan207. America’s perceptions and India’s subsequent handling of 
these issues would later draw the two even closer together. However despite still reserving 
concerns, the trip had been acknowledged by both sides a significant step forward. In a 
departure from an official speech made by India’s finance minister, Yashwant Sinha, before 
the Asia Society in New York on 14 April 2004, the minister acknowledged, “...that Clinton 
had swept away fifty years of misperception and that the two countries appeared to be on a 
path of realistic engagement”208.   
 
It also helped that in spite of America’s unhappiness at India’s nuclear weapons programme, 
which was one of Clintons primary concerns, India was one of the only states who possessed 
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this capacity and was still able to engage with America209. As a result of India’s nuclear tests 
India and America managed to enter into a prolonged high-level dialogue on the issue210. 
This meant the two powers could begin the process of joining together to ultimately form a 
strategic partnership. This partnership has arisen over the last two decades but it was 
President George, W. Bush who began to galvanise the process to take it towards the point 
where it is America’s fastest developing partnership with any nation in the world211. 
 
This was achieved by him in several ways, as Burns demonstrates212: 
 
When  he  entered office in 2001, President Bush  recognized early  on  the  power  and  
importance  of  India's  large  and  vibrant democracy  in global  politics.  He essentially 
doubled the United States' strategic bet on India, pursuing an uncommonly ambitious and 
wide-ranging opening toward it and displaying the courage and foresight to take on the 
complex nonproliferation issues that had separated the two countries for three decades.  
President  Bush  called  for  the  two  countries  to  jump-start  their  relationship  in four  
strategic  areas: civil  nuclear  energy,  civilian  space  programs, high-tech commerce, and 
missile defense. 
 
The most important point in all this for India was undoubtedly the civil nuclear deal. Burns 
elaborates at length: 
 
When Prime Minister Singh visited Washington in July 2005, President Bush made  
this bold proposition:  after 30 years,  the United States was  prepared  to offer  India  
the benefits  of  full  civil  nuclear energy  cooperation. We would not assist India's 
nuclear weapons program, but we would help India construct new power plants and 
would provide it with the latest in nuclear fuel and technology to run them.  In New 
Delhi in March 2006, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh announced the 
realization of this vision through the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. 
Nine months later, in December 2006, a strong bipartisan majority in Congress 
passed the Hyde Act, which approved the initiative, permitting American investment 
in India's civil nuclear power industry. These steps marked a huge change in U.S. and 
global thinking about how to work with India. They  transformed  India  overnight  
from  a target of  the  international  nonproliferation  regime  to  a stakeholder in it. 
Beyond those first moves, the U.S. Atomic Energy Act required a formal agreement 
to lay the legal basis for bilateral nuclear collaboration. We concluded the “123 
agreement” this July, after long and sometimes difficult negotiations. The  benefits  
of  these  historic  agreements  are very  real  for  the United  States.  For  the  first  
time  in  three decades,  India will  submit its entire  civil nuclear program  to 
international  inspection by permanently  placing  14 of  its 22 nuclear  power  plants  
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and  all of  its future civil reactors under  the safeguards of  the International Atomic  
Energy Agency (IAEA). Within a generation, nearly 90 percent of India's reactors will 
likely be covered by the agreement. Without the arrangement, India’s nuclear power 
program would have remained a black box. With it, India will be brought into the 
international-nuclear nonproliferation mainstream. 
 
This significance of all this is that India now enjoys very warm relations with the most 
powerful state in the international system. The opportunities this signals for India are 
incredible, and demonstrate in a variety of ways that India has arrived as a serious player in 
the international system. More than that though, India managed to negotiate a shift in U.S. 
policy regarding the one issue that had threatened to keep them apart for every, nuclear 
proliferation. These types of concession therefore indicate two things; Washington not only 
needs New Delhi on its side within the region, but also now is actively demonstrating trust 
and respect for India as a state. It conveys a sense of legitimacy on India’s global aspirations 
which cannot be underestimated. India has now not only been brought in out of the cold, 
but is in reality, an equal. 
 
India is undeniably becoming a global actor. Her influence extends to a great deal of 
international political, economic and military arenas. India’s political prowess in the 
international system will now be discussed, but with a focus on its most important region, 
which is the one in which it finds itself. The fact that India is active in other multilateral 
institutions such as at the UN and within the Bretton Woods Institutions, particularly with 
regard to reforming their structures to better reflect more contemporary economic and 
political power, will be discussed in the following chapter.  
 
For now though we turn to the final issue in terms of this section of the international 
dimensions to India, which is the role it plays within its own region. In this sense, India, not 
unlike South Africa is somewhat of a regional hegemon. It dominates the states which 
surround it and has a large amount of influence within the region.  
 
Geographically, other than China and Pakistan, India’s immediate neighbours includes 
Bangladesh, the two Himalayan kingdom’s of Nepal and Bhutan, and the two island nations 
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of Sri Lanka and the Maldives213.  Burma or as it is now known, Myanmar, also shares a 
border with India214. India therefore curiously finds itself situated in a region of Asia which 
contains its great nuclear rival, Pakistan, and an equally nuclear capable China. Both these 
states are often top of New Delhi’s regional thinking, especially since it has fought ‘hot’ wars 
with both and continues to view particularly Pakistan as an  active threat. That said the 
reason its region is curious, is that it contains two of the developing world’s brightest stars, 
in India itself and China, along with some very small and very impressionable states.   
 
It is because of this impressionability, location and apparent weakness that India is 
especially interested in Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka215.This is because Nepal and 
Bangladesh are among the poorest and least developed states in the world, while on the 
other hand Sri Lanka and Nepal are both open to foreign influence216. India is particularly 
concerned about the ‘corrupting’ influence of China, Pakistan and radical Islam in these 
countries, which could see them pose threats to its security if they got too close to either of 
them217. However all of these states share economic, social, political and historic ties with 
India, meaning New Delhi still holds some sway with them218.   
 
In its attempt to manage it position within the region, India has adopted a number of 
strategies over the past few decades. Particularly when it came to Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka, India has utilised regional cooperation, coercion and political transformation, as its 
primary methods of engaging with the three219. However following the more recent rise of 
economic globalisation and shifts within its domestic political environment India has begun 
altering the way it engages in the region. The major departure began in 1981, as prior to this 
India, “...was uninterested in any meaningful South Asian regional grouping, preferring to 
deal with its smaller neighbours on a one- to-one basis”220.  This cool attitude towards the 
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region was in sharp contrast with its active and principled participation in global multilateral 
institutions such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations221. 
 
The reason 1981 was significant is because it was at this time that the President of 
Bangladesh, Ziaur Rahman proposed a regional grouping within South Asia222. What 
followed in 1985 was the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)223. That 
said, India still does not fully believe multilateralism is always in its best interests in the 
region, as it inevitably invites in substantial risks, particularly as far as its security is 
concerned224. New Delhi feels that there is often insufficient consensus between the 
member states of SAARC, and rather looks to the grouping’s economic potential as its 
primary interest. Some went so far as to say that during the early days of SAARC, India was 
trying to turn it into its own personal market225.  It has therefore adopted a strategy of 
allowing SAARC to function on minor matters, hoping to improve its economic relations with 
its immediate neighbours, while at the same time being able to further isolate Pakistan from 
other South Asian states226.  
 
The next important arena in which New Delhi finds itself is that of South-East Asia. India 
itself is not considered to be a South East Asian state, and is as such not a member of the 
prominent South East Asian grouping known as the Association for South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). However, “India became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1992, full 
dialogue partner in 1995, and joined the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1996”227. This means 
India has a role to play in the forum and contributes to its agenda. 
 
India has since then gone on to actively participate in this multilateral institution, with which 
it signed a Free Trade Agreement in 2003. Sen, Asher & Rajan explain the process228: 
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The recent bilateral and sub-regional efforts to strengthen economic relations are being 
complemented through an effort by India to intensify its economic relations with ASEAN as 
an overall regional grouping. Thus, a Framework Agreement on establishing a Free Trade 
Area (FTA) between ASEAN and India was signed by the Indian prime minister during the 
Second ASEAN-India summit in Bali in October 2003. The ASEAN-India FTA is expected to 
encompass a strategic and political partnership, thus going well beyond a traditional FTA 
agreement. 
 
Therefore it is obvious that India is now adopting a more active role within its region, even 
though it still often views SAARC as more of a complicated arrangement than a grouping of 
likeminded states with which it can cooperate. It does however still engage well with the 
smaller SAARC members, and has even made moves to normalise its relations with Pakistan 
to some extent. Peace talks between the two estranged parties were called off in 2008, 
following the Mumbai terror attacks, which killed an estimated 166 people and which were 
carried out by militants who were believed to have been based in Pakistan229. However 
since then sometime has passed and the two nations are expected to reengage in their 
mutual peace talks, which are expected to resume in July 2011230.  
 
It is also an important partner to ASEAN, and through its FTA with the institutions members, 
its influence and future prospects appear highly encouraging. India is therefore an 
important social, political and economic force within the broader South and South East 
Asian region.  Its attention to matters here are an active demonstration of its ever 
increasing prowess. 
 
In conclusion the chapter has demonstrated the defining characteristics of both the 
partners. It has also showed their flaws and some of their strengths. The last section which 
detailed India’s prowess serves to illustrate exactly why a continued strategic partnership 
between South Africa and India is of such vital importance, particularly to South Africa. The 
following chapter will explore the dynamics within this partnership, by dealing with the 
major themes contained in the literature and official documentation surrounding it. 
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Chapter 3 
 
3. The Strategic Partnership 
Now that one has a better understanding of both India and South Africa’s domestic 
characters, we can now turn to examining the strategic partnership. The insight gained in 
the previous chapter will be carried over in order to continue the process of laying the 
groundwork to produce a more holistic analytical component, which will emerge in the 
subsequent chapter.  
This chapter will therefore deal with the practical aspects of the partnership, by exploring its 
historical basis and the key areas it covers. It will do so by recounting the evolution of the 
strategic partnership from its early beginnings in March 1997, with the signing in New Delhi 
of the Red Fort Declaration on a Strategic Partnership between South Africa and India, right 
through to the present. The primary aim of this chapter will be to highlight the most 
important aspects of the partnership, and to explore the activity which has taken place so 
far in these areas. In order to achieve this chapter will be broken down into two major 
sections.  
The broad themes covered in these two sections are the economic and political dimensions 
of the strategic partnership. These broad themes will be broken down further into sub-
sections including Trade, Investment and Economic Cooperation, South-South Cooperation 
and Global Institutional Reform, as it is these three issues which represent the most 
important components of the strategic partnership. It is true that the partnership extends 
beyond them, to cover a wide variety of areas including cooperation on issues of defence, 
cultural exchange, science and technology and health. However these issue will not 
necessarily be dealt with, which is not to imply that they matter less to either side, but 
simply from an International Relations standpoint the areas which have been selected are of 
greater importance, and as such will receive special attention.  
It is also worthwhile noting early on that the chapter will also begin to make observations 
about the nature of the strategic partnership. This is in order to extract any possible 
tensions that may exist between the two partners, which will begin to form the basis of the 
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following chapter’s all important analysis. This is not to say that the positive aspects of the 
partnership will be overlooked, but rather that the dissertation will cast a keen analytical 
eye over all of the components of the strategic partnership, equally. 
 
3.1 Conceptualising the Strategic Partnership.  
 
Conceptualising the strategic partnership is an important first step. This is simply because 
before one is able to begin to interrogate the content and spirit of India and South Africa’s 
strategic partnership, we need to recall the definition as outlined in Chapter 1, as to what 
exactly constitutes a strategic partnership. This is essential, as to lose sight of the purpose of 
strategic partnerships in a theoretical sense, will likely result in a failure to produce any form 
of analytical rigor when considering the practical realities of South Africa and India’s 
strategic partnership under real world conditions. 
Therefore we recall the concept of a strategic partnership in the business environment, as 
outlined by Macdonald and Chrisp231: 
The logic of partnership is plain. All organisations have strengths, but no organisation has all 
the strengths required to do everything. For some tasks, the organisation must acquire new 
strengths, through either organic development or the acquisition of external assets. The 
latter course is likely to be much faster than organic development. 
Again, we note once more that232: 
Successful partnership working is built on organisations moving together to address 
common goals; on developing in their staff the skills necessary to work in an entirely new 
way - across boundaries, in multi disciplinary teams, and in a culture in which learning and 
good practice are shared. 
 
These important ideas soon began to form the basis of our understanding of a strategic 
partnership in International Relations, as the term began to be increasingly borrowed from 
the business environment in the 1990’s. When it began to be applied to International 
Relations, the process of adapting it to suit the behaviour and motivations of actors in the 
international arena was quite a simple one.  During this period the concept of a ‘strategic 
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partnership’ readily lent itself to International Relations thinking. This was in no small part 
due to the triumph of the neo-liberal inspired discourses which altered the accepted world 
view by placing greater emphasis on non-state actors such as transnational corporations 
and non-governmental organisations233.   
This phenomenon of the rise of the non-state actor in the face of increasing levels of 
globalisation, began to coalesce into a process that we now commonly refer to as ‘global 
governance’. Kumar and Messner clarify234:  
Analytically, the term ‘global governance’ refers to major transformations in the nature of 
nation state system, globalisation, emergence of global civil society, free flows of 
information, qualified multilateralism etc. Inspired by neo-liberal discourses on economic 
globalisation and supported by the new public management theories, it has, in practise 
 
It is from this rise of the global civil society, under the influence of neo-liberal discourses on 
economic globalisation and supported by the New Public Management theories, which has 
led to the concept of a strategic partnership entering the International Relations 
discourse235. As a result the increased exposure to, and study of, transnational corporations 
meant their influence spread even further, and as a result terms such as ‘strategic 
partnership’ entered the broader International Relations lexicon, when describing 
increasingly close bilateral ties between states and other emerging actors. Ultimately it is 
the core business idea of leveraging mutual strengths in order to achieve greater results 
than would be possible on one’s own that lies at the very heart of a strategic partnership, 
and as such it is this idea which directly lent itself to the field of International Relations. As 
such, states’ tendency to group together or form blocks of like minded ideological and 
political states is well documented. Take for instance the Non-aligned movement which 
India, under Nehru’s guidance, proved instrumental in advancing as a new way of 
approaching global politics for a wide variety of developing countries236.  
However the concept of a strategic partnership goes deeper than a mere partnership 
between individuals or groups of individuals who happen to hold similar views. A strategic 
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partnership sees a state identify another state which most likely embodies its own historical 
experiences, ideals, and political reality, and forms a deeper bond between the two than 
would ever be possible in the multinational, or even trilateral spheres of the international 
system. Therefore it is this concept of a deeper affinity between states that makes a 
strategic partnership truly strategic, rather than simply following the norm of close bilateral 
relations. Strategic tends to signify a connection which encompasses more than familiarity, 
it goes deeper to mutual trust and a cooperative spirit, in combination with higher levels of 
mutual beneficiation, that the conventional forms of bilateral relations between states 
would be hard pressed to emulate. From here the two states enjoy a strategic partnership 
when they leverage these commonalities and overlapping strengths towards a greater aim.  
It is therefore this notion of a deeper and more concrete bond that needs to be drawn out, 
and as such is the notion one needs to keep in mind in order to conceptualise the strategic 
partnership between South African and India, to which the dissertation will now turn.  
3.2 The Ideological Basis of the Partnership:  
 
The foundation of the strategic partnership, as was alluded to in Chapter 1, is based on 
mutual respect and close historical ties between South Africa and India. This section will 
therefore briefly explore these ties from an ideological perspective, since it is arguably the 
most fundamental level on which two states can connect. It is also often one of the first 
points of reference for any form of engagement between states in the modern international 
arena.   
Therefore as the strategic partnership essentially represents a formal acknowledgement 
that the two countries share deep similarities and a hope for a common future which 
extends to the ideological level, their shared ideological bonds must be understood. In order 
to accomplish this, the dissertation will now briefly explore the ideological foundations of 
the partnership, before moving on to the legal basis. 
These ‘shared ideologies’ are therefore expressed through the many similarities between 
the two world views which were crafted much earlier on, and are to be found for South 
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Africa in the ANC Freedom Charter, and in India’s case, through Jawaharl Nehru’s national 
philosophy. Parekh reminds one why a ‘national philosophy’ was so important to Nehru237: 
For Jawaharlal Nehru every state needed a 'national philosophy' or 'national ideology' to 
hold it together and give it coherence and a sense of direction and purpose.  In his view the 
need for such a philosophy was particularly great in a new country like India whose people 
were divided on religious, ethnic, linguistic and other grounds, economically undeveloped, 
socially static and politically inexperienced. As such they desperately needed a shared public 
philosophy to unite them and provide them with a set of clearly defined 'goals' or 
'objectives’. 
 
Likewise when referring to Bernstein’s comments on the formation and purpose of the 
Freedom Charter, one gets a similar sense that the charter was a document that was crafted 
by the people, for the people, and that it ultimately would lay out a unified vision for the 
future of South Africa238, just as Nehru’s ‘national philosophy’ had done for India.  
If we take the comparison even further by examining the content and values contained 
within the Freedom Charter and the same is done for Nehru’s ‘national philosophy’, it is 
once again clearly evident as to how similar South Africa and India’s ideological perspectives 
on remarkably similar issues can be.  The core values expressed in the Freedom Charter 
therefore are as follows: the people shall govern; all national groups have equal rights; the 
people shall share in the country’s wealth; the land shall be shared among those who work 
it; all shall be equal before the law; all shall enjoy equal human rights; there shall be work 
and security; the doors of learning and culture shall be opened; there shall be houses, 
security and comfort; there shall be peace and friendship239. Whereas Nehru’s ‘national 
philosophy’, is loosely based on the following concepts: national unity, parliamentary 
democracy, industrialisation, socialism, scientific temper, secularism and non-alignment240. 
All of these principals are remarkably similar to the underlying thinking behind the demands 
made in the Freedom Charter.  
Clearly these overt similarities begin to demonstrate the fact that there are deep ideological 
connections between South Africa and India. Therefore what motivates and underscores the 
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strategic partnership is not simply a collection of shallow political, or narrowly defined, 
national interests. That said, within the strategic partnership there are many additional 
factors which bring the two together in a more practical sense, which is largely in keeping 
with a ‘realist’ tradition. These will be explored at a later point in the chapter. The 
Dissertation shall now finally turn to the legal basis of the strategic partnership. 
3.3 The Legal Basis of the Partnership 
 
It is now important to recognise that even though shared values and close historical ties 
between the ANC and the Indian government are a critical component of the formation of 
their strategic partnership, they alone are not enough to create a legally binding strategic 
partnership. For a formal and operable strategic partnership therefore, South Africa and 
India required a definitive legal base from which to constitute the partnership.  
The first time the concept of a strategic partnership was officially endorsed, was on 6 
December 1996241. We recall a quote from chapter 1 which contains this excerpt from a key 
note speech made by the then deputy president Thabo Mbeki at Jawaharlal Nehru 
University, in which he said242: 
Our common hope of success will depend on our ability to act together. We are reassured 
that we can count on India as our strategic partner in this historic endeavour, which seeks to 
give birth to a new world of a just and lasting world peace, of prosperity for all peoples and 
equality among nations. 
 
However several years before Mbeki had even mentioned the concept of a strategic 
partnership between South Africa and India, it was Nelson Mandela who laid the 
foundations for the realisation of this vision. Mandela had visited India in 1990, not long 
after his release from prison, which marked the symbolic beginning of closer ties between 
the two states. From this point on Mandela visited India twice more in January 1995, and 
again in March 1997243. Over the course of these two visits a treaty on the principles of 
inter-state relations, an agreement on the establishment of a Joint Commission, and an 
                                                          
241
 Singh, J., Op Cit., p. 7. 
242
 Loc cit. 
243
 Ram, N., Towards a Strategic Partnership, Frontline, Vol. 14, No. 21, 
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1421/14210330.htm, October 18-31, 1997.    
67 
 
agreement on Foreign Office Consultation were produced244.  From here the wider 
diplomatic process behind the formation of the strategic partnership rapidly evolved, until 
the document which formally established the strategic partnership was signed; this is known 
as ‘The Red Fort Declaration On A Strategic Partnership Between South Africa And India’, or 
informally as the Red Fort Declaration. The Red Fort Declaration was signed on the 28 
March 1997, by the South African President Nelson Mandela, and the Indian Prime Minister 
H.D. Deve Gowda245. The signing of this document marked a permanent positive turning 
point in the bilateral relationship between South Africa and India.  
The dissertation will now examine the text of the Red Fort Declaration in order to gain a 
better understanding of the major themes and ideals upon which the strategic partnership 
is based. The first paragraph of the declaration serves to immediately identify the core 
ideals behind the strategic partnership246: 
Gathered at the historic Red Fort in the fiftieth year of India's independence and with the 
emergence of a new South Africa, South Africa and India look ahead with faith and optimism 
to journeying together towards the larger goals of their political freedoms: economic 
development and social justice. As a new millennium draws near, they also pledge to work 
for a global order that is marked by peace, security and equity.  
 
Translating these ideals into more practical areas of cooperation is a process which is 
developed throughout the remainder of the document. The first key concept to emerge is 
economic cooperation247: 
The economies of South Africa and India have certain comparative advantages, 
complementarities and resources which can be optimally used to promote economic 
development through cooperation. For example, India has valuable skills, technologies and 
experiences in the fields of small and medium enterprises development and employment 
generation programmes; South Africa has skills and technology in the fields of mining and 
infrastructure development. 
The next is strengthening South-South Cooperation248: 
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Concerned at the uneven impact of globalisation on developing economies, South Africa and 
India are convinced that the success and sustainability of the globalisation process depends 
on its ability to bring equal benefits to developing countries. They agree to consult and 
collaborate with one another in forums such as the United Nations and the World Trade 
Organisation and to make full use of their partnership within the Non-aligned Movement to 
articulate this concern. They also agree to coordinate their efforts in their mutual endeavour 
to capture the new opportunities for South--South cooperation and to help build capacities 
among the Least Developed Countries. 
Reforming global governance institutions is the last major concept in the declaration249: 
Convinced that the United Nations' structures need to be more representative of the 
concerns and diversities of the developing world, South Africa and India re-emphasize their 
belief in the need for UN reforms. They stress, in particular, the need for an equitable 
balance in the composition of an expanded Security Council to provide a constructive voice 
to the aspirations of the developing countries. They believe that piecemeal and 
discriminatory approaches to such expansion will be inconsistent with the objectives of that 
world body. 
The full text of the Red Fort Declaration can be found in Appendix 3, for further reference.  
Now that the three major themes contained within the Red Fort Declaration have been 
drawn out, they can be examined in greater depth, in order to better understand the reality 
of the early working of the strategic partnership. This is an important step in the process of 
understanding the partnership, because the themes and ideals it contains are not only the 
basis of the partnership, but in many ways effectively the only subject matter to examine. 
This is due to the fact that the declaration, in many instances, tends to outline most of the 
areas of cooperation in broad strokes and not in terms of concrete issues.  
To illustrate, when the declaration actually refers to one specific issue, that being the 
reform of the United Nations and the Security Council, it fails to make any provision of how 
India and South Africa would best go about achieving this through cooperative action. 
Instead all that is mentioned is that South Africa and India, “...re-emphasize their belief in 
the need for UN reforms”250, and that the “...piecemeal and discriminatory approaches”251, 
to reforming the United Nations Security Council are not in keeping with the, “...objectives 
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of that world body”252. Clearly, precious little is specified as to how this might be achieved, 
and through which channels such action should best be undertaken. 
However, the legal basis to the strategic partnership does not end there. On 2 October 
2006, a full nine years after the Red Fort Declaration established the strategic partnership, 
the then President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of 
India signed The Tshwane Declaration on Reaffirming the Strategic Partnership between 
South Africa and India253. This document was far longer, and vastly more comprehensive 
than the original Red Fort Declaration.  The truth of this is self-evident in the following 
extract, which demonstrates the palpable levels of enthusiasm contained in the Tshwane 
Declaration254:  
Conscious of the need to make the partnership more result-oriented and of greater direct 
benefit to the peoples of South Africa and India, President Mbeki and Prime Minister Singh 
have today decided to intensify co-operation and committed themselves to raise the existing 
level of friendship and partnership between South Africa and India to even higher levels. 
 
As a result the Tshwane Declaration strove to flesh out many of the issues previously 
outlined, and went even further than before, by proposing a series of far more specific 
measures which would be implemented in order to achieve these updated objectives.  
Evidence of this new comprehensive approach can be seen in the following excerpts from 
the Tshwane Declaration255: 
Both leaders noted that the political interaction between India and South Africa, marked by 
an exceptional degree of understanding, mutual trust and confidence, had gathered further 
momentum and substance. The number of Ministerial visits exchanged had increased 
significantly since the milestone visit of President Mbeki to India in 2003. They expressed 
their satisfaction at the continued and steady consolidation of bilateral relations. Besides the 
deep political bond that was first forged more than a century ago, the partnership now 
extends to the economic, human resources development, public administration and 
governance, urban and rural settlement, health, defence, cultural and science and 
technology fields. 
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In the field of economic cooperation the Tshwane Declaration notes256: 
Recalling that the Red Fort Declaration had recognised that the economies of South Africa 
and India have certain comparative advantages, complementarities and resources which can 
be exploited to mutual benefit through trade, investment and transfer of technology, they 
noted with satisfaction the progress that had taken place in these areas, resulting in more 
than doubling of the total bilateral trade since 2003 and a significant increase in investments 
in both directions. They acknowledged, however, that the full potential in this regard was 
yet to be tapped and reaffirmed their determination to explore these opportunities to their 
optimal extent, particularly in the following priority sectors: energy, tourism, health, 
automobiles and auto components, chemicals, dyes, textiles, fertilisers, information 
technology, small and medium enterprises and infrastructure. 
They urged the private sectors of both countries to gain better awareness of each other's 
strengths and to set themselves ambitious targets. It should be possible at least to treble the 
volume of bilateral trade by 2010. In this context, they welcomed the scheduled third 
meeting of the India-South Africa CEOs' Forum in Johannesburg on 2 October 2006, which 
would contribute towards this goal. 
The associated area of Skills development is also given attention257: 
Lauding the efforts of the South African Government for promoting broad-based economic 
and social development through the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South 
Africa (ASGISA) and the Joint Priority Skills Acquisition Initiative (JIPSA), Prime Minister Singh 
reaffirmed that the Indian Government was ready to be a partner in these initiatives and to 
provide assistance in building up scarce and critical skills identified by the South African 
Government. 
Reforming Global Governance Institutions is likewise expanded258: 
In addressing wider areas beyond the bilateral realm, the two leaders agreed that every 
effort would be made to conclude the India-Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
Preferential Trade Agreement as soon as possible since it would provide a significant 
incentive to the business communities of the two countries to explore mutually beneficial 
commercial opportunities and contribute to the growth in bilateral trade. 
Convinced of the vital importance of the role of the United Nations in promoting world 
peace, stability and development, the two leaders welcomed the creation of the 
Peacebuilding Commission and the Human Rights Council, as well as the progress made in 
the areas of UN Secretariat and management reform. The leaders noted the importance of 
increased focus on development and the alleviation of poverty. 
They reaffirmed the need for a decision regarding the expansion of the Security Council, 
without which no reform of the United Nations would be complete. They reiterated their 
conviction that the Security Council must be expanded to include developing countries from 
Africa, Asia and Latin America in both its permanent and non-permanent categories, so as to 
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reflect contemporary realities and make it more democratic and representative, and 
resolved to continue to pursue a decision in this regard. 
South-South Cooperation is revisited as well259: 
The two leaders agreed that the consolidation of the African Union (AU) held the key to the 
development of the continent. South Africa welcomed India's willingness to support the 
objectives of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the AU's primary 
programme aimed at consolidating the African agenda. 
The two leaders expressed satisfaction at the outcome of the first IBSA Summit held in 
Brasilia on September 12, 2006. They welcomed the emergence of IBSA as an effective 
instrument for promoting ever-closer co-ordination on global issues between these three 
influential and diverse democracies of Africa, Asia and South America. Both sides also agreed 
to intensify consultations and co-operation at multilateral forums such as NAM, 
Commonwealth, G-77, G-20 and the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) with a 
view to jointly addressing global challenges. 
Lastly, Defence Cooperation is a new area which is given a specific mention260: 
They noted the progress made in bilateral defence co-operation as reflected in the report of 
the India-South Africa Defence Committee, which met in June 2006 in Pretoria. They agreed 
that South Africa and India should work towards closer co-operation in the defence sector, 
including the possibility of joint research and development. Furthermore, the South African 
Government expressed appreciation for the training provided by India on UN Peacekeeping 
and operations of modern submarines. 
 
For further reference, the full text of The Tshwane Declaration on Reaffirming the Strategic 
Partnership between South Africa and India can be found in Appendix 4. 
 Therefore it is self evident, both from the text of the Tshwane Declaration and the 
expanded categories of cooperative efforts, that the Tshwane Declaration is a vast 
improvement on the original Red Fort Declaration’s vague efforts to produce a working 
strategic partnership. 
It is from this point on that the vast majority of the tangible cooperation within the strategic 
partnership begins to emerge. Evidence of just how this has successfully been undertaken 
will be outlined in the following sections, each of which will deal with a specific thematic 
issue, as was mentioned at in the introduction to the chapter. The aim of this process will be 
to relate the sweeping themes and grand gestures that have been extracted from the Red 
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Fort and Tshwane Declarations, back to real world examples of concrete cooperation 
between India and South Africa. Following on from this will be the final section which will 
determine to what extent cracks may have formed within the strategic partnership, by 
exploring areas of possible tension and disagreement. 
The dissertation will now turn to the first most important major theme within the strategic 
partnership, which is that of trade and other associated economic cooperation. 
 
3.4 The Strategic Partnerships Economic and Political Dimensions  
3.4.1 The Economic Dimensions: Trade, Investment and Economic Cooperation 
 
It was during the cold war, which provides us with some of the earliest examples of strategic 
partnerships, or ‘strategic relationships’ as they were known back then, that one factor 
managed to dominated the formation of these partnerships above all others. This factor was 
defence. It was during this period when most strategic partnerships were primarily 
predicated on mutual defence, or uniting against a common external threat, that trade, 
investment and economic cooperation often ended up being subordinated to these more 
pressing issues. The US-Israeli ‘strategic consensus’, mentioned in chapter 1 serves as an 
ideal example of this type of strategic partnership.  Gulshan elaborates261: 
The  first  time  that  the  US-Israel alliance was formally articulated was  in an  assurance  on  
the  occasion  of  the Sinai  Agreement of  September  1975. It was basically a one-way 
assurance in which the US promised Israel that because of the "long standing US 
commitment to the survival and security of Israel the US government will view with 
particular gravity threats to Israel's security or sovereignty by a world power" and would 
give "support, diplomatic or  otherwise  or  assistance  ... “. 
 
He goes on to mention the memorandum of understanding, signed by both parties on 
November 30, 1981, which formalised the ‘strategic relationship’262. He quotes certain key 
passages from this memorandum which illustrate the importance of military cooperation 
even further263: 
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The  published  text  of  the memorandum has six  articles; the  operative  part  of  which  is  
"to  provide  each other  with  military  assistance  to  cope with  threats  to  the  security  of  
the entire  region  caused  by  the  USSR  or Soviet-controlled  forces  introduced from 
outside the  region into the region". In addition to the joint air and naval exercises, it also 
calls for "co-operation for the  establishment  and  maintenance of  joint  readiness  services,  
as  agreed upon  by  the  parties". 
 
It is only once he has dealt with the provision relating to direct military assistance that he 
goes on to describe how the strategic relationship had only been made of true global 
significance, by the inclusion of a commitment to enhanced cooperation in ‘defence 
trade’264. The policy makers at the time were clearly so obsessed with issues of defence that 
the only component of the treaty which made, in Gulshan’s own words, “...the two 
countries partners at the global level”265, also had to be framed in military terms.  
Thankfully in the post-cold war era this type of thinking has largely been abandoned. 
Conventional forms of trade, investment and economic cooperation are now the driving 
force behind contemporary strategic partnerships, and as such often form the bedrock of a 
strategic partnership. It is from this practical and tangible base that many strategic 
partnerships are able to fabricate additional spheres of cooperation on a much wider variety 
of issues. This is largely due to the fact that the post-cold war era has seen the triumph of 
neo-liberal inspired economic globalisation, and the decline of the traditional realist driven 
defence based partnerships. As a result economic globalisation now occupies the top spot 
as the driving force behind most state to state interactions. The result of which is that trade, 
investment and enhanced economic cooperation dominates the global environment, as 
never before.  
India and South Africa’s strategic partnership is as a result no different. Commercial activity 
tends to be a major focal point within the partnership, so much so that it often receives a 
greater share of the collective attention. That said, prior to the signing of the Red Fort 
Declaration very little trade had occurred on a regular basis between India and South Africa. 
The following section will now move on to exploring the burgeoning trade component of the 
strategic partnership. 
 
                                                          
264
 Loc cit. 
265
 Loc cit. 
74 
 
3.4.1.1 Trade 
 
Turning briefly to India’s historical trading relationship with South Africa to further 
contextualise current activity one makes some important discoveries. Recalling that India 
had led the international movement to overthrow the Apartheid government, it is 
important to realise that this came at a quite significant cost to India. This was because of 
the fact that South Africa accounted for around 5% of India’s exports prior to 1947 when 
India took the decision to sever ties with Apartheid South Africa266. It comes as no surprise 
then that during the 1980’s trade linkages between the two countries were effectively non-
existent267. These linkages only began to be repaired during the period between 1993 and 
1995, but in spite of this, total imports into India during this period amounted to less than 
US$1 billion268. As a point of reference, during the same period, other African countries such 
as Egypt, Nigeria and Morocco all individually exported more than that to India269. 
However since the signing of the Red Fort Declaration, trade between India and South Africa 
has made mammoth leaps forward. In 1997, the year the Red Fort Declaration was signed 
South African exports to India amounted to R1, 333 Billion, but in contrast in 2010 exports 
to India had reached a record high of R22, 223 billion270. Imports similarly went from R 1,542 
Billion in 1997 to R20, 749 Billion in 2010271. However significant these improvements may 
be, there almost always remains a partner who will gain an overall net benefit from the 
trade.  
This benefit is expressed in terms of the balance of payments which is calculated by 
subtracting the total imports figure from the total export figure. However what concerns the 
analysis here is not if a positive or negative figure results, which indicates either a positive 
balance of payments or a negative balance of payments, but rather if there is a pattern to 
these figures which clearly favour one partner over the other. Therefore if either partner 
consistently enjoyed a significantly high balance of payments surplus throughout the 
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relationship, it would mean that they are the dominant trading partner. However the nature 
of the country’s export profile and the size of their economy would generally tend to 
indicate who will enjoy the balance of payments surplus, most analysts would tend to favour 
India in this calculation; in that it is a far larger economy than South Africa and it exports a 
far wider range of products and services.  
However in order to effectively judge the net gains from this process one has to view the 
aggregate balance of payments figures which will provide an measure as to which partner 
this might be. These figures are found in the table below. A positive figure of course 
indicates that in a given year South Africa has had a favourable balance of payments with 
India.  
South Africa and India Balance of Payments during the Strategic Partnership272: 
  
Balance of Payments (Rands'000) 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
              
-209,266  -15,030  837,485 1,176,068 1,169,565 1,072,617 211,694 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
              
-863,323 1,243,240 -5,555,697 -3,278,060 -747,081 2,710,550 1,474,172 
 
It may therefore come as somewhat of a surprise to learn that on average, South Africa has 
enjoyed a positive aggregate balance of payments with India. This is mostly to do with the 
export profile of South Africa, in that India buys significant amounts of gold from South 
Africa and it is often this single commodity that distorts the balance of payments in South 
Africa’s favour273. The reason for this is that India possesses a vibrant jewellery industry, and 
Indian culture places a high degree of importance on gold274. In addition, prior to 1994 India 
sourced its gold imports from a variety of sources, but now gets the bulk of its gold from 
South Africa275. The end result is that the balance of payments between India and South 
Africa tends to be somewhat skewed in South Africa’s favour. 
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Alves provides a detailed overview of the composition of South Africa’s trade with India276: 
Exports of gold to India are now well over half of the total (averaging 68% between 2003 and 
2006). Stripping this out reveals that South Africa’s non-gold market share in India grew to a 
high of only 1.5% in 1999, and has since lost these gains, drifting back to the 1994 level of 
about 0.6%. This picture does not change when using multi-year averages (to smooth out 
any single-year anomalies): South Africa’s non-gold market share in India is lower now than 
when bilateral relations normalised. Ignoring gold also means that South Africa’s trade 
surplus with India is misleading- South Africa in fact runs a small trade deficit with India, 
which averaged $230 million between 2003 and 2006.  
 
He goes on to explain further277: 
The gold trade necessarily means that exports are extremely concentrated. Just nine 
products out of a possible 65 accounted for 94% of India’s average imports from South 
Africa between 2003 and 2006. Yet, even if gold is excluded, South Africa’s export profile vis-
ả-vis India is still highly concentrated in natural resource based product groups (14 product 
groups accounted for 90% of exports between 2003 and 2006). The main products here are 
coal, chemicals, metals, paper products and other minerals. 
 
It is important to realise that the levels of trade that have been achieved throughout the 
lifetime of the strategic partnership have been varied. For instance prior to the signing of 
the Tshwane Declaration in 2006, the volume of trade between the two partners was in 
reality, tiny278. As a result the combined total of their bilateral trade in 2002 was just over 
1% of the total trade of both countries279. However following the signing of the Tshwane 
Declaration, with its calls for significant increases in bilateral trade volumes, there has been 
some measure of improvement. If one recalls this particular component of the 
declaration280: 
They urged the private sectors of both countries to gain better awareness of each other's 
strengths and to set themselves ambitious targets. It should be possible at least to treble the 
volume of bilateral trade by 2010. 
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It is this bold call for results which perhaps inspired what followed. In 2006, the total trade 
volume between South Africa and India, calculated by totalling their imports and exports, 
was R 16.3 billion281. To treble this figure by 2010 as the Tshwane Declaration had called for, 
would mean that their total trade volume in 2010 would have to be R 49 billion. In 2010 the 
actual total trade volume was R 42.9 billion282. This serves to effectively demonstrate that 
both partners were not far off from achieving their stated goal, and that the trading 
relationship they now enjoy is quite a substantial one.    
The important part from here though is to provide further context, by comparing this 
performance with that of other countries, some of which also have signed strategic 
partnership agreements with South Africa, such as China, and those which have not, in 
order to determine if there are any irregularities or special features of South Africa’s 
economic performance with India. It may be the case that this trade profile is considerably 
normal for a young trading partnership between two emerging economies. To do this first 
we shall first briefly examine China’s bilateral trade volumes with South Africa, before 
moving on to compare it with that of Japan.  
Beginning with China, one must immediately realise that the People’s Republic only 
resumed full diplomatic relations with South Africa a little later than India did, in 1998283. 
They have also signed a ‘strategic partnership agreement’ with South Africa, which makes 
their trade profile a good comparative benchmark by which to asses India’s bilateral trade 
with South Africa. In some ways it is less useful as China now enjoys a ’comprehensive 
strategic partnership’ with South Africa, which elevates its relative importance above that of 
the one India and South Africa share284. However, it still remains a largely valid example for 
the purposes of comparison. 
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China’s total trade volume with South Africa therefore reached an astounding R 142.6 billion 
in 2010285. Although this is a significantly larger total trade volume than the one South Africa 
and India share, it is entirely in the favour of China. This is because South Africa continues to 
run a huge balance of payment deficit with China, which in 2010 meant that South Africa 
imported R 25.5 billion more than it exported to China286. Therefore even though China is 
both South Africa top export and import destination in 2010, in terms of balance of 
payments, China ranks in at a lowly 247th place287. In 2010, India on the other hand ranks as 
South Africa’s 6th most important export and 8th most important import destination288. As 
was previously noted, this means that India and South Africa’s balance of payments are far 
more favourable to South Africa, placing India as South Africa’s 18th most attractive trading 
partner in terms of balance of payments289.     
We now turn to Japan, who resumed formal relations with South Africa in 1992290, at about 
the same time that India did. Japan however does not have a strategic partnership with 
South Africa, and unlike China is a fully developed economy. This therefore enables Japan to 
serve as an ideal comparative reference point, as its trading relationship with South Africa is 
not prioritised by a strategic partnership, nor is it a member of the ‘developing South’. This 
simply means it possesses few of the ideological similarities that South Africa might share 
with India and China. Of course is not to imply that Japan and South Africa are estranged in 
anyway, far from it in fact, but simply that it is sufficiently different enough to enable a 
representative comparison to be made.  
Overall trade volume between Japan and South Africa in 2010 reached R 77.3 billion, which 
although not as large as China’s volume, is comparatively higher than that of India’s291. As a 
result in 2010 Japan ranked as South Africa’s third most important export and fourth most 
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important import destination292. In the same year, in terms of balance of payments, Japan 
ranked as South Africa’s first placed trading partner293. The implications of which is that 
South Africa received a greater overall benefit from trading with Japan, than it did with any 
other of its 248 trading partners, during 2010294.    
Clearly then in comparison to both China and Japan, India’s trading relationship with South 
Africa leaves much to be desired. Yet some observers may still be somewhat surprised to 
discover that after 14 years of strategic partnership, and given the fact that India is a 
country with a population of over a billion people and an economy that passed the US$1 
trillion mark in 2007295, that the total trade volume between the partners in 2010 only 
reached R 42 billion, in comparison to China’s R 142.6 billion, and Japan’s R 77.3 billion. 
The reasons behind this will go a long way towards evaluating the partnership, and as such 
will be returned to in the following chapter. For now the dissertation will turn to the issue of 
investment.  
3.4.1.2 Investment 
One aspect of international commerce which is often closely related to trade is that of 
foreign direct investment. It therefore forms an important component of most bilateral 
commercial relationships, and as a result is often encouraged with vigour. India and South 
Africa are no different and as a result the have both made this an important issue within the 
economic component of the strategic partnership.     
Before going any further, we first need a brief understanding of why this is the case. The 
traditional assumption as to why it is ‘a good thing’ is because it injects new capital into a 
country’s domestic market, which expands the overall size of the market. Although this is 
the case, it does not paint a complete picture. Wei and Liu provide an explanation which 
fleshes out this basic assumption296: 
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The most important reason why countries try to attract FDI is perhaps the prospect of 
acquiring modern technology, interpreted broadly to include product, process, and 
distribution technology, as well as management and marketing skills. FDI is a package of 
capital, technology and managerial skills, and has been viewed as an important source of 
both direct capital inputs and technology and knowledge spillovers. 
 
Therefore the reason why both partners have encouraged their domestic firms to invest in 
each other’s economies is because foreign investment can produce significant benefits for 
developing economies, which Wei and Liu outline below297: 
FDI contributes to efficiency by breaking supply bottlenecks, introduces new know-how by 
demonstrating new technologies and training workers who later take employment in local 
firms, breaks down monopolies and stimulates competition, transfers technologies to local 
suppliers, and forces local firms to increase their managerial efforts.  
 
South Africa generally has tended to support this type of thinking since its re-emergence 
following the end of Apartheid. Gelb provides an overview of the South African attitude 
towards foreign investment298:  
The onset of constitutional negotiations in South Africa in 1990 ended the disinvestment 
pressures which foreign investors in South Africa faced in the context of international 
opposition to apartheid. Foreign investors began to invest in the country again and 
attracting new foreign investment has been a major thrust of official economic policy since 
the installation of the country’s first democratically elected government in 1994. Investment 
promotion agencies have been established, a variety of tax incentive schemes have been put 
in place, and the single most important economic policy statement since 1994 – the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy announced in June 1996 – made increased 
levels of FDI one of its central objectives. 
 
South Africa therefore actively seeks to attract foreign investment, whereas India on the 
other hand has traditionally tended to adopt a far more cautious approach towards allowing 
it to enter its domestic market. This reluctance stems from the period prior to the 1991 
economic reforms which began the liberalisation of India’s economy. As is to be expected, 
adjusting to the new reality, and abandoning long held beliefs about the negative effects of 
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foreign investment remained persistent for several years. Ganesh provides an excellent 
overview of these widely held negative perceptions299:  
Foreign direct investment in India has been on the upswing after 1991. For local industry this 
is felt as another body blow; following as it does the impact of other measures taken by 
government to reduce protection and increase the play of market forces. The fear is being 
expressed that the wave of foreign investment will sound the death-knell for indigenous 
industry.  
 
Clearly then, the comparison between South Africa and India reveals that two vastly 
different approaches were initially taken to foreign direct investment. Ganesh further 
outlines the performance of early foreign entrants into the Indian market, and offers an 
explanation as to why many of these early entrants failed to make substantial headway300:     
Foreign firms have had a mixed record of performance in India, prior to the 1991 
liberalisation. In certain sectors they performed well, but in others they have not been able 
to consolidate their position. Government's hostility is only one factor which contributed to 
the failure of foreign firms. Many foreign-owned firms could not face up to the competition 
in India, a pattern which can be seen also in the post-1991 period. As a consequence, Indian-
owned firms have a dominant presence in many sectors, primarily covering non-branded 
industrial goods. In some sectors, primarily branded consumer goods, foreign firms have 
built up strengths. The pattern of new FDI varies across sectors, depending on the required 
entry strategy. In high technology industries, and where investment levels are high, foreign 
firms are taking equity positions. Foreign equity is also flowing in where brand names are 
involved.   
 
It would therefore seem that South Africa and India, with their differing emphasis on 
investment, may still have a long way to go in order to cultivate a healthy bilateral 
investment portfolio. However the reality is in fact quite different. Currently India and South 
Africa, or rather Indian and South African firms, have invested quite heavily on the back of 
their government’s strategic partnership. This is partly because even though many Indians 
still dislike the idea of allowing investors into India, they are more than happy to invest in 
foreign markets. It is also partly due the fact that the aversion Ganesh described above, is 
starting to soften somewhat now that considerable time has passed since the Indian 
economy was liberalised.  
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It is therefore quite understandable that one would be hard pressed to find another 
emerging economy which is investing as heavily as India is in South Africa301. Likewise South 
African firms are turning ever more towards India as one of their chief investment 
destination. The reasons behind this, and the extent of the bilateral investment, will form 
the basis of this section. 
Following an invitation by the President of India Pratibha Devisingh Patil, Jacob Zuma, 
President of the Republic of South Africa, paid a State Visit to India from June 2-4, 2010”302. 
During this recent visit, investment featured prominently as a central component of the 
economic aspect of the strategic partnership. Iqbal Meer Sharma, deputy director-general of 
South Africa’s department of trade and industry, who was part of the South African 
delegation, noted in an interview with the Indian newspaper Business Standard, that, 
“...India features among the top 10 countries investing in South Africa, with current 
investment estimated at $6 billion”303. 
This estimated $6 billion worth of investment between the two countries is as a result of 
several prominent deals which both Indian and South African firms have managed to secure 
within each other’s domestic markets. For instance, some of the major Indian firms which 
have invested in South Africa to date include: The Tata Group, Cipla, Apollo Tyres, Godrej, 
Genpact, Aegis, Mahindra & Mahindra, Ashok Leyland, Aurobindo Pharmaceuticals, 
Ranbaxy, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, The State Bank of India, ICICI, Bank of Baroda, Nalco and 
JSW Energy304.What is important though is that these firms are spread out across a wide 
variety of economic sectors, thereby increasing the likelihood that South Africa will receive 
positive spillovers, alongside capital investment.  
One of the most notable of all the Indian investors is the huge multinational Tata Group. 
This is because it is actively involved in a wide variety of sectors, and its many group 
companies maintain a significant presence in the South Africa market. The three most 
important Tata group companies operating in South Africa include Tata Steel, Tata Motors 
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and Tata Consultancy Services. However, it is the motor sector which is one of the more 
promising areas for companies such as Tata, as well as several additional major Indian 
vehicle manufacturers. The result of which is that Tata Motors, Mahindra & Mahindra and 
Ashok Leyland, “...are all actively pursuing plans to set up a manufacturing base in South 
Africa”305. Tata Motors is keen to produce its flagship small car, the Indica, while Mahindra 
& Mahindra wish to manufacture their tractors and Ashok Leylands is aiming to produce 
buses for the US, European Union and several African countries306. According to Sharma all 
of these companies are reportedly interested in taking advantage, “...of the quota-free and 
duty-free regime of South Africa to make entry into these markets,"307.  
Much of this positive attitude demonstrated by Indian investors is due in no small part to 
the fact that South Africa is viewed not only as an ideal gateway towards the rest of Africa, 
but also because it scores so highly in the World Bank ease of doing business rankings, 
placing 34th in the world in 2011308. Many Indian companies also report that the South 
African tax regime did not offer any additional challenges, as it was in keeping with global 
tax systems309.  
Testimony to just how strong the investment climate for Indian firms in South Africa really is 
can be found by looking at the proliferation of commercial entities which are catering their 
services towards expanding this field even further. One such company is the South African 
branch of the world famous Price-Waterhouse Coopers who specialise in providing financial 
services such as tax consultancy to a variety of clients. They are so keenly aware of the 
potential for Indian investment in South Africa, that they have established a dedicated ‘India 
Desk’, which their company website claims will help Indian investors to find potential 
investments in South Africa and to facilitate the Indian investors business by handling the 
South African regulatory framework310. Clearly if a reputable firm like Price-Waterhouse 
Coopers is dedicating an entire department to facilitating Indian investment in South Africa, 
there is more than enough potential for future investment.     
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This of course does not mean South Africa is without its own set of unique drawbacks. 
Indian firms regularly face many challenges in South Africa, which include311: A range of 
regulatory issues, such as complicated Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) rules; strict and 
complicated labour regulations; delays in obtaining licences for certain products; and 
infrastructural challenges, particularly in the energy and telecommunications fields. Price-
Waterhouse Coopers also list crime, health and safety issues and the perceived high 
corporate and individual tax rates, as additional challenges312. On balance Indian firms have 
an easier time of investing in South Africa than South African firms do investing in India. As a 
result, the majority of the bilateral investment within the partnership arises from Indian 
firms investing in South Africa.    
Having just seen how many Indian firms are either currently active within South Africa or 
aim to establish their operations there in the near future, the chapter will now take a brief 
look at the extent to which all of the activity by Indian firms has been reciprocated. As was 
noted previously there tends to be limitations towards investing in India, which would once 
again understandably mean the volume of investment by South African firms in India is less 
than it almost certainly should be.  
Alves reports that South Africa firms have identified the following challenges as being 
dissuasive when considering India as an international investment destination313:  India still 
places restrictions on foreign investment in certain sectors; it often tends to have opaque 
licensing procedures and other regulations; the fact that rules differ across state borders; 
India has an overburdened legal system; suffers greatly from inadequate infrastructure, 
especially when it comes to transport and energy; and that India only formally adopted a 
competition commission as late as 2002.   
Yet these setbacks are tempered by the fact that India possesses a large consumer market 
with massive potential for growth and development. It is also easier for South African firms 
to conduct their operations in India because if we recall from the previous chapter, English 
is widely spoke throughout the country. When this is combined with the fact that The Indian 
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workforce is also highly educated, and India’s legal system similar to that of South 
Africa’s314, we begin to understand that India does indeed hold many possibilities for South 
African investors. Moreover, it is also no small benefit that India is a large and successful 
democracy as well315.  
Perhaps one final consideration which interests many large firms, such as South Africa’s 
Sasol who has invested $10 billion into a technologically sensitive joint venture partnership 
with the Tata Group316, is that when investing in India the threat of intellectual property 
theft is far lower than in many alternative investment destinations317.  This means that 
despite its sometimes severe shortcomings, India’s high degree of similarity with South 
Africa allows South African investors to understand India far more than they do other key 
emerging economies of the south such as, China and Brazil318. Understandably, because of 
this, most forward looking South African firms include India in their long term growth plans, 
alongside China319. 
India holds significant potential for South African investors in the infrastructure, financial 
services, retail, tourism, automotive and mining320. In light of this, the South African firms 
which have made inroads into India include: Tiger Brands; The Airports Company of South 
Africa; Bidvest SAB Miller; First Rand Bank321; Sasol who opened an office in Mumbai in 
January 2007322, Old Mutual which in 2001 launched a joint venture partnership to create 
Old Mutual Kotak Mahindra Life Insurance323; and Shoprite324. 
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As we have seen, the investments between the two nations are in-fact substantial. The 
governmental efforts which have heavily promoted investment at the national level have 
gone a long way towards ensuring that this not only occurred in the first place, but will 
continue to grow over time. The processes through which both governments established 
the resulting investment friendly environment, is by using the South Africa Business Forum, 
the Indo-South African CEO forum and the Joint Ministerial Commission. Through these 
initiatives, the economic component of the strategic partnership has been guided and 
shaped by the blending of state and private sector efforts.  
Beginning with the South Africa Business Forum, we find an institution which expends 
significant energy towards developing the commercial ties between South Africa and India. 
It aims to, “...provide a platform for South African business leaders and companies with a 
semi-permanent, permanent or joint-venture presence in India to address issues of 
interest to them”325. It also serves as a liaison between South African business interests in 
India, and the South African Mission to India, as well as the International Marketing 
Council of South Africa and South African Tourism326.    
 The next high level initiative which has done much to facilitate greater trade and 
investment ties between the two partners is the Indo-South African CEO forum. The forum 
was established in 2006 under the leadership of Ratan Tata, the CEO of Tata Group and 
South African business leader Patrice Motsepe.  The CEO’s forum has not been very active 
over the last few years, but received a new impetus during the South Africa state visit to 
India in June 2010. According to a joint statement issued at the time, both parties welcomed 
the reconstitution of the CEO forum the year before, as it would be able to act as an 
institutional mechanism for closer business interaction, and would do so with full 
governmental support327. Moreover to improve coordination the CEO’s had agreed in 2009 
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that they would conduct formal meetings twice a year from then on, hosting one in South 
Africa and the other in India328.  
The final mechanism which serves as a high-level forum for South African and Indian 
representatives to voice issues relating to the economic component of the strategic 
partnership is the joint ministerial commission. The commission itself has been in operation 
for several years, and continues to serve the interests of both nations in a variety of areas, 
including investment. As an example of how the joint commission facilitates these ties, we 
turn to a report back on the most recent commission held from the 6 to 7 March 2011 in 
New Delhi.  In the report back, an ANC spokesperson Maite Nkoana-Mashabane describes 
how the South African government329:  
... used the opportunity of our interactions to invite more Indian companies to come to 
South Africa to assist us - in the creation of jobs, especially investment in the tourism, 
mining, infrastructural development, green economy and agriculture. We also used this 
opportunity to impress on our Indian counterparts that South Africa has embraced a New 
Economic Growth Path which is aimed at enhancing growth, prioritising value addition 
(beneficiation), creating employment and working towards the achievement of equity in all 
aspects of the economy. Republic of South Africa (RSA) targets the creation of five million 
jobs over the next 10 years).    
 
The end result of this process of exploring investment between South Africa and India 
means that we are keenly aware that this is quite an active sector, and although it stands to 
be expanded, it requires far less effort and attention than the more important trading 
relationship. It therefore becomes increasingly self-evident that investment forms one of 
the most crucial component of the strategic partnership, not only because of the volume of 
bilateral investment, but because there are so many efforts being made both in the private 
and public sectors to facilitate its growth. As such investment holds great potential and 
promises to continue to produce significant benefits for both partners. The dissertation will 
therefore now move on to the final economic component of the partnership, which is 
economic cooperation. This is a smaller component that trade and investment, but it 
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requires some mention in order to establish a holistic picture of the economic dimensions of 
the strategic partnership. 
3.4.1.3 Economic Cooperation 
Economic cooperation is in a sense a broad term that refers to South Africa and India’s non 
trade or investment linkages. Most of the activity here is driven by a desire to assist one 
another with developmental issues, such as providing education and expertise which will 
enhance each other domestic capabilities. 
So far most of these types of efforts have been driven by India, as it helps South Africa by 
funding job creation efforts and provides additional training opportunities for South 
African’s in India. The flagship South African enterprise which dealt with these types of 
issues was the Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA). The JIPSA initiative, “...was 
established in March 2006 as a high level partnership between government, business and 
organised labour to accelerate the acquisition of priority skills in order to meet the demands 
of Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA)”330. However331:  
In March 2009, Cabinet approved the revised Human Resource Development Strategy for 
South Africa (HRD-SA). Cabinet’s decision marked the migration of work initiated under 
JIPSA into the HRD-SA and the incorporation of the JIPSA secretariat into the Human 
Resource Development Support Unit. With the migration, the JIPSA secretariat will be known 
as the Human Resource Development Support Unit. 
 
What JIPSA aimed to do though was to focus its attention on skills development. 
Therefore332:  
The JIPSA strategy had rested on the assumption that skills acquisition was not merely a 
numbers challenge, but a systems challenge. It involves broadening the training pipeline, 
retaining people in skilled employment, and training them more effectively and to higher 
quality standards. Along with the setting of targets, it is equally important to address the 
systems blockages and inefficiencies and problems of quality that impede the acquisition of 
relevant, high-quality skills to sustain growth over the medium to longer terms.  
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The significance of JIPSA then was that it saw significant interest from India and acted as a 
vehicle through which India was able to further its economic cooperation with South Africa. 
As a result, prior to JIPSA being incorporated into the HRD-SA, India played an important 
role in funding several JIPSA programmes. It also provided South Africans with training 
opportunities in India. The following paragraphs from the Tshwane Declaration illustrate the 
extent of India’s approval of the initiatives333:  
Lauding the efforts of the South African Government for promoting broad-based economic 
and social development through the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South 
Africa (ASGISA) and the Joint Priority Skills Acquisition Initiative (JIPSA), Prime Minister Singh 
reaffirmed that the Indian Government was ready to be a partner in these initiatives and to 
provide assistance in building up scarce and critical skills identified by the South African 
Government. 
President Mbeki welcomed the growing co-operation within the framework of the Indian 
Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme and Prime Minister Singh's 
indication that India would increase the number of ITEC slots allocated to South Africa from 
55 to 100, with 50 of these slots earmarked specifically for the JIPSA Initiative. 
 
Additional efforts to assist South Africa with JIPSA are mentioned in a press statement 
released by the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation, on 
the occasion of the visit of the Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee, for the Joint 
Ministerial Commission meeting held in Pretoria in February 2008.  In it there are three 
distinct categories of AsgiSA and JIPSA programmes, they are as follows334: 
 Government-sponsored Programmes 
This programme focuses mostly on the 100 ITEC (Indian Technical and Cooperation) slots that 
are made available to South African public servants through the Indian Ministry of External 
Affairs. 
 Programmes driven by Institutions 
These programmes have the potential of being the most significant contributions towards skills 
development in South Africa because of the size and extent of projects.  These projects are 
driven by the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) in co-operation with BUSA.  The focus is on 
developing skills of artisans (electricians, plumbers, bricklayers, etc); and the objective is to 
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provide training to large numbers of South African apprentices, in order to address the skills-
deficit at the operational level in these trades. 
 Private Sector Initiatives 
Major Indian corporate companies (like TATA, Sahara, Satyam, etc) are training young, 
unemployed South African graduates in the fields of tourism and ICT.  These programmes last for 
an average of 3-4 months and involve “on-the-job training” at major centres in India.  These 
same companies’ forays into the SA economy, makes these opportunities they provide a case of 
enlightened self-interest on their part rather than pure altruism. 
 
The statement also mentions that India is one of the biggest contributors to South Africa’s 
AsgiSA and JIPSA related programmes335. Since JIPSA has been incorporated into the HRD-
SA, it seems highly unlikely that India’s commitments thus far will evaporate, as India has a 
solid existing foundation on which to continue its support for this crucial component of the 
strategic partnership. 
Moving on now to more political issues, the dissertation will examine the phenomenon 
known as South-South Cooperation, as it is one of the major arena within the strategic 
partnership, after the partnerships economic ties. 
 
3.4. 2 The Political Dimensions:  South-South Cooperation and Global Institutional Reform 
3.4.2.1 South-South Cooperation 
 
South Africa and India tend to cooperate closely on issues derived from South-South 
Cooperation. This may be surprising, as South Africa is far inferior to India when it comes to 
India’s rising global influence as derived from economic and demographic potential that 
South Africa could never hope to match336. That said, as we witnessed earlier on in chapter 
2, South Africa generally tends to exert more influence than one might consider appropriate 
given its relative size.  
This is demonstrated by the very fact that India signed a strategic partnership agreement 
with South Africa, for if South Africa had been inconsequential there may never have been 
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one in the first place. Therefore as a result of the strategic partnership, it is fair to say that 
South Africa and India, “...share a grand vision of a more just and equitable world and better 
mechanisms for governing it”337. In light of this both India and South Africa have made 
enhancing South-South Cooperation a priority. It is an issue which is given specific mention 
in the Red Fort Declaration338: 
Concerned at the uneven impact of globalisation on developing economies, South Africa and 
India are convinced that the success and sustainability of the globalisation process depends 
on its ability to bring equal benefits to developing countries. They agree to consult and 
collaborate with one another in forums such as the United Nations and the World Trade 
Organisation and to make full use of their partnership within the Non-aligned Movement to 
articulate this concern. They also agree to coordinate their efforts in their mutual endeavour 
to capture the new opportunities for South--South cooperation and to help build capacities 
among the Least Developed Countries. 
 
The nature of South-South Cooperation is that it brings together a series of developing 
states, all of whom are attempting to carve out new niches and new political space within 
the broader international system. They therefore are beginning to challenge the leading 
nations of the North, through the reassertion of the growing North-South divide.  The result 
of this process is that Southern states, many of whom are middle powers, have tended to 
club together to deal with the issue cooperatively within multilateral forums. Cooperative 
efforts are as a result the hallmark of South-South cooperation because as Alden and Vieira 
point out339: 
The established discourse on middle powers is fixed within a relational dynamic that is 
essentially derived from a materialist account of states and power set within the framework 
of the international system as a whole. From this perspective middle powers are understood 
to be committed multilateralists as a means of overcoming their material deficiencies in 
terms of structural power. 
 
South Africa and India are no exception. They have both actively embraced these moves 
which now allow them to assert their views on global challenges as never before. It is as a 
result of this type of thinking that multilateralism has become almost entirely synonymous 
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with the concept of South-South Cooperation. That said, India and South Africa demonstrate 
slight differences in their approach, often as a result of their standing within their respective 
regions, and by virtue of their domestic situations. The dissertation will now outline both 
partners’ positions with regard to South-South cooperation.  
Beginning with South Africa’s, we soon see that its approach to South-South cooperation 
embraced the concept of multilateralism wholeheartedly, and as such it became a central 
component of Pretoria’s foreign policy. Alden and Vieira comment on these 
developments340: 
 
The impulse towards multilateralism in foreign policy, reinforced by negative responses to 
Pretoria’s unilateralism among African states, mirrored aspects of classic middle power 
strategy as the new government sought to leverage its material deficiencies through 
recourse to international organisations. Where it differed from established middle powers 
was that Pretoria sought to position itself, first and foremost, within the institutional and 
ideational framework of Southern international organisations such as NAM, the Organisation 
for African Unity (AU) and UNCTAD.  
 
Under the Mbeki presidency South Africa took the concept of utilising multilateralism to 
galvanise further more ambitious thinking. Mbeki himself announced that he wanted to 
create a ‘G-7 of the South’, and by 2001 this thinking had been adopted by the South African 
Department of Trade and Industry policy341. He said342: 
 
In relation to possible future rounds of the WTO, our policy will be to seek to bring 
developing countries around a common agenda—the so-called G-South. It is evident that 
only a co-ordinated response from the South will be able to secure sufficient concessions 
from the powerful industrialized countries. 
 
India’s position is somewhat similar. It is not quite as assertive as the call by Mbeki to create 
a G-South, which incidentally was never fully embraced by other Southern actors, but did 
mirror South Africa’s position to a large extent. India’s position is largely founded on 
Jawaharlal Nehru’s national philosophy. As we have seen this not only informs India’s 
ideological approach to the strategic partnership but also its approach to South-South 
cooperation. It was Nehru’s foreign policy goals that most influenced South-South 
cooperation, which were, “...the improvement of the international economic and political 
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order, independence in foreign relations, equal treatment among states, independence of 
colonies and many others—which placed a premium on the building of peace and co-
operation in the world”343. 
 
A few decades before the broader South-South movement began to take shape, Nehru’s 
thinking had helped India carve out a unique space in the international system, with the 
creation of the Non-Aligned Movement.  In some ways this served as an Indian precursor to 
South-South cooperation, and could be credited at the very least with being part of the 
inspiration behind its eventual emergence onto the international stage.  
Furthermore India as a global power, is more attune to a wider Southern audience, meaning 
it has to posture itself somewhere between the prevalent issues within its own South Asian 
region, and the wider international South-South movement which deals with a far larger set 
of issues.  
Having witnessed the similarities between their two national positions, a few of the more 
prominent concerns that the South-South movement has to face should first be noted. 
These common issues addressed by the broader South-South movement come from a 
document released by the Group of 77 (G77)-to which both partners are active members, 
entitled the Marrakesh Framework of Implementation of South-South Cooperation344.   
This document broadly lists education, information sharing, global institutional reform, the 
promotion of investment, improving market access for developing nation’s exports through 
the WTO, food security, agriculture, improving health, poverty alleviation and enhanced 
South-South dialogue within the UN, as some of the most prominent concerns that South-
South cooperation should address345.   
Turning now to South-South cooperation within the strategic partnership, we see a similar 
concerns shared by both partners. One of the most recurring themes throughout all official 
statements and the academic literature on South-South cooperation deals with the issue of 
global institutional reform. This will as a result be dealt with separately in the following sub-
                                                          
343
 Ibid., pp. 1086-1087.  
344
 The G77, The Marrakesh Framework of Implementation of South-South Cooperation, 
http://www.g77.org/marrakech/Marrakech-Framework.htm, December 2003. 
345
 Loc cit. 
94 
 
section. First though we will examine the practical aspects of their commitments to 
furthering South-South cooperation.  
Perhaps the most recognisable manner in which the strategic partners have taken practical 
steps to deepened South-South Cooperation, has occurred through the June 2003 launch of 
The India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum346.  According to the IBSA website347:  
The establishment of IBSA was formalized by the Brasilia Declaration, which mentions India, 
Brazil and South Africa’s democratic credentials, their condition as developing nations and 
their capacity of acting on a global scale as the main reasons for the three countries to come 
together.  Their status as middle powers, their common need to address social inequalities 
within their borders and the existence of consolidated industrial areas in the three countries 
are often mentioned as additional elements that bring convergence amongst the members 
of the Forum. 
 
White remarks that348: 
 
IBSA is best described as an alliance of like-minded countries that share similar interests, 
skills and needs. It is a geopolitical arrangement underpinned by political symbolism, which 
has provided a unique negotiating caucus in multilateral fora. 
 
It is naturally understandable then that although this is a trilateral forum, including Brazil, it 
often is utilised as the vehicle through which both India and South Africa coordinate on 
issues relating to South-South cooperation. Therefore a great deal of their efforts relating to 
South-South cooperation derived from actually cooperating with themselves and other 
Southern partners, or it is conducted within the confines of multilateral institutions. The 
strategic partnership therefore usually simply endorses these efforts and encourages further 
discussion in multilateral settings, such as that of IBSA.  
 To reinforce this assertion it is worthwhile noting that according to the G77’s assessments 
following the Eleventh Meeting of the Intergovernmental Follow-Up and Coordination 
Committee on Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries, which was held during 
March 2005 in Havana, Cuba349: 
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Most South-South and North-South activities occurred within the framework of regional and 
sub-regional arrangements. Regional groups were oriented predominantly towards the 
promotion of South-South flows of trade among developing countries. By the end of 2002, 
the World Trade Organization had recognized nearly 250 regional and sub-regional free-
trade arrangements intended to promote economic and social development.   
 
Although it has to be said the two partners do coordinate their positions of South-South 
cooperation through the Joint Ministerial Commission, which we previously saw played a 
key role in promoting investment. Both partners use this forum to discuss a variety of issues, 
and as such released this statement to that effect350: 
On the Joint Ministerial Commission (JMC), we agreed that it provides a platform for 
government-to-government interaction over a broad spectrum of issues with a view to 
further deepening and expanding our bilateral relations. We jointly reiterated that the JMC 
stands as a reaffirmation of our commitment to the strategic partnership that we have with 
India, based on our shared vision and common values - key amongst which are democracy, 
development, justice, respect for human rights and equity, and the quest for a better life for 
all our people in a just and peaceful world. 
 
Their specific South-South concerns are constantly shifting, as new issues arise and changes 
in the emphasis of their efforts are required. Understandably therefore concrete points are 
difficult to find, but as usual will inevitably rest somewhere within the ambit of the major 
themes that the South-South movement generally embraces, which were outlined above by 
the G77 document.   
As economic cooperation has been dealt with already, cooperation on the one major South-
South issue which the strategic partnership specifically mentions will now be explored. This 
issue which features strongly on the political side of the partnership is global institutional 
reform.   
3.4.2.2 Global Institutional Reform 
 
As was mentioned above, the concept of global institutional reform is one that is very 
closely related to South-South cooperation.  As a result many states within the developing 
South often frame their efforts at reforming these institutions as a concern of South-South 
cooperation. 
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Alden and Vieira describe these efforts at reform as being the result of a crisis of legitimacy 
for many of the world’s global governance institutions351:  
The crisis of legitimacy facing international institutions underlies much of the conduct of 
developed and developing states in the aftermath of the Cold War. While the Northern 
countries have tended to emphasise issues of UN credibility in the light of significant 
operational failings, cost-effectiveness and other policy dilemmas, the Southern critique has 
been rooted in a deeper structural analysis. For the established powers situated within these 
institutions the question of legitimacy is seen through issues of activism and state-invested 
interests.  
 
They continue by outlining the position and concerns of the developing states352: 
In contradistinction, for developing countries the crisis is fixed less in activism and interests 
per se and more in terms of structural concerns. Participation in the UN was, for many newly 
independent states of Asia and Africa, a triumph of faith over experience. Indeed, Sukarno's 
initial ambition for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was to create an alternative world 
order to that of the Western-dominated UN. This impulse for reform of international 
institutions did not, however, disappear, but became a renewed source of contention in the 
waning days of the Cold War. The South Commission, authorised by the NAM and funded 
primarily by the Malaysian government, launched a study in 1988 in which it called for 
reform of the Security Council and the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) to better reflect the 
concerns of the developing world. The Commission for Global Governance, whose report 
was issued in 1995, set out the general case for significant reform of international 
institutions to take into account the changing dynamics of the international system, as did a 
number of UN commissions. The focus of structural reform remains the UN Security Council, 
with its permanent membership and veto privileges, and the BWI. The weighted voting 
system of the IMF and World Bank, based upon what is in effect a politically negotiated 
interpretation of relative economic standing dating back to the second world war, is 
particularly contentious for developing countries, given BWI influence over many of their 
economies. 
 
Turning now to South Africa and India’s commitment to this aspect of the partnership, we 
find that both the Red Fort and Tshwane Declarations make specific reference to the 
importance of these processes. It is given specific mention in the Red Fort Declaration as far 
back as 1997, when the idea of a strategic partnership had only just emerged. In the Red 
Fort Declaration one sees the first inklings of the holy grail of institutional reform, that being 
the reform of the UN and particularly the Security Council, being mentioned353:  
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Convinced that the United Nations' structures need to be more representative of the 
concerns and diversities of the developing world, South Africa and India re-emphasize their 
belief in the need for UN reforms. They stress, in particular, the need for an equitable 
balance in the composition of an expanded Security Council to provide a constructive voice 
to the aspirations of the developing countries. They believe that piecemeal and 
discriminatory approaches to such expansion will be inconsistent with the objectives of that 
world body. 
 
Obviously these are strong words which have been carefully chosen to reflect just how 
robust both partners’ feelings are when it comes to this issue. This is most likely due to the 
fact that they came at a time when both nations were buoyed by idealistic fervour following 
both the end of Apartheid and the rise of Neo-Liberalism. However references to UN reform 
in the strategic partnership do not end here. The Tshwane declaration contains additional 
comments on the process of furthering the reform agenda354:  
They reaffirmed the need for a decision regarding the expansion of the Security Council, 
without which no reform of the United Nations would be complete. They reiterated their 
conviction that the Security Council must be expanded to include developing countries from 
Africa, Asia and Latin America in both its permanent and non-permanent categories, so as to 
reflect contemporary realities and make it more democratic and representative, and 
resolved to continue to pursue a decision in this regard. 
 
Extracts from the recent comments made by South Africa’s representative to the General 
Assembly, Dire Tladi during the 48th & 49th Meetings from Sixty Fifth General Assembly Plenary 
on 11 November 2010, reveal an important portion of the South Africa’s perspective in this 
regard. South Africa355:  
...aligning with the Non-Aligned Movement and the African Group, called on the Council for 
greater engagement with non-members, especially those parties directly affected by or 
involved in a specific conflict. 
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Additionally356:  
Welcoming the thematic debate on protection of civilians, among others, as well as 
increased cooperation with the African Union, he said Council reform remained a top 
priority.  There was no going back into the mode of endless consultations.  Now was time for 
meaningful give-and-take negotiations.  To that end, he said that a streamlined text that 
identified areas of convergence was required, with deletion of redundancies in the current 
text taken as a first step to preparing such a text.  Proposals that offered no prospect for an 
outcome must be identified and discarded, while those offering the best prospects for a 
solution should be consolidated.  Progress could be achieved based on a convergence of 
views that reforms would require expanding both membership categories.  Efforts to build 
on the convergence of views on working methods and the relationship between the Council 
and the Assembly were also needed. 
 
From the same document we find India elaborating its own position, which was delivered by 
Bhubaneswar Kalita a member of the Indian Parliament357: 
Next, he expressed his gratitude that countries and leaders around the world had articulated 
their support for India as a permanent member of an expanded Security Council, noting the 
United States’ recent affirmation of its support, and called on other nations to extend their 
support to his country.  Further, he called for the expansion from the current 15 members to 
a “figure in the mid-twenties” with a mandatory review after a period ranging from 8 to 
15 years.  The G-4 position on the question of veto was unambiguous and constructive, and 
stressed the need for an outcome that ensured the democratization of decision-making 
within the Council.  India associated itself with the growing clamour for early reform of the 
Council’s working methods. 
 
He continued358: 
 
Regarding the issue of regional representation, India supported a Charter-based distribution 
of seats that addressed the lack of representation of African, Latin American and Caribbean 
countries and Asian countries in permanent membership and non-permanent membership 
of developing counties, including the least developed, landlocked countries and small island 
States.  In closing, India called for the Assembly and the Council to respect each other’s 
distinct roles to secure the effective functioning of the United Nations.  India was ready and 
willing to reach out to work in close cooperation with other countries.  In that regard, the 
Council must shorten the negotiation text and proceed wholeheartedly into real 
negotiations. 
 
As these statements reveal both countries are largely in keeping with their South-South 
cooperative themes, emphasising greater inclusivity and coordinated efforts. References to 
the issue in the confines of the strategic partnership can be found in the joint press release 
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on the occasion of President Zuma visiting India, to meet with Prime Minister Pratibha 
Devisingh Patil, from 2-4 June 2010359: 
The two Leaders emphasized the need for the reform of the United Nations (UN) to render it 
more democratic and consistent with the priorities of the developing world. They 
emphasised that no reform of the UN would be complete without the reform of the UN 
Security Council, including an expansion in both permanent and non-permanent categories 
of membership, with increased participation of developing countries in both, for the Security 
Council to have the representativeness and legitimacy it needs to face contemporary 
challenges. The two leaders undertook mutual support for their candidature for non-
permanent Security Council seats for 2011-2012. 
 
Now that it has been demonstrated that both partners, within the confines of the strategic 
partnership and without, are keen to prioritise the issue of UN reform, we can now move on 
to further efforts they have taken in this regard. This is because the concept of reforming 
global governance institutions does not stop here; in fact they are expanded even further as 
was alluded to earlier on. A core tenet of the partnership, as far as global institutional 
reform is concerned, is that all global institutions should be more representative of the 
current realities within the international system. The process of reform is therefore also 
extended to the global financial institutions, particularly the Bretton Woods institutions. 
This is further evident from the joint declaration of 4 June 2010, in which360:  
The leaders stressed the need to reform the Bretton Woods Institutions to increase their 
effectiveness and to enhance their accountability, credibility and legitimacy. They underlined 
the importance for a greater voice and participation by developing countries in these 
institutions. The two leaders stated that a positive outcome of the Doha Round of trade talks 
within the World Trade Organisation would be instrumental in economic recovery, 
particularly in job creation, as international trade has experienced its sharpest decline in 
several decades. A development oriented, balanced and successful conclusion of the Round 
at an early date would bolster the credibility of the multilateral trading system in the face of 
increased protectionist pressures. The Leaders confirmed their intention to continue to work 
to strengthen the alliances of developing members that have effectively changed the 
negotiating dynamic in the World Trade Organisation, placing developing countries, for the 
first time in the history of the global trade system, at the centre of the negotiations. 
 
India and South Africa have therefore been somewhat successful at reforming the Bretton 
Woods Institutions, as their collective voice has helped to drive the process forward. They 
still have some way to go, but it seems increasingly likely that they will continue to make 
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their presence felt. However, due to previous failures during the Doha Round, and the vast 
number of inputs from variety of developing and developed nations it is understandable 
that the process of reform is slow. That is not to say that it is non-existent, as recent 
developments seem to be encouraging.  
One development in particular was the formation of the core group at the sixth ministerial 
conference of the World Trade Organisation, on the issue of Non-Agricultural Market Access 
(NAMA)361. India used its dominant position in world trade talks to establish the core group, 
and invited South Africa to act as co-chair of the group362. The group was originally 
composed of nine members, but soon expanded to become a key developing voice at the 
WTO363. The expanded group is now commonly known as the NAMA-11, and its 
membership includes364: Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Egypt, India, 
Indonesia, Namibia, Philippines, South Africa and Tunisia. At the time the formation of the 
core group was seen by experts as an important development365:  
According to Milind Murugkar, agri-policy researcher from India, the G-20 helped correction 
to a "great extent" the imbalance in the agricultural negotiations. However, there was no 
such movement of NAMA. The need for such a coalition on NAMA arises especially in the 
backdrop of E.U's demand for greater market access in the developing countries for its 
industrial goods in exchange of any market access for agricultural products from the 
developing countries. The formation of the core group would give these countries a better 
bargaining power while dealing with Europe on agriculture. 
 
This provides a clear practical demonstration by India and South-Africa of their commitment 
to the issue of reform, and as a result contains practical steps towards furthering these 
goals, rather than simply committing to their principals with vague statements of support. 
The NAMA-11 group has gone on to actively campaign, under South Africa and India’s 
leadership, on issues such as366: Placing development concerns at the heart of the 
negotiations;  ensuring “less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments” for developing 
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countries;  comparable level of ambition with agricultural market access; and appropriate 
flexibilities to manage adjustment costs and address development needs. 
India and South Africa have met with less success with regard to reforming the United 
Nations Security Council. Obviously since the UN Security Council in particular has yet to be 
incorporate the changes many nations would like to see. These measures would include 
offering new permanent seats and veto rights, to those who find themselves as non-
permanent members of the Security Council.  
That said, South Africa and India have managed to do is raise their profiles within the UN 
and as such have both been offered non-permanent positions on the Security Council.  In 
fact at present India and South Africa are both acting non-permanent members of the UN 
Security Council, incidentally along with Brazil, their partner from the IBSA dialogue 
forum367. India and South Arica were elected on 12 October 2010, while Brazil was elected 
the previous year368.   
Turning now to the final component which needs examining before moving on to evaluating 
the strategic partnership, the dissertation will look at tensions which have appeared over 
the years within the partnership. This is because no matter how close the partners are, they 
will never be able to agree on all matters, all of the time. Therefore it is these disagreements 
or tensions, no matter how minor that often provides valuable insight into the true state of 
the strategic partnership. 
 
3.5 Emergent Tensions 
 
Since both partners are so closely aligned in both their broader world view and their 
ideological similarities, while also enjoying such strong historical ties it would be natural to 
assume that there are almost no areas in which they would disagree on how best to 
approach any given issue. However this has not always proven to be the case.   
                                                          
367
 The IBSA Dialogue Forum, Press Statement on the Non-Permanent Members Election of the UNSC, 
http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas-mais-informacoes/saiba-mais-ibas/documentos-emitidos-pelos-chefes-de-
estado-e-de/press-statement-of-the-ibsa-forum-on-the-occasion-of-the-election-of-india-brazil-and-south-africa-
as-non-permanent-members-of-the-un-security-council/at_download/file, New York, 12 October 2010. 
368
 Loc cit. 
102 
 
Both India and South Africa have disagreed on certain approaches to issues, as well as 
aspects of one another’s conduct within the international system. For the most part these 
have not come to much, and remain minor points of contention which would in no real way 
divide or threaten to end the partnership. 
However they need to be discussed none the less in order to produce a truly balance picture 
of the two nations dealings within the strategic partnership and will contribute significantly 
to the analytical component that will follow in the final chapter. 
Beginning then with one of the most significant issues which have arisen within the confines 
of the strategic partnership, we will now explore the nuclear issue. If anything has produced 
potential tensions, it is most likely this. The nuclear issue has arisen because India, which 
became a recognised nuclear weapons state after its first weapons test in 1974, and 
subsequently never signed either the NPT or the CTBT, has potentially distanced itself from 
one of South Africa’s fundamental foreign policy positions. 
In a 2009 interview with India’s External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee,  he told India 
Today Group Editor Prabhu Chawla, that , “We will not sign CTBT or NPT and we have made 
it absolutely clear to the US that we are bound by the bilateral agreement with it and India-
specific safeguards with the IAEA”369. This however is not something South Africa is likely to 
be pleased to hear. The specific safeguards mentioned by Mukherjee were negotiated 
between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), represented by IAEA 
Director General Mohamed ElBaradei and Ambassador Saurabh Kumar of India, and 
culminated in the signing of the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities 
agreement in Vienna on 2 February 2009370. Accordingly371: 
The IAEA currently applies safeguards to six nuclear reactors in India under safeguards 
agreements concluded between 1971 and 1994. In the future, additional reactors are 
expected to be under IAEA safeguards under the newly-signed agreement. 
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Yet even though South Africa undoubtedly will have welcomed the signing of these 
safeguards, which represented a significant departure from India’s traditional position of 
remaining outside the NPT and the CTBT, India’s nuclear reality still has the potential to 
drive a wedge between the two partners.  
This is especially true if one considers that under the agreement with the IAEA India will 
place its civil nuclear facilities under the supervision of the agency, but in return gains the 
ability to obtain access to the international nuclear fuel market372. However, if these foreign 
fuel supplies should be interrupted, the agreement allows India to ‘take corrective measure’ 
to remedy the loss of supply373. This essentially means India can now buy fuel from foreign 
suppliers, but also produce it domestically if these foreign producers are unable to honour 
their commitments. That is therefore the worrying part.   
To therefore understand why South Africa might be concerned about India’s new found 
nuclear legitimacy, while it continues to remain outside of the NPT and the CTBT, we need 
to understand South Africa’s history with regard to nuclear weapons. This history is well 
documented. Purkitt, Burgess and Liberman reveal the early beginnings of South Africa’s 
nuclear Weapons programme374:    
With the start of negotiations in Geneva in 1964 on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT), Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd decided against South African participation. In 1970 
his successor, B.J. Vorster, rejected the NPT and instead announced the creation of a new 
South African uranium enrichment process and invited collaboration by  "non-Communist  
countries"  in developing it." While emphasizing the peaceful aims of the program in 
parliament, Vorster also proclaimed that South Africa would not be limited to promotion of 
the peaceful application of nuclear energy.  
 
Yet evidence suggests that375: 
 
Prime Minister John Vorster had already decided in 1974 to proceed with developing 
nuclear explosives and a test site, although this was still purportedly aimed at commercial 
'peaceful nuclear explosives'. The government officially decided to acquire nuclear weapons 
only in 1977 or 1978. 
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South Africa had from here undertaken a top secret nuclear weapons programme which 
ended up producing six and a half Hiroshima-type bombs376. In the end there came an 
announcement by South African President F. W. De Klerk in March 1993, following 
significant international and domestic pressure, that South Africa had already completed the 
dismantling of both its weapons and the weapons programme377. This made South Africa 
the only nation in history to relinquish its nuclear weapons capability. 
 
This of course sets quite a precedent, and later formed the basis of South Africa’s staunch 
support for the global anti-nuclear weapons movement, which saw it become a signatory to 
both the NPT and the CTBT. Its position on nuclear weapons is best described by a 
statement by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, before the South African 
National Assembly, following two questions asked by Mr. D Sithole of the ANC in 2006. His 
questions related to the future of the NPT, and whether South Africa should convince the 
powers in the world to disarm and sign the NPT. A portion of the Minister’s response 
provides powerful insight into South Africa’s opinion on disarmament and nuclear 
proliferation378:  
At the relevant disarmament and non-proliferation fora, South Africa has consistently 
reiterated its principled positions on nuclear disarmament. These include our strong 
conviction that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction are not a source of 
security, but only serve to further increase insecurity. The continued retention of these 
weapons, as well as the development of new types of nuclear weapons also means that 
significant resources that can be used for development purposes are diverted towards the 
maintenance and further development of these instruments of destruction. As we enter the 
next review cycle that will lead up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, South Africa, 
together with like-minded partners in the Non-Aligned Movement and other groupings such 
as the New Agenda Coalition, will continue to urge the nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm 
their commitments and unequivocal undertakings made at the previous Review Conferences 
to systematically and progressively eliminate their nuclear arsenals. As President Mbeki said 
just prior to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, "The situation should not be allowed to 
continue that the Nuclear Weapons States oblige everybody merely to focus on the issue of 
non-proliferation, while completely ignoring the demand of the overwhelming majority of 
humanity for the complete abolition of WMDs, an objective which our country has already 
achieved". This remains our primary focus as we enter the next review cycle of the NPT. 
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South Africa will also continue to work towards the universalisation of the Treaty by 
encouraging those that have not yet joined the NPT to do so without delay. 
 
India and South Africa’s strategic partnership may come under some strain because of the 
seemingly diametrically opposed viewpoints they hold on this issue. Evidence to suggest 
that this has been the case in the past, and as a result may be once again in the future, 
comes from President Nelson Mandela. At the 1998 12th summit of the Non-Aligned 
Movement held in Durban, it was reported by Frontline, a publication produced by the 
publishers of one of India’s premier newspapers, the Hindu that379: 
Although Mandela spoke only a few words on issues relating to nuclear proliferation, South 
Africa tried behind the scenes to push a critical statement on the proliferation scenario in 
South Asia in the wake of the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May. Mandela and his 
party, the African National Congress, have strong views on proliferation. South Africans said 
that Mandela felt let down when India conducted its tests and that he refrained from 
criticising the tests publicly because of the great respect he had for India. At the NAM 
conference, Mandela said "the critical question of nuclear disarmament" had to remain high 
on the list of NAM's priorities.  
 
However the Tshwane Declaration contains an important passage on this very issue, which 
as we know comes from a much later period380: 
President Mbeki and Prime Minister Singh reiterated the unwavering commitment of South 
Africa and India to the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in a 
comprehensive, universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable manner and expressed concern 
over the lack of progress in the realisation of that goal. They emphasised the necessity to 
start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons 
with a specified framework of time to eliminate nuclear weapons, to prohibit their 
development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and 
to provide for their destruction. 
 
Evidently then, despite India’s nuclear weapon status and South Africa’s heavily anti-nuclear 
weapons stance, the two may make progress on the issue, but only if South Africa continues 
to have faith in New Delhi’s policy of no-first-use. Even so, it seems like this is an aspect that 
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the partnership that both South Africa and India will try not to focus too closely on, because 
of the inescapable reality of their respective nuclear capabilities. 
Turning now to another area of possible tension; the issue of human rights. This may seem 
to be an area in which neither partner would be even remotely concerned about each other 
commitments to the cause of advancing human rights in the world. Their common histories 
are almost entirely composed of a human rights based approach to the struggle for 
independence from foreign rule, or freedom from racial oppression.  Their shared history 
also abounds with examples of human right champions, in the form of Mahatma Gandhi, 
Jawaharlal Nehru and Nelson Mandela. In addition to this both partners welcomed the 
creation of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in 2006, and expressed positive feelings 
about it in the Tshwane Declaration.  They also served together on the UNHRC together 
throughout the period from 2006 to 2010, at which point their membership was passed on 
to alternative fellow UN member states381. 
Therefore they both possess substantial pro-human rights credentials and have actively 
worked together through the UNHRC towards promoting the concept of human right 
throughout the international system. This is why it seems almost completely 
uncharacteristic that they should have grounds to express concern over one another 
conduct with regard to human rights. Yet both partners have room to do so, despite what 
one might think. This of course does not mean that they have, nor that they will, but rather 
that the inherent moral and principled nature of the strategic partnership, as well as their 
individual stance on human rights at home, could see tensions emerge in future if the 
incidents this section describes start becoming a trend.  
South Africa’s potential for concern stems from various issues. These include India’s recent 
treatment of a prominent domestic human rights activist, Dr. Binayak Sen. According to 
CNN382: 
Sen and two others were found guilty of sedition and conspiracy in December for helping 
India's Maoist Naxalite movement, outlawed as terrorists and considered by the government 
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as India's greatest internal security threat. Sen, a pediatrician, had been working for three 
decades in the eastern state of Chhattisgarh, where he was considered a pioneer of public 
health in one of India's poorest areas. He gained international recognition as a human rights 
defender and won several accolades including the Jonathan Mann Award for Global Health 
and Human Rights. He was detained in 2007 for colluding with Maoist rebels and has been 
behind bars since then. Twenty-two Nobel laureates from around the world appealed for his 
release to the Indian authorities. The government said he had met Naxalite leader Narayan 
Sanyal in jail and that he had taken his passion for helping people a step too far by serving as 
a conduit between Naxals. 
 
He has since then been granted bail, and will be released from jail while he appeals his 
case383. This incident saw India come under international pressure and as far as many are 
concerned is a blight on India’s human rights record. 
South Africa could also take further exception to India’s conduct in an important region, 
much closer to home. One example of questionable conduct comes from India’s Oil and 
Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) decision in 2003, to purchase a 25% stake in Sudan’s 
Greater Nile Oil Project384. What makes this important, is not simply that India bought a 
stake in the oil industry of a heavily criticised and oppressive Africa state such a Sudan, but 
rather that one of the only reasons they were able to do this was because the Canadian firm 
who had attempted to negotiate on the stake before ONGC received it, Talisman Energy 
Inc., was forced to pull out of the deal due to intense pressure from Canadian human rights 
groups385. India therefore went in knowing full well that to do so would be at the very least, 
unethical. 
This is why many analysts are beginning to recognise that there are substantial shifts being 
made within India’s foreign policy and its energy security policy.  “There is now far less 
emphasis placed on non-alignment principals and on an ‘ethical’ foreign policy and far more 
on narrowly defined national interests”386.   
That of course does not mean that South Africa was not at fault either. India had a clear 
opportunity to criticise South Africa on its handling of the crisis in Zimbabwe, particularly 
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during the Mbeki presidency. President Mbeki, during his time in office adopted a policy 
approach known as quiet diplomacy. Adelmann recalls the situation at the time387:  
Despite, and because of, the apparent failure of their own response to the crisis, the 
Western world increasingly turned their attention to South Africa. As the direct neighbour, 
regional leader and Zimbabwe's major trading partner, it was strongly felt that South African 
peer pressure was the key to the crisis. But unlike the Western world, South Africa's 
President Thabo Mbeki has not applied sanctions against Zimbabwe, but has instead chosen 
a strategy of quiet diplomacy and constructive engagement. In Europe and South Africa, this 
approach soon attracted high attention and widespread criticism. On the one hand, 
international leaders such as George W. Bush and Gerhard Schroeder appreciated (during 
their visits to South Africa) Mbeki's quiet diplomacy, because it kept open a channel of 
communication between Mugabe and the outside world. On the other hand, the policy was 
criticised as being too soft on Mugabe and inconsistent with Mbeki's own democratic ideals. 
 
India therefore would have been perfectly able to criticise South Africa’s handling of the 
process at the time. 
Therefore the real issue here is more about pragmatic foreign policy approaches. India’s as 
we have seen is increasingly turning towards this way of perusing its foreign policy goals, by 
defining its action more and more through its national interest. South Africa on the other 
hand claims it desires to adopt a pragmatic and flexible foreign policy388. So would this shift 
in foreign policy styles and agendas, as we have witnessed above through the above 
practical examples relating to human rights which is a fundamental ideological position both 
partners are supposed to support, going to draw them together or push them apart in the 
future? Time alone will reveal if values and their expression through the lens of foreign 
policy would be sufficient to create noticeable tensions within a strategic partnership, 
where both parties are used to such close cooperation and enjoy so many positive benefits 
from their overall engagement. 
The final issue which will be looked at before moving on to the analytical component in the 
following chapter is that of something which may develop into a possible tension, but has 
yet to do so.  
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This issue is derived from the fact that we have said all along how India is so much larger 
and more powerful that South Africa in nearly every sphere imaginable, including those of 
the economic strength, military prowess and political clout. However what we have not 
done is assess the extent to which this may become the biggest division of all. Some believe 
there is a real danger that India may leave South Africa behind. 
As India continues to grow in importance across the board, and gains newfound respect for 
its opinions and aspirations, it is possible that India will come to so outshine South Africa 
that the smaller of the two strategic partners will become less relevant to the other. India is 
already making significant forays into Africa right behind China, establishing itself as a 
political force on the continent, which also possesses far more capital and potential for 
African nations than South Africa does. This may see India dealing with Africa on its own 
more and more, without having to worry about consulting with South Africa first. 
However the more realistic threat for the strategic partnership is that India will simply be 
too busy in its own region, and on the international stage, to pay much real attention to 
South Africa. This is not to suggest that the partnership would dissolve, but rather that India 
could possibly start to neglect it while its attention is focused elsewhere. Therefore if it 
should occur it would most likely be as a result of practical considerations, and not through 
malicious actions. 
One must not forget India is now forging close strategic partnerships with both the United 
States, the world’s sole superpower, and The People’s Republic of China, the world’s second 
largest economy. Therefore balancing relations with the world’s two most significant 
nations, one of whom India has had somewhat distant historical relations with, which will 
require additional effort, means India will be focusing the bulk of its activity and attention 
on matters other than its strategic partnership with South Africa. This seems even more 
likely when one attempts to construct a rough cost-benefit analysis between the benefits 
derived from its strategic partnerships with America and China, in comparison to its 
strategic partnership with South Africa. The amount of effort and capital it would have to 
put in to expand its relationship with South Africa to achieve anywhere near the existing 
benefits India receives from China and the U.S., is nothing short of monumental. The 
political benefits of ongoing ties with South Africa are also far less prominent that one might 
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expect as South Africa is rapidly being dwarfed by not only India itself, but other developing 
nations such as China who has a UN Security Council seat already, and other nations like 
Brazil who are closely following behind as leaders within the global South-South framework.  
That said, the partnership is still on solid ground, and the bonds between the two are highly 
significant to both partners. It is on the back of this future possibility that we now turn to 
the final chapter, which will begin a holistic evaluation of the strategic partnership and its 
future direction. 
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Chapter 4 
 
4. Assessing the Strategic Partnership 
 
The best way to begin this chapter which deals with the task of assessing the strategic 
partnership and its long term prospects is to make reference to the statements which 
Mansingh uses to open her discussion on the Indio-US strategic partnership. They are as 
follows389: 
Phrases such as 'strategic partner-ship', 'strategic relations', 'strategic dialogue', trip off the 
tongue these days so easily as to deprive them of significance. One or the other of these 
fashionable phrases is used to describe diverse relationships, as between India and Iran, 
India and the European Union (EU), India and China, the United States (US) and Russia, the 
US and Uzbekistan, and most recently, the US and India. The common thread appears to be 
one of intent rather than of content. Two governments agree to raise the level of their 
regular interactions to embrace levels from the lowest to the highest, to deal with the great 
variety of issues that concern each of them in a cordial and holistic manner seeking 
cooperation or understanding, and to make long-term commitments for mutual benefit and 
furthering their respective goals, but do not enter into alliance. The substance of any 
strategic relationship, and its possible transformation from 'dialogue' to 'partnership', 
however, depends on the depth and span of interactions, the actual congruence of interests 
and objectives, and the amount of effort each party consistently devotes to accommodating 
the other's concerns and winning support for its own positions. 
 
Evidently Mansingh has grasped the difficult nature of the task, and has struck right to the 
very heart of understanding how to asses any ‘strategic partnership’. His insight that it takes 
more than simply signing an agreement to elevate relations to the strategic level, 
demonstrates a brilliant understanding of the fundamental problem of assessing strategic 
partnerships. 
 
This is that they are a product of political processes, and as such there is a tendency to 
forget that a strategic partnership can make significantly bold claims and commit to any 
course of action on paper, but when it comes to reality, it is actions that count. Substance is 
one thing, but results are quite another.  
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The critical issue here then is, determining to what extent the strategic partnership is a 
partnership of substance, rather than simply being a way to pay homage to South Africa and 
India’s common history. Unfortunately when examining the text of the Red Fort and 
Tshwane Declarations which established and then reaffirmed the strategic partnership 
between India and South Africa, the outlook appears grim.  
 
Both documents contain language which is filled with allusions to the significant potential 
that exists for cooperation, and even sometimes goes so far as to list several areas of mutual 
understanding where the partners commit themselves to action. However what they both 
tend to do more often than not is lack specificity. The Red Fort Declaration was signed early 
on in the bilateral relationship between the two, and as both states were still emerging into 
a rapidly changing world, it is perhaps understandable that it contains few specific issues or 
proposals as to how the areas identified should best be approached by their collective 
efforts. 
 
However the Tshwane Declaration was signed at a time of relative stability and prosperity in 
the International system. India was well on its way to establishing itself as a leading 
international actor with its phenomenal economic growth, its military prowess and its 
substantial voice on global issues. South Africa too had enjoyed remarkable domestic 
stability, moderate economic growth and some success in the international arena, such as 
seeing the launch of NEPAD and being a leading figure in the African Union.  As such neither 
party to the strategic partnership was politically naive, and as such both had begun to assert 
themselves throughout their respective spheres of influence.  
 
It comes as somewhat of a surprise then that the Tshwane Declaration in 2006 contained so 
much vague language and terminology. It was definitely a more comprehensive and detailed 
document than the Red Fort declaration, but it had failed to push beyond the boundaries of 
the hollow diplomatic language it was written in. It provides large amounts of detail, but 
little in the way of specifics and even less in the way of a recognisable plan of action for the 
foreseeable future.  
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For example, take this passage from the Tshwane Declaration which appears early on in the 
document390: 
Conscious of the need to make the partnership more result-oriented and of greater direct 
benefit to the peoples of South Africa and India, President Mbeki and Prime Minister Singh 
have today decided to intensify co-operation and committed themselves to raise the existing 
level of friendship and partnership between South Africa and India to even higher levels. 
 
Clearly the two heads of state are committed to the concept of a partnership, and even 
admit publicly that they desire cooperation to deepen, but do not give any real indication of 
how they will translate this desire into reality. The following paragraph in the declaration 
makes any mention of neither what these higher levels of cooperation are, nor how they 
plan to reach them. However the language in the text of the Tshwane Declaration which 
illustrates this point the best is the following, which incidentally happens to be the final 
paragraph in the document391: 
In conclusion, President Mbeki and Prime Minister Singh reiterated their deep 
conviction that peace and development are indivisible and that good governance 
was the best-known way to ensure both. They emphasised that under-development 
could not be addressed in isolation, but that its eradication was a factor of numerous 
social and environmental influences, including education, health care, basic 
infrastructure and amenities, capacity building and skills enhancement, political 
participation at all levels, advancement of indigenous culture and social organisation 
and access to natural resources, clean water and air for all. They emphasised further 
that the right to freedom had an important economic dimension, as it embraced not 
only political freedom but also the freedom to lead a life with dignity, unfettered by 
domination and discrimination. They noted that the strategic partnership between 
South Africa and India was guided by the common vision of a global order marked by 
peace, security and equity. To tackle these multiple challenges, they reaffirmed their 
commitment to enhance their co-operation bilaterally as well as multilaterally, to 
build a better, safer and more prosperous world for present and succeeding 
generations. 
 
The fact then that none of the issues they raise here are given individual attention serves to 
reinforce the vague and even haphazard nature of the Declaration.  In order to really make 
these issues stand out there should have been an announcement following their 
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commitment to deal with under development through a simple gesture, such as announcing 
the formation of a body or instrument that would be responsible for implementing the 
commitment. For instance, the announcement of a presidential fund to promote education 
could have been included in order to make the issues far more immediate and would have 
served as a goodwill gesture to start the rest of the partnership off on a good note. 
 
It is somewhat of a shame then that the strategic partnership lacks apparent focus and 
direction. It in some ways tries to do too much. The Indo- US strategic partnership for 
instance is defined by military cooperation and India becoming a responsible nuclear 
weapons state. Therefore these two issues at a glance tell one exactly what their 
partnership is predicated on, and how they intend to take action in order to achieve its 
stated objectives. Where therefore is the South Africa and Indian’s strategic partnerships 
nuclear and military deals, or to be more specific, where are the defining issues which can 
galvanise the partnership? The language of the partnership should be improved to include 
far more specifics and tighter references to a handful of primary, and practical real world 
issues. 
 
However it can be pointed out that the Tshwane declaration does indeed contain specifics, 
at points, and that it is overly hasty to cast such doubts on the rigor of the partnerships legal 
basis. This is in fact true, and one specific area of cooperation which has to receive a 
mention is that of trade. Trade makes it into one of the only components of the document 
that not only sets a target for the parties to aim towards, but also specifies a timeframe in 
which the objectives of improving that aspect of the relationship are to be achieved by. This 
of course is referring to the call to treble trade volumes by 2010. Incidentally however the 
language of the document lets the process down here, yet again. If we pay close attention 
to the component which calls for the trebling of total trade392:  
 
They urged the private sectors of both countries to gain better awareness of each other's 
strengths and to set themselves ambitious targets. It should be possible at least to treble the 
volume of bilateral trade by 2010. 
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This is highly misleading at it leaves the responsibility of increasing economic ties between 
the partners in the hands of the private sector, and calls for ambitious targets but provides 
no indication of what they might be. Furthermore note how it mentions that, “It should be 
possible”, when calling for trade volumes to treble, this is not a very convincing statement 
either. In some ways it is implied that this desire to treble trade is obviously within the 
bounds of possibility and as such the trebling is not nearly as dramatic a target as it first 
sounds. 
 
This is because at the time of signing the agreement, if one recalls from chapter 3, the trade 
volume between the two economies was only R 16.3 billion393, and to improve on that 
volume across a three year period it should almost achieve a trebling organically, it is so low. 
Therefore we need now to examine the trade component of the strategic partnership in 
depth. The best place to start with this is where we left off in Chapter 3, which was where 
we were in the process of comparing the performance of two of South Africa’s trading 
partners against that of the performance of India’s and South Africa’s trade.   
 
Again if we recall in 2010 India’s trade volume with South Africa only reached R 42 billion, in 
comparison to China’s R 142.6 billion, and Japan’s R 77.3 billion. So this begs the question, 
why does a rising global power with a population of a billion plus individuals and a trillion 
dollar economy only manage R 42 billion worth of trade with South Africa. The answer to 
this lies partly with the continued failure of South Africa and India to negotiate either their 
Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), or the follow on from that, a Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA), and partially with the diversity or the mix of goods and services they export and 
import between one another.   
The most important point here is that in spite of a strategic partnership which has been in 
existence for 14 years, South Africa and India have failed to make progress on the economic 
side of the partnership, which as we once again recall form the previous chapter is the most 
significant portion of all contemporary strategic partnerships. It could be fair to ask why any 
state would bother engaging in a strategic partnership in the current global climate if not for 
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one of two reasons; there are clear economic or political gains to be had. Military 
cooperation is still relevant but in increasingly limited situations, and in many ways military 
cooperation between strategic partners is becoming part of the wider commercial 
consideration rather than the defensive ones.    
 
To deal first with the trade agreements it is necessary to explore India’s trade policy, as it is 
this which has largely prevented concrete progress on either the PTA or the FTA from 
emerging.  First however the background to these trade agreements has to be outlined. 
South Africa began trade talks with India as far back as 2001, and managed from here to 
sign a framework agreement in 2002394. However progress from here was not forthcoming, 
and when the time finally came to negotiate the trade agreement, South Africa’s trading 
partners from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) expressed a strong desire to be 
included in the negotiations395.  In June 2004 SACU trade ministers agreed to open 
negotiations with India, and it is from this point on that very little progress has been made 
on drafting an actual agreement396. 
 
The agreement itself is separated into two stages, the first stage will compromise a PTA 
which covered trade in goods and the second stage would be the FTA which covers a 
broader agenda397. However one must be aware that even though these agreements stand 
to benefit both the SACU nations and India, they will not generate substantive gains for 
either. This is because even though market-access related opportunities for exporters in 
both regions do exist, SACU and India are not natural trading partners398. This already would 
indicate that India is in-fact not that serious about the commercial benefits from the 
negotiation of a trade agreement with SACU, and that the entire arrangement is mostly a 
politically motivated one.   
 
Alves reinforces this notion by revealing that for India, the point of the trade agreements is 
not to secure preferential market access, but rather to use them as a tactic which will in 
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essence, ‘buy’ India support in other arenas. It is the political implications of these 
agreements which are truly valuable to India. This is because it helps India foster 
cooperation in the trading arena. What this does then is translate existing cooperation on 
trade issues into a natural affinity within the multilateral trading arena, effectively allowing 
India to cement alliances with a number of developing countries at the WTO.  India 
recognises that as a still highly protected economy, it will have to make large concessions in 
multilateral trading negotiations. However bi-lateral trade negotiations with smaller 
partners do not pose these types of risks, as the concessions India will have to make in the 
grand scheme of things are limited in comparison to the concessions it will have to make 
with major trading nations such as the U.S., Europe or Japan399.   
 
South Africa likewise has been aware from around 2000 when it first began negotiating 
trade deals with India that India as both a strategic partner and a South Asian economic 
dynamo would be able to produce significant levels of economic growth400. Therefore South 
Africa attempted to get involved with India in trading terms because as India’s high tariffs 
fell gradually over time, it would have already established a successful track record with 
India and then would be able to exploit this history to its advantage401.  
 
Ultimately this thinking did not pay off for either side, as the PTA and the FTA are still yet to 
emerge. India managed to secure the necessary alliances at the WTO through alternative 
means, such as its strategic partnership with South Africa which meant it could hold off on 
making trade concessions as the two nations would support each other anyway, and 
because it found additional trade deals much closer to home in the ASEAN region far more 
helpful in this regard. This is why it was during president Zuma’s recent visit to India that it 
was announced that the agreement was on track once again and would be ‘wrapped up’ as 
soon as possible402.  
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If we look at the issue of investment next we see that unlike trade, there has been some 
significant success in this area. However it still begs the question as to how much of this 
success is as a result of government policy and cooperation through the strategic 
partnership, and how much is down to private investor’s simply seeking opportunities 
abroad. This forms another area in which solid economic benefits are open to India, yet it 
fails to grasp them due to its protectionist measure which it uses to shield its domestic 
economy from foreign competitors. Once again it demonstrates that the strategic 
partnership itself is of little use in producing this outcome. 
 Additional research would have to be done to determine if investment inflows were directly 
attributable to government policy and coordinated efforts through the partnership or simply 
as a result of South Africa’s relative openness. It begs questioning how much of the 
investment success has been attributable to the CEO’s forum, which although has state 
backing, is a grouping of private individuals who facilitated investment on their own terms.  
In addition if we recall the ‘India Desk’ established by Price Waterhouse Coopers, which acts 
as a sort of clearing house for foreign investors, facilitating actual specific investments far 
more readily than undoubtedly any measures taken by the governments of India and South 
Africa.  Once again, it would appear that there is a distinct possibility that the apparent 
achievements the partnership has produced are not necessarily attributable to the 
partnership itself. It seems that the strategic partnership is not living up to its full potential. 
Undoubtedly however South Africa stands to gain far more from the strategic partnership. It 
is interestingly always going to be a partnership not of equals, but of Indian dominance. 
South Africa could never hope to compete with the sheer size of India’s highly educated 
population, and incredible growth rates. However it does not necessarily have to. Should 
South Africa continue to maintain the strategic partnership as is, it would most definitely 
not damage South Africa’s future prospects or international standing. The only advisory 
note though would have to be that South Africa would need to remain conscious of its own 
limitations and what is realistically achievable.  
 
Therefore it is quite obvious from the apparent lack of results on several fronts that neither 
partner is particularly concerned with altering the status quo. It would appear that both 
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partners recognise that they face significant domestic challenges, as we witnessed in 
chapter two. India inevitably will be concerned with first dealing with its reducing poverty 
and maintaining its current growth path, while also working towards maintaining its security 
and projecting itself within its immediate region. South Africa on the other hand has the 
issue of Zimbabwe to deal with, along with migration, crime, unemployment and 
maintaining its leading role in Africa.    
 
If these factors are taken into consideration, and the notion that the partnership is more 
and more a political construct and not designed with any specific benefits in mind, but 
rather serves as a diplomatic and status multiplier, then there is no reason why it should not 
be used as such. The political bias within the strategic partnership serves both partners well. 
It enhances their South-South profile, provides them with a type of diplomatic safety net 
which is always there in the back ground should it be needed. This in turn frees up resources 
and time, allowing India to concentrate on more important issues and its other strategic 
partnerships with the United States and China, while South Africa can continue its work with 
NEPAD and derive the tangible benefits of a strategic partnership from the one it enjoys 
with Beijing. 
 
The future direction therefore is likely to be one of closer ties, but ties which maintain 
consistency with what we have already seen. There should be no radical departure from the 
levels of cooperation we have seen so far, not unless there is a change in attitude, 
particularly on India’s end. South Africa would arguably seek more meaningful engagement 
but Delhi will most likely be concentrating on alternative options, from the ASEAN region 
and its main international partners, or with challenges such as dealing with a growing 
Islamic militancy and security threat from Pakistan. In many ways therefore South Africa is 
just too small to entice New Delhi into making the type of effort South Africa would like to 
see. 
 
However that remains the extent to which the cooperation we have seen within the 
partnership is likely to progress in the future.  What remains then is the direction in which it 
will go. Perhaps the most important direction will be that of coming together to deal with 
climate change. Climate change is a distinctly political issue, and falls right in the ambit of 
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the strategic partnerships established norms, and practises, which as we have seen are 
closely centred on South-South cooperation. Climate change is one of the most potent 
issues at the moment within the international system which is serving to unite the 
developing ‘South’ against the developed ‘North’. It is also something which is surprisingly 
not given any mention within the Tshwane Declaration. 
 
Masters explains the South African approach to climate change403: 
 
South Arica’s response to the issue remains unequivocally linked to the idea of sustainable 
development. Derived from the 1987 Brundtland Report, this concept is defined as 
‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs’. 
 
India arguably will share similar views on the issue, as it is constantly aware of the challenge 
of meeting the infrastructural and energy needs of its growing population.  It will also be an 
area of international cooperation which will be, and is already becoming an inescapable part 
of global governance. It is the perfect issue around which India and South Africa can focus 
their efforts by building on their existing cooperative base. In doing so they will be able to 
ensure they make reasonable concessions on emissions targets and improve their ability to 
jointly compel developed nations to make bigger concessions on theirs. 
 
There is also an additional arena in which India and South Africa are likely to work closer 
together in the near future. This is within Africa. The strategic partnership, with its history of 
collaborative effort in multilateral institutions will most likely play a decisive role in guiding 
joint efforts within Africa. India has begun to assert itself in the region, somewhat behind 
China, but it is doing so none the less. The pre-existing strategic partnership and India’s 
democratic nature will enable close cooperation on issues which arise in South Africa’s 
region, which it has ever since 1994, taken a special interest in. Mbeki’s African renaissance 
established South Africa as being a nation which held the interests of Africa close to heart, 
and now instead of feeling threatened by the presence of a significant player in its backyard, 
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India and South Africa will be able to work together in Africa, offering each other mutual 
support and capabilities they would not otherwise posses if they went it alone.  
 
Sidiropoulos provides a perfect summation of the situation that confronts the two 
nations404:  
India and South Africa are both competitors and potential partners; they are developing 
countries playing a leadership role in the South, but in fact also display substantial 
differences in interests compared with other, smaller developing countries, for example in 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) or climate change negotiations. Their engagement in 
Africa can be explained as much by the shifts in global power and realpolitik as by their 
desire to be seen to be playing a positive developmental role, exerting influence and 
shouldering global responsibilities – which many in the United States and elsewhere in the 
North regard as an essential criterion for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. 
 
She goes on to remark that405: 
For cooperation to occur there needs to be an element of trust and underlying commonality 
of values and interests. Both India and South Africa would agree that since the resumption 
of relations in 1993 the political and economic potential of their relationship has not been 
fully realized. This is partly because of capacity constraints on both sides, as well as a lack of 
clarity or misunderstanding on where each country sits on certain issues, and the fact that, 
for all the rhetoric about South-South cooperation, they are potential rivals or competitors, 
especially on the African continent. While cooperation may well be possible in certain areas, 
therefore, in others it may be too politically sensitive for them to be perceived to be working 
together. 
 
These revelations however do not by any means preclude the possibility of cooperation, 
particularly within Africa. Their rivalry in many ways could serve as a driving force behind 
greater efforts to engage with one another on the continent. If the partners are able to find 
common ground, this does not have to become a decisive issue, what remains to be seen 
then is whether or not they will be able to do so. 
 
Therefore the future direction of the partnership and the questions surrounding the 
possibility that the benefits it is able to provide either partner have been maximised and 
there is not much more that can be done, are proving to be false. There is plenty more for 
the strategic partnership to come to grips with, it just depends on the extent to which both 
sides are prepared to commit themselves to this shared endeavour. 
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Overall therefore one gets the distinct impression that despite their best efforts India and 
South Africa’s strategic partnership is in reality akin to an elaborate exercise which simply 
serves to pay homage to their shared ideals, rather than to the concerns of global realpoitik. 
 
In spite of this however the strategic partnership will inevitably continue to progress 
forward, as it appears that both partners rely on one another for their mutual support and 
the fact that they offer each other a sounding board for their efforts. Provided therefore 
that the domestic challenges and possible tensions which were covered in the previous 
chapters are maintained at acceptable levels, there is no reason why the strategic 
partnership should not continue on as before, or even grow to new heights if the required 
political will and the right mix of issues present themselves . 
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Appendix 1: 
 
South Africa in Figures 
 
 Total land area: 1.2-million square kilometres406.  
 Population (2010 Mid-Year Estimate): 49 991 30407. 
 Gross Domestic Product (2010):  US$ 354.414 Billion408. 
 Per Capita Income (2010):  US$ 7,100.81409.   
 Ease of Doing Business Ranking (2011): 34 out of 183410. 
 Income Gini Coefficient (2000-2010): 57.8411. 
 Human Development Index Ranking (2010): 110 out of 169 countries412. 
 Percentage of Population at risk of Multidimensional Poverty (2000-2008): 3.9 %413.  
 Gender Inequality Index Ranking (2008): 82 out of 138 countries414. 
 Life Expectancy at Birth: 53.3 Years (Males), and 55.2 Years (Females), as of 2010415. 
 Infant Mortality Rate (2010): 46.9 per 1 000 live births416. 
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Appendix 2: 
 
India in Figures 
 
 Total Land Area: 3.3-million square kilometres417. 
 Population (2001): 1,028 million418, the next census is set for 2011. 
 Gross Domestic Product (2010): US$ 1,430.02 Billion419. 
 Per Capita Income (2010): US$ 1,176.06420.  
 Ease Of Doing Business Ranking (2011):  134 out of 183421. 
 Income Gini Coefficient (2000-2010): 36.8422. 
 Human Development Index Ranking (2010): 119 out of 169 countries423. 
 Percentage of Population at risk of Multidimensional Poverty (2000-2008): 16.1 %424. 
 Gender inequality Index Ranking (2008): 122 out of 138 countries425. 
 Life Expectancy at Birth: 63.9 years (Males), and 66.9 years (Females), as of 2005426. 
 Infant Mortality Rate (2010): 53 per 1000 live births427. 
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Appendix 3: 
The Red Fort Declaration On A Strategic Partnership Between South Africa And India, 
March 1997428. 
 Gathered at the historic Red Fort in the fiftieth year of India's independence and with 
the emergence of a new South Africa, South Africa and India look ahead with faith and 
optimism to journeying together towards the larger goals of their political freedoms: 
economic development and social justice. As a new millennium draws near, they also 
pledge to work for a global order that is marked by peace, security and equity. 
 In the knowledge that their shared mass struggles began with initiatives against racial 
discrimination launched in South Africa by Mahatma Gandhi, the two countries look 
back with pride and gratefulness at their creative partnership through decades of 
struggle. They rededicate themselves to the ideals and vision of the Mahatma which 
have inspired them and which are powerfully symbolised by their common commitment 
to the preservation of the Gandhi heritage sites in South Africa, Phoenix Settlement and 
Tolstoy Farm. 
 Recalling the spirit of the Asian Relations Conference held at the Red Fort fifty years ago 
and the Asian-African Nations' Conference held at Bandung in 1955, South Africa and 
India reaffirm their commitment to the goal of universal human freedom and equality 
among nations. 
 Convinced of the need to retrieve their historical ties in fulfilment of an Afro-Asian 
destiny, they resolve to coordinate efforts to make the Indian Ocean Rim Association for 
Regional Cooperation an instrument of substantive economic partnership towards the 
development of a regional identity. 
 India appreciates the role being played by South Africa within the Southern African 
Development Community with the sensitivity to political and economic imperatives that 
such a role calls for. South Africa welcomes India's recent initiatives to promote 
friendship and good-neighbourliness in the South Asian region. 
 Reiterating their respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, South Africa and India agree to mutually consult on matters relating to regional 
and global security and to support each other's efforts to promote good-neighbourliness 
and cooperation in their respective regions. In particular, they reaffirm their adherence 
to the bilateral Treaty on the Principles of Inter-State Relations of January 1995. 
 The economies of South Africa and India have certain comparative advantages, 
complementarities and resources which can be optimally used to promote economic 
development through cooperation. For example, India has valuable skills, technologies 
and experiences in the fields of small and medium enterprises development and 
employment generation programmes; South Africa has skills and technology in the fields 
of mining and infrastructure development. 
 South Africa and India recall with satisfaction the healthy growth in their bilateral 
relations in the political, economic, defence, scientific, technological and cultural 
spheres, constituting a firm basis for the launch of a concrete and mutually beneficial 
programme of cooperation in the twenty first century. They recognise South Africa's 
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geostrategic location as a trans-shipment point between Asia, Africa and Latin America 
in the development of South-South relations. 
 Concerned at the uneven impact of globalisation on developing economies, South Africa 
and India are convinced that the success and sustainability of the globalisation process 
depends on its ability to bring equal benefits to developing countries. They agree to 
consult and collaborate with one another in forums such as the United Nations and the 
World Trade Organisation and to make full use of their partnership within the Non-
aligned Movement to articulate this concern. They also agree to coordinate their efforts 
in their mutual endeavour to capture the new opportunities for South--South 
cooperation and to help build capacities among the Least Developed Countries. 
 Convinced that the United Nations' structures need to be more representative of the 
concerns and diversities of the developing world, South Africa and India re-emphasize 
their belief in the need for UN reforms. They stress, in particular, the need for an 
equitable balance in the composition of an expanded Security Council to provide a 
constructive voice to the aspirations of the developing countries. They believe that 
piecemeal and discriminatory approaches to such expansion will be inconsistent with 
the objectives of that world body. 
 Recognizing that the end of the bi-polar world has re-defined global equations, South 
Africa and India reaffirm their belief in the vitality and crucial importance of the Non-
aligned Movement as a vehicle for safeguarding the independence of thought and 
autonomy of action of its members-, as an instrument for extending the principles of 
democracy and freedom in international affairs; in promoting the objective of a world 
free of nuclear weapons; and as a mechanism for furthering the impulse for an equal 
world. South Africa and India therefore resolve to work for NAM's increasing 
effectiveness in the promotion of political and socio-economic justice and disarmament. 
They do so because they believe that peace, freedom and prosperity are, each one of 
them, equally indivisible. 
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Appendix 4: 
The Tshwane Declaration on Reaffirming the Strategic Partnership between South Africa 
and India, 02 October 2006429. 
1. In commemorating the centenary of the launch of Satyagraha, and in the spirit of the 
strategic partnership that was established during the historic visit of South Africa's first 
democratically elected President, Nelson R Mandela to India in March 1997 and carried 
further by the visit to India by President TM Mbeki in October 2003 and the visit to South 
Africa by President APJ Abdul Kalam in September 2004, South Africa and India reaffirm 
their commitment to a global order of peace, equality and justice. 
2. President Thabo Mbeki and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh paid tribute to the global 
role played by Mahatma Gandhi through the implementation of the principles of truth, non-
violence and self-sacrifice, as enshrined in the philosophy of Satyagraha. Gandhi's influence 
was felt throughout the world and inspired numerous leaders and renowned personalities 
like Martin Luther King, Albert Luthuli, Oliver Tambo, Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu. It 
was the unflinching spirit of Mahatma Gandhi that contributed decisively towards the 
demise of the British Raj; similarly it inspired the struggle against apartheid, particularly 
during the Defiance Campaign. Above all, it was the strong message of non-violence 
contained in Gandhi's Satyagraha that helped to bring about a peaceful transformation in 
South Africa and the realisation of truth and reconciliation between the destructive human 
divisions that had been spawned by apartheid. 
3. In sharing the fundamental values espoused by Mahatma Gandhi, President Mbeki and 
Prime Minister Singh stress their continued and unfaltering belief in the peaceful resolution 
of disputes and the recognition of the rights of nations to self-determination and freedom. 
4. President Mbeki and Prime Minister Singh express their belief that South Africa and India 
draw their strength and inspiration from the diverse, multi-cultural societies constituting 
their respective nations; and that the best assurance for continued peace and prosperity lies 
in the adherence to democratic governance that is rooted in the respect for human dignity 
and the fundamental rights of all people, as laid down in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
5. The two national leaders furthermore reaffirmed their belief in the growing partnership 
with the signing of the following bilateral agreements/MOUs: 
 Co-operation in the Field of Education 
 MOU between Spoornet and Railways 
They furthermore noted that the following agreements will be signed imminently, once the 
regulatory procedures have been completed: 
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 Exemption of Visa Requirements for Holders of Diplomatic and Official Passports 
 Programme of Co-operation in Science and Technology. 
6. Conscious of the need to make the partnership more result-oriented and of greater direct 
benefit to the peoples of South Africa and India, President Mbeki and Prime Minister Singh 
have today decided to intensify co-operation and committed themselves to raise the 
existing level of friendship and partnership between South Africa and India to even higher 
levels. 
7. Both leaders noted that the political interaction between India and South Africa, marked 
by an exceptional degree of understanding, mutual trust and confidence, had gathered 
further momentum and substance. The number of Ministerial visits exchanged had 
increased significantly since the milestone visit of President Mbeki to India in 2003. They 
expressed their satisfaction at the continued and steady consolidation of bilateral relations. 
Besides the deep political bond that was first forged more than a century ago, the 
partnership now extends to the economic, human resources development, public 
administration and governance, urban and rural settlement, health, defence, cultural and 
science and technology fields. 
8.1 Recalling that the Red Fort Declaration had recognised that the economies of South 
Africa and India have certain comparative advantages, complementarities and resources 
which can be exploited to mutual benefit through trade, investment and transfer of 
technology, they noted with satisfaction the progress that had taken place in these areas, 
resulting in more than doubling of the total bilateral trade since 2003 and a significant 
increase in investments in both directions. They acknowledged, however, that the full 
potential in this regard was yet to be tapped and reaffirmed their determination to explore 
these opportunities to their optimal extent, particularly in the following priority sectors: 
energy, tourism, health, automobiles and auto components, chemicals, dyes, textiles, 
fertilisers, information technology, small and medium enterprises and infrastructure. 
8.2 They urged the private sectors of both countries to gain better awareness of each 
other's strengths and to set themselves ambitious targets. It should be possible at least to 
treble the volume of bilateral trade by 2010. In this context, they welcomed the scheduled 
third meeting of the India-South Africa CEOs' Forum in Johannesburg on 2 October 2006, 
which would contribute towards this goal. 
9.1 Recognising the major priority attached to the health sector in both countries, they 
agreed that the Agreement on Co-operation in Health and Medicine should be implemented 
expeditiously. 
9.2 Further, South African and Indian companies providing health services, including 
diagnostics and medical care, would be encouraged to work jointly to provide affordable 
health care to nationals of both countries as well as in third countries. 
10. Recalling the important Agreements, which were signed in October 2003 to promote co-
operation in the fields of hydrocarbons, electricity and power, they agreed that these should 
be implemented at the earliest. 
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11. They noted the progress made in bilateral defence co-operation as reflected in the 
report of the India-South Africa Defence Committee, which met in June 2006 in Pretoria. 
They agreed that South Africa and India should work towards closer co-operation in the 
defence sector, including the possibility of joint research and development. Furthermore, 
the South African Government expressed appreciation for the training provided by India on 
UN Peacekeeping and operations of modern submarines. 
12.1 Lauding the efforts of the South African Government for promoting broad-based 
economic and social development through the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of 
South Africa (ASGISA) and the Joint Priority Skills Acquisition Initiative (JIPSA), Prime 
Minister Singh reaffirmed that the Indian Government was ready to be a partner in these 
initiatives and to provide assistance in building up scarce and critical skills identified by the 
South African Government. 
12.2 President Mbeki welcomed the growing co-operation within the framework of the 
Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme and Prime Minister Singh's 
indication that India would increase the number of ITEC slots allocated to South Africa from 
55 to 100, with 50 of these slots earmarked specifically for the JIPSA Initiative. 
12.3 Noting with satisfaction that the visit of the Deputy President of South Africa to India 
from 9 to 13 September 2006 had helped identify further avenues through which India 
could contribute to ASGISA and JIPSA, the two leaders decided that a Programme of Co-
operation addressing growth and skills would be drawn up by designated co-ordinators from 
both sides. 
12.4 To identify means of co-operation in capacity building and skills enhancement in the 
key ICT sector, they requested the Working Group set up under the MOU on Information & 
Communication Technologies to convene as a matter of priority. 
13. They expressed satisfaction at the increasing cultural exchanges between the two 
countries and decided that the Cultural Exchange Programme, which expires in 2006, would 
be renewed; and that academic exchanges between the two countries, particularly through 
University-to-University linkages, would be promoted. 
14. President Mbeki and Prime Minister Singh expressed their satisfaction on the opening of 
the South Africa Tourism office in Mumbai in 2005 and reaffirmed their belief that increased 
tourism would not only bring commercial benefits to both countries, but also enhance the 
warm people-to-people relations between South Africa and India. In this context, they 
welcomed the imminent opening of an office of the International Marketing Council (IMC) 
of South Africa in Mumbai. 
15. In the critically important field of Science and Technology, President Mbeki and Prime 
Minister Singh agreed that a more extensive and active network between relevant 
institutions of the two countries would be promoted by the concerned Departments. 
They noted that President Abdul Kalam had delivered the second Philip Tobias Lecture at 
the invitation of President Mbeki and had called for greater co-operation between scientists 
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of South Africa and India in meeting the challenges of development, including in partnership 
in the Pan African e-Network and the World Knowledge Platform. 
16. In addressing wider areas beyond the bilateral realm, the two leaders agreed that every 
effort would be made to conclude the India-Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
Preferential Trade Agreement as soon as possible since it would provide a significant 
incentive to the business communities of the two countries to explore mutually beneficial 
commercial opportunities and contribute to the growth in bilateral trade. 
17. President Mbeki and Prime Minister Singh welcomed the launching of the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC)-India Forum in the Republic of Namibia on 28 April 
2006 to promote technical co-operation between SADC and the Government of India in all 
fields of economic activity with the empowerment of the people in the SADC region and in 
India as a key priority. 
18. The two leaders agreed that the consolidation of the African Union (AU) held the key to 
the development of the continent. South Africa welcomed India's willingness to support the 
objectives of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the AU's primary 
programme aimed at consolidating the African agenda. 
19. The two leaders expressed satisfaction at the outcome of the first IBSA Summit held in 
Brasilia on September 12, 2006. They welcomed the emergence of IBSA as an effective 
instrument for promoting ever-closer co-ordination on global issues between these three 
influential and diverse democracies of Africa, Asia and South America. Both sides also 
agreed to intensify consultations and co-operation at multilateral forums such as NAM, 
Commonwealth, G-77, G-20 and the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) with a 
view to jointly addressing global challenges. 
20. The two leaders shared the view that international economic relations continue to be 
characterised by inequities and inequalities with large sections of the world yet to reap the 
benefits of globalisation, which has led to economic crises and instability in several 
developing countries. The two leaders agreed that to be sustainable and successful, the 
globalisation process must address, not perpetuate or aggravate the existing inequalities. 
They, therefore, deeply regretted that the Doha Development Agenda negotiations had 
been suspended which had pitted the interests of corporate agriculture and large industrial 
enterprises of the developed countries against those of small and the vulnerable producers 
that predominate in developing countries. This constituted a grave setback to the 
development promises of the Round and a serious disappointment for developing countries. 
Failure to conclude the negotiations in accordance with the mandate will deprive 
developing countries of fair and equitable conditions for fully realising their comparative 
advantages across agriculture, industry, and services. Both leaders emphasised that 
substantial and effective reductions in all forms of trade-distorting domestic support 
provided by the major subsidisers is an unfinished agenda and must be secured to meet the 
agreed aim of establishment of a fair and market-oriented trading system in the global 
agricultural sector. 
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21.1 Convinced of the vital importance of the role of the United Nations in promoting world 
peace, stability and development, the two leaders welcomed the creation of the 
Peacebuilding Commission and the Human Rights Council, as well as the progress made in 
the areas of UN Secretariat and management reform. The leaders noted the importance of 
increased focus on development and the alleviation of poverty. 
21.2 They reaffirmed the need for a decision regarding the expansion of the Security 
Council, without which no reform of the United Nations would be complete. They reiterated 
their conviction that the Security Council must be expanded to include developing countries 
from Africa, Asia and Latin America in both its permanent and non-permanent categories, so 
as to reflect contemporary realities and make it more democratic and representative, and 
resolved to continue to pursue a decision in this regard. 
22. The two leaders expressed their deep concern over international terrorism, extremism, 
trans-border organised crime and illicit trafficking in humans and in arms and drugs. They 
viewed terrorism as a serious threat to sovereign states, international peace, security and 
development. They agreed that counter-terrorism efforts by the international community 
under the auspices of the United Nations should be global, comprehensive and in 
conformity with international law, human rights and humanitarian law. The ultimate 
objective is the total eradication of this scourge, so that barbaric attacks, such as the ones 
carried out on 11 July 2006 in Mumbai and other parts of the world, do not recur. To this 
end, South Africa and India would continue to work towards the early adoption of a 
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) in the UN General Assembly. 
23. President Mbeki and Prime Minister Singh reiterated the unwavering commitment of 
South Africa and India to the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in a 
comprehensive, universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable manner and expressed concern 
over the lack of progress in the realisation of that goal. They emphasised the necessity to 
start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons 
with a specified framework of time to eliminate nuclear weapons, to prohibit their 
development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and 
to provide for their destruction. 
24. They agreed that nuclear energy could play an important role in ensuring safe, 
sustainable and non-polluting sources of energy to meet the rising global demands of 
energy, particularly in developing countries. They reaffirmed the inalienable right of all 
States to the peaceful application of nuclear energy, consistent with their international legal 
obligations. They agreed to explore approaches to co-operation in the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy under appropriate IAEA safeguards. They further agreed that international 
civilian nuclear co-operation, under appropriate IAEA safeguards, amongst countries 
committed to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives could be enhanced 
through acceptable forward-looking approaches, consistent with their respective national 
and international obligations. 
25. In conclusion, President Mbeki and Prime Minister Singh reiterated their deep conviction 
that peace and development are indivisible and that good governance was the best-known 
way to ensure both. They emphasised that under-development could not be addressed in 
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isolation, but that its eradication was a factor of numerous social and environmental 
influences, including education, health care, basic infrastructure and amenities, capacity 
building and skills enhancement, political participation at all levels, advancement of 
indigenous culture and social organisation and access to natural resources, clean water and 
air for all. They emphasised further that the right to freedom had an important economic 
dimension, as it embraced not only political freedom but also the freedom to lead a life with 
dignity, unfettered by domination and discrimination. They noted that the strategic 
partnership between South Africa and India was guided by the common vision of a global 
order marked by peace, security and equity. To tackle these multiple challenges, they 
reaffirmed their commitment to enhance their co-operation bilaterally as well as 
multilaterally, to build a better, safer and more prosperous world for present and 
succeeding generations. 
 
(signed)..................................................................................(signed) 
President................................................................................President  
The Republic of South Africa.................................................The Republic of India 
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